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ABSTR\CT
This research thesis aims to add to the underst andLng
of industrial distribution systems and to develop our
ability to model such systems. The work is empirically
based, taking a particular distribution system, studying
it in depth and observing it durin3 a period of change
and reorganisction.
The thesis is also part of a wider resear9h pro~raffime
to investigate the problems of applying Operation Resea~ch
to decision making in unstabl~ environments. Change in
.: :-
distribution systems often provides good examples of this
form of decision making,and So~e tentative generalisationc
are drawn as a contribution to this wider programme.
£~pirical research into either distribution systems or
decision making in unstable environments poses the problem
of access. A characteristic of this form of decision
making is its informality, without the usual stress on
co~uittees and reports found with more formal lon3 range
plannin3. In order to ensure access to the real decision
making process the researcher became an indispensable part
of that process. The research method adopted· was of a
type since become known as the dual researcher/change
agent type. With this method the researcher had the two
responsibilities of solving the particular problem while
recording material as objectively as possible for research
analysis. Hence a subobjective of the research pro[,r..:tITilTIC
was a project to diagnose and cure a pr-obLern arising in
the distributive system under study.
To do this two models were developed. Firstly
a channel choice model vhich summarised the economic
variables of the distributive system. By exploiting a
particule.r structure inherent in the model, this could be
recast into a form similar to the classical transportation
algorithm. As the cost matrix was of a predominantly
block-diagonal form an extended application of the saddle-
point theorem allowed an efficient' dual decomposition
procedure to be developed.
The second model ·relied on attitudinal data, and
attempted to model merchanc'e behaviour in terms of how
they construed their role in the distributive system and
of the pressures placed upon them through the bargaining
relat LonsbLp,
These models were used in tandem, the first demon-
strating the ideal channel choice configuration from.the
manufacturer's point of view, the second showing what
could feasibly be achieved in spite of the power structure
maintain~d by the merchants.
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2This research thesis aims to add to thC"!understandin:;
of industrial distribution systems and to develop our ability
to rnod~l such systems. The work is empi~ically based, takiu3
a particular distribution system, studying it in depth and
observing it during a period of change and re-organisation.
The thesis is also part of a Hider research prog:;:-amme
to investigate the problems of applying Operational Research
to decision making in unstable environments. Change in
distributicn systems often provides good examples of thi~
form of decision making, and some tentatiVe gener:-alisations
are drawn as a contribution to this wider programme.
Elnpirical research into either distribution systems m-
decision making in unstable environments poses the probl~m
of a~c~ss. A characteristic of this form of decision making
is its informality, "Tithout the usua I stress on committees
and reports found with more formal long range planning. In
order to ensure access to the real decision making process
the researcher became an indispenaable part of that process.
The research method adopted was of a type since become known
as the dual researcher/change agent type. ~nth this method
the res~archer had the two respons~bilities of solving the
.particular problem while recording material as objectively
as possible for research analysis. Hence a sub-objective
of the research progremme was a project to diagnose and
cure a problem arising in the distribution system under
study.
Part I of the thesis is intended to be ~n extended
sumnaxy of tho rosf!'::'l.'ch programme and is best read as a
'Y]holein the order given to avoid minimum loss of cont:ir.-
uity~ rare 11 provides all. the detailed materi3l and can
be entered at any appropriate point if supportive evidence
to Part 1 BS required. The sequence of material in the t'Y~O
parts is roughly the same, and at the end of each section
of Part ! an indication is given to the relevant section
in Part 11.
As it is the intention to m~ke the results of the
research freely available and aD many of the personalities
involved are still working for the organisations studied,
it has been necessary to conceal names.
The bulk of the research, "",hlehincludes the. particular
project, was carried out between September 1967 and May 1970.
(~.
1• rrl'i!~; DJ t;;r.t~IL~I.::·i:I\?;.:'~ ~·i::.:r~·;:~'··;4
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a three-tier sy5t~m of manuf~cture~~ distributors and
merch-ints. Both distributors and merchants arc usually
" , "h' b .1nocpenacnt wUS1nS5GOS, Cl~S the le&sl owner of goods in
their possession. The firm delivered to national distrib-
utors who ~cre paid discc~ntG proporticn~l to their yccrly
trade. The distributors stocked g~ods and delivered to
local merchants. The merchants stocked goods and delivered
to users as required. Practically all combinations of by-
passing occurred, both by the manut actucer-s who delivered
direct to merchants and user.s and al~o by distributors
going straight to users. Neverthe1.ess this by-passing
never constituted more than 10% in any region and this
discussion here will focus primarily on the three-tier
system. The discount rate for merchants was naturally
higher the more trade they handled, but marginal discount
rates were decreasin3.' Brokerage was not a significant
factor.
User markers could. be fairly ,yell classified by
geographic~l position, pro~uct range::;and the order size::;
in which t!:leY,purchased., An unusual' and crucial aspect of
, .," ... ' '. '_ - ,_ ..
this syrtemwas the importance:of the stoc.~holding function
in allowing smaller orders to be assembled into,larger
of orde~ sizes on the manufacturers.
Engineered components were normally needed either i~
larger quantities for uGsembling into new mAchinery or in
smal.Lexamounts for replacement Ln exi.st h16 machines.
Some customers bought just replacement or production,
othexc fol.'both.
As frequently occurs with distribution channels, this
system had adapted to changes in the past by a series of
defensive manoeuvres, each making it a little more out of
step with economic reality. The =osts associated with
warehousing, maintaining a lorry fleet, promotion and office
costs had forced the merchant to press for increased disco,mts
from the manufacturer. The total market had been shrinking
steadily for a couple of years, and this combined with
pres3ure from their own organisations to reduce costs had
encouraged users to seek higher discounts, thus eroding the
merchants margins further. In order to cut costs, merchants
had begun to reduce the range of goods stocked and to cut
reorder quantities for the rest. This meant that even
though the total sales reaching the; firm had already dropped
by 2010 - 25%due to the economic recession experienced from
'.;_' <io. _.", : ' ••
1965 t? 1~67, ~n,t()pof this was the effect that a very'much
higher proportion. of sales came i.nthe form of small orders.
, . > "', ,__ -_.: • ':',.;' :.~-< ....~.
This in effect means that a 1ar5e proportion of orders (40% -
~ :
45%) did not cover the administrative costs of processing the
.,;." ":-':"( ,:,,_.- ~~ ...,~ ';;;4< .•,
order. Thus in the firm the clerical staff were working
_'1t:. -~.;_ " ',. ...., "':~'i"~· . '-", ,.,-.: .01- .-~,.
, ,i
harder than ever on orders that \-7c:ce still mak i.ng a net;
loss, while the stocks of standard products so~red fo~c1n3
the men on the bulk production m~chines onto short time
working. The non-standard and special items 'I.;hichvere
not stoc~ed were now being ordered in smaller quantities
increasing unproductive downtime on the shopfloor and
hence causLng et major backlog, on cus tomer s unfilied orders.
Because merchants were keeping lower stOCKS all round
they tended to place greater urgency on reorders. Thus
profitable rW1S on machines were interrupted for rush orders
again increasing costs. The increa~ing nmnber of small orders
to be processed caused serious delays in delivery causing
further loss of trade. Merchants, users and distributors
all extended credit to themselves by delaying payment on
goods received as long as possible. The firm could not do
likewise because of the low percentage of raw material cost
in the finished product. All this ~ime merchants had been
pressl.ng for 'informal'. discount increasE:s over and above
the published rates, using as leverage their influence with
customers •
. '.This sequence of events had placed the company in a
" ,~" - ;
serious financial position, having made a substantial net
loss for two consecutive years; the second one being
approximately £0.5 million on 8·turnover of £19.0 million.
They, as well as their competitors both required and
·anticipated some major reorganisation of the distr.ibutive
system. At that:time not only was there no general
7e.Gl:-c:em~;nt: :lU'lf);;gS'tthe senior 17'~~~,'1gementof the f i.rm on the
<\01-type of change l:cqu.iredbut a l.ao it ~,;ras~clear at t-;'hat 10'11'21
change e \·;r8re anticipated. Some people argued for t act Lcal,
changes such as a renli3nmcnt of discount structures at the
mer~hBnt level, whil~ others were just as seriously discu3siug
the need for. the establishment of a comp.ctcly new uistrlbu'd.'v0
system.
'I'herna i.noptions open to the firm centered round the '
purchase of one or more of the three major distributors, or
purchasing selected merchants in various :r.egicns.
Other options open were the establish~ent of their own
depots providing a brand new distribution channel, or part-
ownership of merchants, franchise~ dealership or agency
agreements, financial assistance for merchants to assist in
stockholding and the seriously considered option of offering
the entire marketing and distribution function to a sole
agency.
For more detailed discussion of the distributive system
reference should be made to section A.I and A.2. ~o= details
concerning the firm in the period immediate before the study,.
see section e.2 and for a longer term history of the firm,
I e.l.
, '
",'; Those involved in the distributive system felt that the
limit of piecemeal manoeuvring had been reached and that the
next major change would cause an avalanche of competitive
'.actions and reactions. '
8increases, combinerl with the fir~!s serious financial
situation, h&d made it clear to the senior mamangement
of the f i.rmthat change ,":rasimperative withi.n the dLst ri.b'-
uti \'0 system. This fact "pas also recognised by other
mc:mufacturers, merchants and distributors in the syotem,
In consequence a hypersensitive state had been a~hicvcd 1n
vh ich everyone knew that change was inevitable but ,,,,ere
un',villingto make the first move, fearing it would cause an
avalanche of competitive actions and reactions.
It was in this environment of cone Ldor-abl,einstability
that the firm, on corporate advice, requested assistance
from Operational Research. The project co~~enced in September
1967. The terms of reference originally concerned the choice
I
of which distributor, if any, to purchase, but were soon
widened to allow us to consider any restructing of the distrib-
ution system. The study reported directly to the Board and
the Managing Director.
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2. ()UTLln~~ OF' THE }/';OI\:mnC 1'·10i)~~L..--.....-......--__...--------.,.--- ....._.,..---~
Because of the wide variety of options open, an
economi.c model of the distributive system vas needed for
ma!'\~gcment to experiment "lith +he effects of possible
future policies. It would then be possible to compare
alternative options systematically in a wide ran8e of
possible future cost and sales environments.
For each product range the distribution of users'
orders and merchant's reorders were discretised, making
it possible to model the mer<;:hantt~stockholding policy
by a linear transfonnation. Then the merchant's discount
structure wa s approximated by a piecewise linear curve.
No entry restrictions were required on this curve because
of the convex monotonic increasin8 nature of the discc\mt
payment. The same procedure was used at the dist~ibutor
level leaving finally a large lin~ar·model. An application
of the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions enabled the model
to be cast into the 'transportation,'form having a block
diagonal structure apart from a block of complicatinz
constraints. Each of the diagonal blocks referred to a
geographical region and the. complicating constraints
\' . , ...,' : {'",' '. ~
reflected the fact that a merchant norrnally.serviced several
-,! -J .,'
demand regions •. A decomposition method based,on Takahashi
.~ • '~"''-,-_,~ ~.;?, '\." " 1.,.,,_ \_ ",~ ~ ,
wa~ de~el.o,~e~,whereby the dual master. problem was approximated
by a series of pupporting hyperplanes.· The major motivation
forusing'decomposition was to avoid the necessity of using
t'.l·'(-' 0"· cl" se fi j er: dur"; "" CO~l;PUt:Ut,_·o n s , Adclitional(-1.... • .I ... , --- ,-1., ..a.·I.~v _
bene t i t s thoUCih arose e l.mos r Lmmedi.atre Ly , such as offerin.?
the facility to take certain extra contraints into account,
and cleo the Lnforrua t i.on gained in 'Using the dual vari::lbles
in the master prob:cm as 'macro' control variables on channel
flows. After the research was finished and t1me was available
to de compar at Lve vo rk it became clear that significant time
savings had occurred ~·;rithdecomposition.
The option to establtsh depots led, of course, to the
familiar local/global problem of non-convex pL·ograffimlng. In
practice the space over ,,,hichnon-convex search was r-equt.r ed
was never more than 3-space. Although a simple application
of Zotttendijk's method of feasible ~irections was developed,
this was never needed in practice, as it was found that a
crude grid search interpreted ,\\'ithcertain contextual kn"~""-
ledge was quite adequate. Inter.estingly, the problem was so
structured that when using Zeu.tendijk's method, the solution
of the quadratic programme to determine the best directions.
from boundaries vas entirely removed as an analytical proce-
dure W&s possible.
The economic model is described in section B.2, a~d
the extension to the depot case, which was never actually
applied, in Appendix 1. The ad hoc procedure used in .
practice for the depot Cl\le can be found1n the discussions
of flection C.
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3. l.;:~A)Y;:./Al!\GIES O~' THE: Ef:Ol'K';·a.C HODJ':L..----...~, .....--~ - .......-.--.---..---
For each problem situation a series :1f possible
strategic dcc i.sLon s wece eva Luat ed , The rc:sults presented
to management contained the :[ollm.ying il1formation. For
each option the expected funds rec;uired off:=;ci:by C:Kpcct€:c!
s<'\vingsboth inunediately and over the first three years.
Then some estimc.te of the time scale that was needed to
imrlement the change. This knowledge eliminated several
opt Lons iT.mediCltelyby show i.ng that action could not be
completed early anough to forestall major competitive
reactions. 'rhe major sources of risk associated with the
opticn were then listed. These included such points as
leaving large sections of the market vulnerable to compet-
itive activity or indicating that although a certain
channel. configuration ,jas the cheapest it wa s necessary to
almost reach the optimum point before any savings began to
show. Thus another option might not be quite so cheap at
the optimum but it was possible to begin to make some
savings much earlier. It was found that ~~nagement paid
more attention to this 'cut-in' point, i.e. when s3vings
begin to show,. than to optima as such.'
The last information presented was termed initialisa-
tion actions, and ,,"'ereof two tYP9S. Firstly c~ntextual
': - . , .:/
actions such as 'begin negotiations' or 'begi~ capital
~, J ;; <, :_.~ :';,':.. <--A '. ~< '; •
requ~stion.procedures'. The second type come directly
';/;i ~<.;:.::.;',\ .~;;-) ..,. <
from the model when the prt:!sentsituation was used as an
initial feasible solution, thus su3.table interpretations
.12
va l ued the ex t r.a LnLorrmetLon provided by the dual variables
and re,Qdily accept-ed the limitations that they must only be
interpreted at the margin.
The r-cs cc rchcr- then worked wit:h management; to selt~ct
first!.y a shor-t list of these options and then the final
~ecision using criteria such as :-
a) Are expected savings worth making t..hechange 7
b) 1.5 the liquidity position of the firm such as
to make the expected funds flow possible ?
c) Is the risk associated with a certain expected
savings acceptable ?
d) Is action possible within the required tL~e scale ?
e) Do certain initialisation action leave several
strategic options open at a later stage ?
In so far as the model was still economic in structure
.
rather than behavioural it was ~till clearly inadequate.
Consideration had to be given to possible competitive action.
Competitive action from other manufacturers was no different
than in any oth~r situation. \~at was new was competitive
action within tpe distributive system itself.
thr ough certain channels, b\.::'::as the firm did not necessarily
own all or even part of some of these channels~ it ha~ no
power' to instruct merchants to hand l.eTtihat: wa s required,
other than a certain financial coercive power.
ever a period of time a beli<3f bad dcvcloped,espccially
amongst sales management; of the finn, that the autonomy of
the merchant lE:vcl was inviolable. Duri.ng discusaions)
whenever an option was considered which substantially
affected the owner sbi.pof the merchant level, such as :-
a) Purchase merchant As o~
b) .purchase a 51% holding in Merchant C, or
c) give selected area franchises to merchants F,
Hand K, or
d) set upa depot to operate at the merchant
level and serve users,
then these options were immediately vetoed by the sales
.managemenr , Their arguments were basically Eimi_lar in
every case and foLl.owed the lines of "if you attempt ro
substantially affect the status quo of the merchant level,
then the merchants will rise as a body and cut you out of
.that particularmarketu• It was this dogmat:ic belief in
the strength of 'merchant power', as it came to be called,
that prohibited any real progress towards selecting the
best: option.
ini !:i<711y both 'tmt:r~Et ab l.o and ur,ahie to 1')0 cha L'lerij ed on
e;-:;pi.rical g:counds. It \-iQ.S cons idered tha t the mor-chant;
PC',,7cr concept 'Has not entirely a myth and must be treated
f:criouG Ly, Ncver:the less it 'U1S p.l.so consLdo red tho t the
sales mana~~~ent were making an over-generalisation and
ovcr-c~:tc~ncling their argument , A shar-per instrument 'vas
needed ~.,)hichcould pi.npoir.twhcr~ merchant, power could be
expected to be a potent fOl:ce and vhere it could be safely
isnored. This pzcbl.em, of course, 'I.;asnot recognised her e
for the first time. Research had begun at an early stage
of the project tmvurds understanding the sources and internal
dynamics of this 'merchant powez-!, in order that its strengths
and weakncsse~ might be identified and exploited. The dis~uss-
ion now turns to look at this topic in more detail.
Rather than refer directly to one section of Part 11
this section has been rather of the nature of a connective.
Further details about choosing between options and some
working doc~ents used with management can be found in
section C. Further introductory remarks about merchant
powe r can be found in sections A.l, A.4 and B.3.
'.. ,.;
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Merchunts range in size from the small family concorn
to or2anise. tim"ls ,;·;rith a cerrt ra Ld.scd managorncnt; ot ruc t uco
con tr'oLl.Lng several branches. Only the 1.:1q'jBst Hould ever
have sufficient econo~ic and ~arket po~er to directly
cha l.Lenge the manufacturers. The smal.Lcxmerchant, by
himself, migh~ be a~le to convert a few user acccunts onto
alternative products, but he could do little morc. The
merchant pove r that management feared ~las formed rather
from the collectivity and solidarity of merchant behaviour.
Each merchant wo uLd be aff:'liated to several informal
groupings of other merchants. These might be ~ased on the
geographical locality, they might all serve the same
industry, or they might have some other characteristic in
common , These groupings provide local netwo rks of informa-
tien Biving merchants access to such information as, the
'going discount rate for standards' or the credit extensions
offered by distributor X. This information is seldom avail-
able to merchants not belonging to the relevant groupings.
One consequence of these local nets of information is the
disproportionate power that might rest with a merchant by
being the only merchant comnon to two different groupings •
•Another consequence is the· time merchants spend cross
checking,infonnation and checking on the reliability of
their sources.
,,.
, ...0
is for self-definition of their roles in the distributive
systern, These roles are primarily defined in terms of the
merchant s relationship:;> Hith otb;!rs in the system. These
relatio~ships can be crudely separ-ated into tt-,O types ~
vertical relationships t.vith supp li.ers ar.d customers;
horizontal relationsh5.ps with vtb'-!rmerchants.
4.1. Vertical Rela~~hips.
At one extreme a merchant mi5ht consider himself
practically an appendage to the user, working in clo~~
collaboration with the userfoi purchasing agent and
seeing the user's problems of supply as effectively
his ovn , At the other e:~tre:nehe might see all the
user's needs and demands as lying in direct confltct
to his own. We can delineate similar extremes in his
relationship with the distributor and/or manufacturer.
He might consider himself the manufacturer's agent,
protecting him from small orders and the day-to-day
exigencies of the market place; he might even request
some institutionalisation of this process with contracts,
franchises or agreements. On the other hand, from which
~1:.l;' manufacturer he buys may be a source of indifference to
him. His aim'is to keep minimal stocks whilst maintainin~•
as high a,discount as possible. Different ident;fication
by merchants between these extremes will lead to different
reactions to channel' disturbance;
,...
,. ,
4.2. H0~i2ontal ~elation~hips.___.,..,,_.-.------,-'-__...UI~...-.-
do with otbcr ~erchants, treating them as rivals at
whose expen se only can he expand his trade. On the
other hand they might work in close collaboration to
'carve-up' the demand in their re3ion. In this case
vi.cti.rni.action ,,;illoccur if Lnd i.vdduaLe attempt to
overstep their traditional territories~and collective
action will prevent new entrants into the field.
t!ost merchants occupy a pas ition sornetche xe between
these c~~trernesand the manuf cc.turor e ,·lillfrom time-
to-timG either encourage or discourage this collecti-
visation, depending on particular circumstances.
Horizontal cohesion is to some extent institutionalised
in local and national trade associations. These trade
associations provide a focus for dissent in rLmes when
merchants have a felt need for some defensive collect-
ivity.
Through his group affiliations a merchant will
compare his own role in the distributive system as he
construes it with what'he considers a desirable role.
If these seem roughly the same then he will seek to
_i"
maintain his role; on the other hand if he observes
significant role 'discrep'ency he '''illseek to adapt
,his present role.
"
The principal'channel for role
adapt ion "and maibternance is via'the bargaining
relationship.
].0~)
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or between merchant and supplier requires agreement on
several product char-ac ter-Lst Lcs such a.s. quantii, ty ,dLscourrt ,
pr Lce , delivery dates end credit extension. If agroemenc
cannot be reached LmmediateLy those involved ,..ill he~h1
to trade one characteristic off against another.
"lf you are prepared to double your order then 1
could let you have that discount, but not otherHise".
,If agreement was not reached, an across-order
compromise miBht be attempted.
"1f you are prepared to Hait for your ordex:·,1111
be able to get this one to you directly".
And then perhaps a sequential compromise,
"1f you are prepared to place a regular order we
might manage those terms, but not otherwise"
and so the procedures used to reach agreement get more
and more serious right up to the direct refusal to
continue trading.
By placing different pressures on different parts
of this bargaining relatio~ship, or by resisting certain
pressures placed by others, a merchant could maintain or
• adapt his construed role. If it became obvious that
this was"not 'going to'b~ succ~ssful and the' role dLscr ep-
ancy '~"as still signific~nt he might \vell resort to
;''''-'--- '.,,';
structural change~ • such as offering 511" shareholdings
or seeking sole agencies.
·19
4~4.So~c C8ns~qucnCC$.-_ ...._,. .... ,_-_
Thus a crude descriptive model of merchant
behaviour has been developed, ',l.he,;eby a merchant
learns and defines his role by interaction within
group affiliations and relation3hip~ wi~h user end
suppliers. Ee then maintains or adapts this role
via the bargaining relati.onship using the loc£.l
ne two rks of i.nformation available to him throush
group membership. If this fails he ma.y resort to
structural change or just "learn to live" "lith his
new role.
An important consequence of this model is th.:lt
a merchant's response to certain economic pressure~
is unlikely to be predictable without some knowledge
of h1s group affiliations and of how he construes his
role in the distributive: system. Thus under the same
economic pressure different merchants might react in
quite different ways, and also the same behaviour
might result from different merchants under quite
different economic pressure3. Thus a refusal for a
.discount increase might bG taken by a merchant to
mean a routine "tightening-up" by the manufacturer
in times of relative peace. During a critical chaIlge
period, though, the same merc!1ant could see it as
"1;he thin end of the wedge", or lithe last straw" or a
"shot across the,bows" signalling a start of a policy'
of aggression towards merchants.
20
Thus the model demonstrat~s that critical
attention must be paid to how actors see their roles
and how they construe the options open to them at
anyone time. Thus using just an economic model some
merchant behaviour might appear bizarre and extrava8ant
0-.c\./Q..5::.compared with the modest ~ made against them.
But viewed in conjunction with the action mode l, above
his behaviour becomes much more comprehensible.
This behavioural model of merchant action is more
f~lly developed in section A.4.1, a wider ranging
description of group affiliations in A.4.2, a discussion
of merchants' construed roles is in A.4.3 and more about
the bargaining relationship in A.4.4. A series of
sketches illustrating the variety of merchant establish-
ments forms section A.3.
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5. Cf-~LIlW.t~TION OF THE BEHAVIOtJRt\J, MOD£L------..--_---------_.-------
The behavioural model described above was not in a
fonn suitable for use as an analytical tool for assisting
mansserial decision-making during the change period, that
was expected to be initiated by tl:1efirm or one of its
competitors ~aking a major change within the distributive
system. It was necessary to, at least partially, calibrate
this descriptive model. The crucial aspect that required
calibration was the cognitive position of a·merchant in the
syste~ as construed by himself. Empirical work made the
researcher confid~nt that three five point scales were
suitable. One describing the horizontal position and one
each for the vertical positions vis-a-vis the users and
suppliers respectively. Using these instruments and observing
how merchant's adjust their construed positions as changes
occurred would give an opportunity to see where strong
merchant cohesion was occurring. Also isolated merchanto
could be identified as could those with either strong or
weak integration with users or suppliers. A consequence of
the general model was that role adapt ion was likely to occur
fairly vigorously before any structural changes. Thus it
was hoped to be able to use these results as, at best,'a
p~edictor, .or at ..least as a warning light of merchant
reactionq.to channel disturbance •
..Initially the measurement of merchant cognitive positicn
was done empirically by direct measurement. It came as a
surprise that· this was found to·be fairly easy; mecchancs",
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questioned found little difficulty in locating their
view ef their role within the scheme. This success was
put down to two reasons. Firstly, the crudeness of the
calibration. Secondly, the instruments were developed
in cont.ext, using the sort of sentiments ~nd language
that merchants would often use themselves. The resulting
instrument thus struck them as roeaningful and relevant
to their day-to-day operations.
This direct measurement, althou8h successful: could
not be applicable during the actual. change period when
a~cess t~ merchants would either be impossible, or if
possible would not produce reliable results. An instrument
was thus needed capable of indirect application.
In order to develop such a tool, it was investigated
how the sales management of the firm could claim to know
,,'hctheror not certain merchants were "getting together to
,hit back" or "not prepared to tolerate any further incursion
,.by direct supplies.
, '
It was gradually appreciated that this was an agsregate
affect: a "feel" 'deduced from a large number of small events
each apparently trivial in themselves' but sufficient' vhen
aggregated to cause thesal~s management to be prepared ,to
stop a policy at 'Boardroom 'level. These events arose mainly
•
out of-the bargaini~g r~lation~hip'that we 'have discussed
above •." By using" the sales clerks and the salesmen from the
'firm and certain selected purchasing agents from users it
"",
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was possible to develop a measure of the severity of
procedures used to come to agreement on orders. To
do this the frequency of occurence of each procedure
was weighted by a consenus opinion of their severity.
In this way a tool to measure the integration of the
barg·aining relationship was calibrated. Extensive
testing showed that there was by and large, agreement
by both sides as to the procedures used and also showed
that changes in horizontal cohesion were associated with
shifts in the integration of the bargaining relationship
as reflected in the procedure used.
As an immediate consequence of beginning to measure
the content of this aggregate affect, the sales staff began
to feel less misunderstood and were able to move away
slightly from their defensive position of being continually
forced into the role o! censoring change and defending the
status quo. Previously when they had tried to convince
their colleagues of the possible backlash developing
amongst merchants they could only produce as evidence a
series of minor instances each apparently trivial in
themselves. The only safe route for them had thus be~n to
generalise. their argument and sustain the dogma of merchant
power. This sharper instr'ument ga~e them the opportunity of
discussing with their.colleagues on the Board which merch~nt
groups were.particularly sensitive at that time;
Fullerdet'ails ~f the calibration 'of the' :behavioural
,model are in se~tion 'B.3. Descriptions of it in use can
. "be ,"found in section C.
6. THE HODELS IN PRACTICE.
There was an immediate opportunity to test the model
in practice on a modest scale, before tacklini the whole
of the U.K. This \;rasin the South t~est of England and
the South \lales industrial region. A merchant in Swindon
'was requesting a substantial loan in order to expand his
business throughout the region. Rather than just investi-
gate this one alternative it ~"as used as an opportunity
to look at the area in general. The model indicated that
a depot at the merchant level in the Swindon region was a
very de~irable proposition. The best and quickest way to
achieve this facility "ras to purchase a 51% shareholding
in the merchant. This was to be ~ccompanied by a gradual
by-passing of the distributor level in the region and a
build up of direct supplies to users and merchants,
particularly in South Wales. The results were implemented
~the merchant reaction against the moves were so fierce
that management was prepared to reverse the decision and
withdraw completely. The cognitive model though showed
that only selective withdrawals were really needed rather
than a 'blanket' move. By the time the study ended an
annual saving of about £50,000 was beinB made, using the
reorganised system.
Then the main national study:was embarked upon, treating
the three areas of the South West,. Midlands and the North
separately. Overall the balanc~of the results recommended
the pUrchase of one of the national distributors, but before
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this could be done a competitor made a surprise purchase
of ano thex distx:'ibutor.It was critical that the immediate
reactions that the firm took to counter this offensive did
not jeopardise their long term flexibility. To ensure this,
the economic and attitudinal mode l,swere uued several times
to evaluate possible courses of action and to pinpoint
groups of merchants ,~l",eredefensive solidarity could prove
either advantageous or a stumbling block. It was discovered
en route that the texture of merchant relationships in the
North, Midlands and South East were all quite different.
The purchase of the distributor was then made for about
£~ million and the next eighteen months mainly devoted to
the integration and rationalisation of the two previously
overlapping distributive systems. This proved a long job
but it gave the firm time to get to know the distribution
business and get used to thg idea that they were now a
major distributor of engineered component s,
Included in the rationalisation at this sta~e was the
establishment of a large warehouse in the North to serve
merchants and selected users in ,the area.
Both models were then used again to try and resolve
the contradictory position of the one remaining independent
distr~.butor. The zeconmendat Lcn to purchase him for a
. _' '-'-:. . ' .
'price not much exceeding .£900,00,0 Jof po~sible ~as accepted.
~ _.. ! •
The purchase was made and this distributor integrated into
. I .
-, -.
the distribution system, with the consequent rationalisation
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of salesmen, lorry schedules nnd stockholding procedures.
This also took longer than anticipated because of a
considerable public concern over redundancies caused by
the rationalisation, redundancies mainly drawn from workers
in the joint distribution systems.
Overall concLusLor.s on the results are difficult to
define because of the impossibility of separating out the
particular contribution of Operational Research, but the
following major changes had occurred either directly or
indirectly as a result of the study.
The total reorganisation of the distribution system
including vertical integration one level nearer the
mar~et.
From making a £~ million loss the year before the
study the firm passed to an almost £0.8 million
profit the year after the study.
A complete shift in managerial attitudes from being
solely concerned with prod'.lctionand engineering, to
considering distribution and marketing a principal
part of the firm's'business.
On arrival at the firm in 1967. a possible strategic
option "yas to give a sole agency and withdraw completely
from distribution. On leaving the firm in 1970 a seriously
considered possibility was to :lose the manufacturing
",facilities and use them for'distributing imported components.
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As it was impossible to describe the whole series of
events in detail, two regions have been selected for
detailed co~ment, the rest being treated in swa~ary.
Section C.4 details the South West 'and C.5.1 the South
East in the initial stages. The rest of C.5 concerns
other regions in the initial phase. Section C.6
describes the second phas e bepinning in January 1968.
Section C.7 concerns the third phase corrmencing July
1969, and the final phase, starting August 1970 is
d~scribed in section C.8.
.2[3
7 • A SE!UES OF CONJECTURES HECAnDIN~~ APPLICA!.!.~
OF O.R. IN UNST.:\BLE ENVIRONMENTS.
Strategic change in industrial distribution systems
provide5 a particularly good example of studying the
application of O.R. to decision ~~king in unstable
situations.
Because of this, the opportunity has been taken to
draw some tentative conjectures out of the empirical
work, as generalisations about this form of behaviour.
These conjectures are listed here in summary, reference
must be made to,section D of Part 11 for further details.
a) In decision situations characterised by
considerable instability 'in the environment,
analysts need to be specifically trained to
recognise<,'tand deal with the pitfalls of
reasoning that occurs in groups, as time does
now allow the natural control of informed
scepticism, reflection and discussion to .
,develop,to a sufficient degree. "('henine
,"types of pitfalls that were encountered most
-;. . -, ~ -~ -
, '
I
freque~t,ly'during the empirical work are
.discussed.and examples of where they arose.... ~" ~',- .' '..:, .~~~ \',' ""; ,
,given. In some instances there is a report
on how they.were avo_ided. These pitfalls
overlap, to some extent, the,expected sources
of distortion which arise from iriformation
b)
J
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bias, selective information being av~il~ble
and sectional interests. The guiding principle
behind the investigation was that knowing about
a pitfall assisted in avoiding it.
The problem of access in these situation~
can be solved satisfactorily by the change-agent
or the dual consultant/researcher method. In
this discussion the main focus is to compare the
published results of other workers in the field
with those of. the present work. The major results
is the similarity of th~ conclusions of this thesis
with those published towards the end of the project
period. l~e are optimistic then that a convergence
.of ideas is occurring and look forward to the
development of a sounder and more robust methodology
in the future.
c) The situation forced the analyst to use
hypotheses for diagnostic purposes and interpretations
as mechanisms of change, 8:8 much as for explanation
and prediction. lntera'ction with clients tended to
become more· s·peculat'iver'ather than just informative.
. .
Relatio~ships'with cli'ents became more ~f a aialo.3u~
or ·~ombined"eifb'r~;·~t fo~h1.ation or clarification
ra'ther;'than;;at:ec~i.cal ~~rvice.
" .~'i,' i" ~1
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cl) Discuss ions '·lithcolleagues beforehand
had left us '''iththe impression that using
O.R. in situations where decisions were
required urgently meant ,taking smaller samples
of whatev~r data was required and generally
weakening our criteria as to what constitutes
valid information or conclusions in the study.
In practice we found this to be only part of
the truth. It also becomes necessary to have'
more frequent recourse to alternative sources
of data, sespecially where that means obtaining
personal judgements of the situation from actors
involved. This tends to shift the concern to
the reliability of the source itself rather than
the data. Criteria to judge this reliability
were not found to be consistent and "~erea function
of the source and type of the information and the
purposea for which it was required.
e) The relationship between strategic and tactical
decisions becomes more complex in unstable situations,
with the direction of cause and effect influence
" less a predominantly one way affair. The assumption
of a certain stability implies that tactical ,
deviations caused by unexpected environmental
:{
influences can be accommodated within existing
strategic'plans. . 'A stream of such deviations
would then'.feed.back to a realignment of the
~l
strategic position over a period of time. It
is typical of an unstable system though, that
a series of tactical changes are the first
significant warning that the organisation
receives concerning the approach of a sudden
change. The im~ediate response to ~hese
changes, although often tactical itself, can
significantly affect which long term options
remain open. No solution is offered to this
problem, which is a matter fo~ further research,
but it is merely placed on record as an empirical
observation.
That concludes the list of conjectures.
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8. CO~'CLUSIC7~S.
This thesis had three obj~ctives and conclusions
can be dra~~ about each of them separately.
Firstly it must be judged whether our work adds to
the understanding of industrial distribution systems and
whether it develops our ability to model such systems.
We believe tha,tthe detailed description, of the changes
in the economic variables and of the gro\o1thand internal
dynamics of merchant power does give significant insights
into such a system. We also consider that both of the
mathematical and altitudinal models are able to be trans-
lated,with the minimum of restructuring, to assist in
decision making in other industrial distributi,on systems
of a basically similar type.
Conclusions from the second objective take the form
of an assessment of the contribution made towards,the
methodological problems" involved when applying Operational
Research, to situations where reasonable environmental
J stability cannot be arrived. It is our contention that the
work supports the c'onject'm.teslisted above. We make no
. ..", .claims at ,this level.of 'generalisation, other than our ".
results provide supporting evidence for ~hese conjectUras.
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The third objective was the solution of the specific
industrial problem to reorganise the distributive system
of the firm manufacturing engineered components. This is
.to be judged as either a poor or good piece of Operational
Research. Our model was accepted by management and used
fequently and successfully over a period of two and a half
years to assist in the decision making at Boardroom level.
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A. !HE D1STRIBUTIVE SYSTEM.
A system for distributing engineering components in
the United Kingdom will be described in five sections.
Firstly an overall view of the market served will
be given and a brief comparison with the distribution
of competing products. Rather than do this for the
vhole country a particular geographical region is
considered as representative. Secondly, a detailed
investigation of the economic variables of the system
is given and their changes over recent years traced.
Thirdly, specific merchants are considered in detail
to demonstrate the scope of alternative merchant
establishments. Fourthly, consideration is given to
the relationship between units operating in the system
and lastly a very b~ief description of the internal
operations of the component firm is given for complete-
ness.
-,"'-j
The intention is to be descriptive, but it can be
'J. .'1.'; ~;... -~ , ',,- ~ -.• ,~. ..~~ _~: '1
considered research in the san.e sense as the work of
" ,_, ...
Roy (55). '.. ' ,
t{ ~-->_,_.,_t" .:'::
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This section makes particular reference to one area;
the South tlest, including Devon , Gloucestershire, Somerset,
Wiltshire, Bristol and South ~ales. This was chosen in
consultation with the marketing personnel as being fairly
representative and also an area where a participant observer
would be least likely to 'put the backs up' of merchants.
It was unrepresen~tive in as far as no major producer of
these components has manufacturing operations in the area.
The area had a lm,rer average density of usage and larger
customers were often more widely dispersed. Nevertheless,
it was considered that the differences were not too great
to unduly influence the organisational.structure and thAt
th~ 'custom and practice' was broadly representative.
A.I.l. The Market.---
The area concerned is shown with distributors
I
and merchants marked in Fig. A.I.
An indication of the flows o{ goods occurring
is shown in Fig. A.2., Product usage is not horoogenous
but relative to the principal industries.
Thus mining and steel' industries of South 'lales
require heavier and stronger components and are ?ot
interested in precision tolerances. The .aircraft
industry around Bristol require light components,with
can increas('.
We would
expect this diff~rence'in market requirements to


reflect itself in the type ui meLchant servicing it.
A merchant servicin3 the heavy industry need have
little technical knowledge, he can cut corners and
prices by having inadequate and over-loaded ware-
housing. If he runs out of an itemr.e \o1illusually
be able to get some more, at a price, from the next
merchant. His "arehouse handling equiment can be old
and crude, if a few items are seriously damaged as a
result, it matters little. His stock value is low and
he can float variations without negotiating special
overdraft facilities with his bank. He does'nt have
to employ skilled salesmen. He knows that his
customer is interested primarily in keeping his
machinery working. If a component break-down stops
machinery he needs a merchant who will get a replace-
ment without delay. The wrong component will do, as
long as it gets the machinery working again.
On the other hand a merchant servicing an
industry with an advanced technological base will ba
keeping a valuable stock which he will need help and
capital to float. He will have to know how to contact
and deal with sources·of capital or loans. His ware-
have to be excellent, most
His salesmen
critical marketing
A. 1..2. E£21ac~ent and Production ~1Q.!.~'
Components are required for two main purposes.
Firstly they are required for assembly into new
machinery being produced; secondly when that
machinery has been sold and is in us~, components
are required for replacement. Components for
.....
production are often tendered for, either informally
by asking for quotations from several sources or
formally by'asking for tenders. They are bought in
considerable quantities and often involve only a
few different items from the product range. The
major factors affecting p,'rchasing are price,including
quantity and 'single-type' discounts; design factors
such as quality and suitability; and ability to kee~
delivery dates. A few extra points need to be made
about each of these. Concerning price, we must mention
the continued growth of central purchasing departments.
Mo5~ component manufacturers will offer a central
purchasing office of a corporation collective terms,
He then supplies each of the produc tLon facilities in
the country with goods at this centrally agreed price.
Local purchasing agents are informed that they ~ill
purchase a-cert~in list of items from a certain
source, unless ·.theyhave a very good reason not to.
that much of the selling
, . . .
must be.directed towards the·designer. inscead
at the. purchasir,goffice. In many organisations,
under study, the purchasing .
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function in newly designed prod,~cts for manufacture
is quite distinct from the purchasing of replacement
items. Frequently a customer will maintain two
separate accounts, one for each. Concerning the
ability to keep to delivery dates we must explain
the function of the 'call-off'. Here the customer
will negotiate with the manufacturer for a certain
price, discount and delivery date; and he also will
stipulate that he wishes to 'call-off' at his local
merchant supplier. Then rather than accept delivery
of the whole batch quantity requested he relies on
hi~ merchant doing the necessary storing and progress
chasing. He merely makes an agreement with the
merchant that they will require up to so much
delivered per month, say, and a certain quantity
capable of being delivered immediately in case of
emergencies. With that stipulation the merchant is
free to organise supply as he wishes. It is said in
the trade that the merchant who services 'call-offs'
1s just acting as a storage unit for the customer,
that he is effectively under the control of the
customer. This, though is not quite the case, and
we consider that it is an error to think in these
terms. The only difference between 'call-off'
service and 'merchant'service is that certain
contractual agreements hav~ been made over time.
The customer has lowerci the risk to his supply at
a certain financial cost.
~fuellwe turn to the replacement market we find
that the emphasis shifts to availability, merchants
being able to supply rapidly and moves away from
price and discount negotiating. Of course these
two types of purchasing are seldom found in isolation
and we give some examples below.
FIG. i1
Transport firm: Swindon
sample size: 83
freq.
200 order size
Electronics fi~ •• Swindon
sample size 166
freq.
..-: 1,000
200 order size
Product~on alone:
_.._- ---
Aircraft component manufacture : Wiltshire
sample size 28
1001\ 20K 30K
Steel firm •• Swindon
sample size: 77
freq.
1K order size
ur:'orO
Hydraulics firm Somerset
sample size : 240
lK 5K GK 30K
Instrument manufacturer: Oxfordshire
sample size : 287
I lK 10K 30K
IA.l. 3. g_Ql!mJ~£i~Q.!Lwitb._Colilll~i£Qrs'Disll:i2~ti2.!L~l~r~illE.·
The manufacturers sell to either the distributors
or merchants or else go~~ direct to the user. The
distributor sells to the merchant or customer and the
merchant just deals with the customer. There are of
the order of 12/15 distributors dealing with the
components under study here and perhaps ~OO/450
merchants, \-lithbasically four manufacturers. The
difference between a distributor and a merchant is
one of degree rather than type. A big merchant with
many branches will 'feed' other merchants and will
most likely get 'distributors terms' or something
near to them. A small distributor will be acting
rather like some of the larger merchants. The
difference is shown by the characteristics of :-
size, distrib~tors are generally bigger;
coverage, a distributor is usually national, a
merchant local;
terms, distributors get better discounts etc.;
stocking, a distributors major sales effort is
meant to be towards merchants rather than customers.
In this industry there is only negligible amounts
of brokerage, and the little that does exist is on an
informal basis.
For the firm we are considerin6 the flows of
standard products are nationally :-
l Firm I
I
Merchants
r-f Distributors \
6.2M 10.41'1
Merchants
O.9H 1.5M TC'tal--
I 19.0I Users Users
10.4M
IUsers1 Users
...
Figures in £ Millions
and for the South West re3ion
[I G ~2
ri~
I
rlDistributors I
2.1 0.4
o.03 Merchants I·Merchants O.
Users
4
Total---
2.93
Figures in £ Millions
}to
, _'
We notice from this that the S.W. has a higher
proportion of sales boing throu&h merchants, that
Firm-Hech and Dist-mech are hig.her proportions with
Firm-User and Dist-User being correspondingly 10'Her.
Notice that 85'70 of sales in this ace.a go through the
merchants and 72% through the channel Manuf-Dist-
Hech-User. 'tole wou l.dexpect then to find in this
region that Merchants enjoyed somewhat more power
than the country, as a whole; the pr-opoxtLons
nationally being 59% and 55% respectively. The
patterns for competitors vras somewhat different.
This competitor had acquired distributors
operating in this area as well as a merchant. His
trade pattern was as follows :-
In the South West;
1 AI
0.3 1.1 0.05 O.
I Owned distributcrl ~Other distributor I
, 0.~~0.2
0.1 1.05
I Owned merchant rOther merchant
.15 1.30
P'
\ Users 1-
06
I2.W.
.51
"
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1'1111S he vias competing with his own distribution
system. He 3ave the sa~e discounts to both owned
and not owne d distributors, and the owned distributors
and merchants were independant financially.
Nevertheles3 certain policy rules were imposed by the
organisation. Because of the fear of retaliatory
action by other merchants, their owned merchant did
not aggressively compete in the market, but competed
defensively by improved service and stock availability.
Stocks were kept high in the owned channel, this
meant that other channels drew from them as required
end consequently gave as good a service. If supplieb
did get tight they could switch to other brands
whereas the owned channel was tied to the one. Thus
this configuration was not treated as a potent threat
by other merchants and distributors but they welcomed
the improved service it afforded them. But this was
'Pt4i l(,QI\.not a stable optbttism-, they knew that the longer the
manufacturer owned a channel he was Ilearnin6 the
distribution businessl, was developing contacts and
skills which would be valuable if ever he wanted to
;
Igo it alone'. Other merchants knew that the
manufacturer could begin to squeeze them out of the
market, that he could begin to give priority to his
ow~ customers, .and that ultimately his financial
b&cking would carry him through any extended discount
war. This short-term security anJ long-term
uncertainty led naturally to opportunism and profit-
taking at the individual l~vel with defensive
mov~ments forcing merchants together for solidarity
concerning their long run existence. lfuat company A
was going to do next became a frequent topic of
conversation combined with defensive manoeuvring
and posturing.
With company A structuring its channels in thir.;
way, a defensive wariness was maintained in all
transactions and relationships. Merchants be&an to
spread the risk of having their supply dry up and
began to open new contacts or renew old ones.
Merchants began to search, although perhaps not
very actively, for alternative sources of supply~
'Call off' accounts were at a premium because of
the security involved. Stocks were built up by
some in case supplies began to fail, while others
cut back so that they might the more easily switch
brands. Similarly some attempted to extend credit
hoping by this to reduce the risk of being shut
out, while others did the exact opposite for the
same reason, thinking that the most 'credit-worthy'
customers would be the least likely to be dropped.
Pressure was applied on discounts and guaranteed
margins in an attempt to 'get more while the goings
good', but not too much pressure, because this
would force the manufacturer to take action.
Attendances at informal area gatherings of mercha~ts
rose now that they had something to discuss that
affected'them all.
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COn)Detitor B.__..__---
Company B was in an unusual position. It
still had only a small market share but had grown
from nothing rapidly. To help speed its growth
and allow it to concentrate on manufacturing, a
job the management considered they knew best,they
had given the sole-agency for distribution to a
nation wide professional industrial distributor.
This distributor had branches in most industrial
regions and provided a wide marketing coverage
for them initially. But now that they had 10 - 15%
of the market, this was be3inning to act as a
bottle neck. Their distribution pattern was as below.
I
I B I
.5
Sole distributor I .005
.15 0.35
l-Merchants1
I
I Users J
Only one major conflict remained apart from
brand competition and that was between Company B
and the distributor. B was attempting to develo~
a second distribution channel while the distributor
w~s attempting to squeeze 'that extra 2~k' out of
Company B.·
r:: ~.»:
TI16 distributive pattern was as confused for
C as for A, but in this case the friction was not
so apparent, partly because the total sales were
so much smaller and partly because the pattern had
remained unchanged for some time. Company C owned
several merchants and partly owned others. Little
of their trade in this area was throu~h distributors
as such. The f Lows were as below :-
r I G._~~
Total--and wholly
owned merchants 0.71
Figures in £ MillionsUsers
We had difficulty finding out much about the
working of this system except that most of the
accounts were with long e£tablished customers of
the parent company which owned company C •. The
accounts specifically for the components in question
were newer since they only effectively entered the
market about 8/10 years previously.
Most of the remaining analysis will focus en the
distributiGn system for the firm in question but
reference will be made to A, Band C when necessary.
A.2. ECONONIC V;Rlt\BLES THTlllN 7lJE D!STRIRUTIVE SYSTEM.------------ --- ------
The important economic variables concerned with
both the maintenance of the existing structure and
providing an impetus for chan6e, are each investigated
separately.
These can be considered under various headin3s.
Firstly a distinction must be made between user,
merchant and distributor discounts. Then between
what can be termed the 'formal' and the'informal'
discount structures.
A.2.1.1. ~~formal' s~s~.
This is the discount structure as published,
by the manufacturers. 'Standard' items will be
meant as referring to the standard catalogue of
the manufacture where he undertakes to supply
any standard item from stock. There is an
awkward division for non-standard items but one
which it is worth continuing. A non-standard
item which has stil.l the formal geometry of a
standard item but perhaps just varies in
dimensions will be referred to as 'non-standard'.
A non-standard item which is ·of an entirely
distinct design to the standard range will be
called 'special'. Most of the manufacturers
keep to a classification near enough to this
for our purposes. We are not claiming that
they make the same allocation of items into
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these groups. What is 5tandard to one
manufacturer will often be claimed as non-
standard to another. The published gross
discounts only refer to the 'standard' and
'non-s~andard' ran3es.
Qis!.ribut2.!:~_£i2.£QQ!l~.
All manufacturers give standard discounts
to distributors. This means that taking the
previous few years sales into account a discount
is agreed upon between manufacturer and distri-
butor; and then applied to all purchases from
there forward regardless of product value or
quantity ordered. From time to time discount
review will take plac~, which in practise means
the distributor has asked for an increase.
Fig. A. 9 gives an indication of hew discounts
have varied over time.
£: 1 G. A.9
Year--- Qiscount ran~
17~h - 22~/.
25% - 27~'.
27~'7. - 30'7.
35% - 40'7.
57/58
63/64
66/67
68/69
Notice the sharp rise indicated during the
period of the study, and the quite substantial
rise in the ten years proceeding. No figures
were available before 57/58, but people claimed
th~t there had been only gentle rises inter-
laced with long stable periods before then.
For comparative figures we turn to Fig.A.IO.
[_I G A.IO
y~ 2!lliiL.llim ~Q.m12~ go~p_], £2.lill?-9.
57/58 17~/. - 22~1. 22~% 20% (iii)20%
63/64 25% - 27~i'. 30% (ii1)30% 27%
66/67 27~'1.-
(1): 35'1..30% 35'1. 30%
(ii)
37~"Io68/69 35% - 4G'¥. (Lv) 40% 40%
(i) changed to 35':'.about 65.
(ii) changed to 401'. end of 67.
(iii) figures unreliable.
(!.v) changed about end of 67.
From these figures it is see~ that the study
firm has lagged continually behind competitors
for the last decade. The slight lagging by
Company B could be said to reflect their single
agency type distributive system. The overall
picture is of A, B, C making the running,~E~Y~h
or perhaps because of, the study finds still
dominant position in the market
Turning to the 'non-standard' range, tt'loet'e
are the corresponding figures in Fig. 11.
[_I G. A "~L
X~ 2.!lli!Y_firm Comp A Como B Comn C-- _.___
57/58 l5i'0 (iii) 15'10 (iii)15% (i" '12~·'J.a a. i ';t •
63/64 17~/ .. 20% 22~'7o (iii)207...
(iv)26%
(1)
27~'7..66/67 25% 25,,,
(ii)
68/69 30% 0.i)30% 40% 37'10
(L) changed about 65.
(ii) changed end of 67.
(iii) figures unreliable.
(iv) figures unreliable because of major
changes in the definition of what was
standard 01.- non-standard.
These figures show much the same sort of
trends as for standards except that the final
figures for Band C race ahead. Here it must.
be remarked that C does not have such a wide
range of non-standards as either A or the study
firm; and B has a particularly narrow definition
of standard. This is, many items classed a~ non-
standard by B, others 'vould take as scandard , also
the items that are in Bls non-standard range tend
to be Inot-sol non-standard as for A and CiS
range. They do not tend to manufacture some of
the more bizarre sizes that others do.
Distributors as a rule randle few 'specialsl
arid also'Companies Band C tend not to make very
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many. tlhen they do handle 'specia l.s' they
usually come under the terms of non-standards
unless they need special storage or treatment,
in which case the discount is individually
bargain3d for. In neither case are there
published figures.
Each of the companies tend to try and grade
their merchants according to the total sales that
they place with them. Rather than have a contin-
uous sliding scale, a series of 'categories' of
merchants has usually been created.
The clcssification for the study firm in
1966 is ahown be Low :-
F\~~.\~
Class ~~~g~ ann~al_pur£h~~ ~umber iUb.~l!!ll
A..A.. above - .£30,000 124
A ,£15,000 - .£30,000 45
B .£5,000 - ,£15,000 74
C .£2,000 - ~£5,000 24-Total 267
Comparable figures for competitors were
unobtainable, but the class range was ascertained
to be much the same. Both competitors Band C
combined classes Band C together.
To get some idea of the spread of sizes
within these ranges, data was obtained for the
annual purchases for 1965 by AA merchants only.
;32
24
16
..- r"\UU
This is shown in the histogram Fig. A.13.
8
Total = 130
o 60 120 180 2~·O 300 360 rest
.£l,OOOIS
8
4
~e breakdown by annual purchasers for
those below the .£30,000 criteria level is
displayed in Fig. 14 below :-
Total =·26
o 5 30 .£l,OCOI~10 15· 20 ' 2~'
It can be seen from this that most probably
two distributions have been sampled, the grc-up
in the last peak being those falling naturally
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into the AA ~atcgor.y but who for some reason
did not manage to achieve the requisite
£30,000 sales. This sort of case is overlooked
by the ~anufacturer and the merchant is not
penalised for this temporary lapse. The other
peak represents a population which is not really
of the AA category but who the manufacturer have
favoured with better terms. These may include
merchants who total trade with all manufacturers
is substantial and more of his trade is trying to
be lured this way. It might be a merchant who was
owned by another firm ~ho had an 'across the
board' agreement with all its suppliers.
It must be remembered here that most
merchants deal with more than one supplier
and woulJ thus be classified differently by
each. Merchant discounts are given in Fig.A.15
for standard items.
6')(_
MfHCH
CIXss------
COMP C---
57/58 AA 17~'1o 17~% ·15% 15%
A 10% 10% NA NA(iv)
7~'70B (vii) (vii) (vii)
(i) C 5%
63/64 AA 201. 251G 22~% 22~'70
A. 12~/. 15'YG NA 1570(ii)
10,~-12~%B lOIu 10% NA
(i) C 5% (viii) (viii) (viii)
66/67 AA 25% 3010 27~1. 27~1.-3010
A 15%-17~10 17~/. 1510-17~% 17\1.-301.
B 10%-15% 12~10 NA (ii) 15"/0
(i) C 7~% 7~1o-10% - NANA
68/69 AA 301. 30% 301~ 30"/.-401.
A 17\1. 15,,/.-17% 17\%-301.(iii) 20'70
B 15% NA 15,,/.
C (vi) (ii)NA NA NA NA
Notes (i)
(ii)
C includes non-stockist.
Not available because of being
wit~in single agency.
Study company discarded differentials
between A 3nd B.
(iii)
(Lv ) This formal class structure not in
existence then, has been recreated
(v)
(vi)
from figures for report convenience.
Type C class did not exist until 1960.
Type C effectively discontinued after
1967, although still formally anncunc ed ,
Did'nt classify there at this time.
Type C did'nt exist for them at this
time.
(vii)
(viii)
This data again gives the impression that the
study company was always a little b~hind the others
in giving merchant discounts on standards. Notice
the substantial rise~ that have occurred over the
decade and in particular the remarkable rise
bet,,'een\964and\967. Notice also that this
discount competition was not just limited to the
largest companies, but was' active at a\l levels.
Included is the rather uneven history of class C
not because of any particular intrinsic interest
in the discount but rather because of the way
companies attempted to accomnodat e it. As a
backlog of pressure from merchants began to
build up, there wes an attempt to with stand
it from the companies by dividing the merchants
into classes. This divided the solidarity and
made them able to gear discounts with turnover
of sales. The spotted history of class C is
where they were attempting to go just too far.
Notice that neither of companies B or C took
any notice of this lowest class.
Comparable figures for the non-standard
range are sho~~ in Fig. A.lt.
'·lenotice in this data that the rise has
not been so marked as in the standard case,
which reflects the competitive position. But
notice one piece of rather aberrant behaviour
and this was the way that the two smaller
companies Band C put considerable discount
pressure on non-standards, and eff~ctively
treated them as though standard. This has
been partly explained above but we think that
it can still be ccncluded that these companies
made a definite competitve drive to increase
their share of the non-standard market.
57/58
63/64
66/67
68/69
t1~ STUDY
Q.bAS§. EIRM
---
AA 10'7.. 10'7'.. 10"1.. 7 !{l~
A 51.. 51.. NA NA
B NA NA NA NA
AA 12~18 12~% 20% 17~%
A 12~% 7~% - 1510
B 7 !:ff. 51. Nl\ 5"1..
AA 151'. IS/'.. 27~'70 27~%-30%
A 12~'7. 101'. ) 5''/0-17 ~/. 17 !210-30'1 ..
B 7~'1. 7~% NA 10''/.,
AA 20'7. 15'1. 30"/. 30'1..
A 101'.. 17~i .. 20l'.-30'/~
10'10
B 7~'7. NA NA
In interpreting compare with notes of Fig. ~.15
cs
User discounts are of two types, quantity
and single type. Quantity discounts only operate
on scheduled orders and items must lie within a
producL range of standards and certain non-
standards. Most manufacturers operated t-:iththree
or four sub-ranges within their product range.
These were usually based on value of the component.
There were little differences amongt tbe firms and
any short r~~ differences that did occur were soon
made good by others Icoming into line'. Also data
was not available to show movements over the decade.
Data was available for the 1962/63 period and again
when it changed in 1965/66 but the data available
for 1959/60 was felt to be somewhat unreliable.
Another difficulty is now that in 1965 the
definition of ranges for three out of four of the
manufacturers was changed from four categories to
'three. The approx. relationship is depicted in
Fig. A17 overleaf. The top line referring to the
product ranges in 62/63; the lower r~ferring to
65/66.
19(:2/63
C.r7
v'I
The available quantity discounts are given
below :-
BANGE_l
1962/3 1965/6
10,000 - 50,000 2~/. 5%
50,000 -100,000 7~/. 10%
100,000 -250,000 101. 12~i.
250,000 -500,000 12~% 15%
above 500,000 on application
MtillE 2
gUANTITY 1962/3 1965/6
2,500 - 5,000 2~. (i)NA
5,000 - 10,000 2~/. 5'10
10,000 - 50,000 7~'1. (ii)12~1.
50,000 -100,000 12~% 15%
above 100,000 on application
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JiiNGF. 3
QUANIIIX 1962/3 1965/6
500 - 750 2~'1.. 5%
750 -1,000 51" 10%
1,000 -2,500 10% 12~'o
2,500 -5,000 12~'1" 15%
above 5,000 on application
RANGE 4
Q1!ANTl'1'Y. 1962/3 1965/6
(iii)
500 - 750 5'1. NA
750 -1,000 7~1. NA
1,000 :-2,500 12~'1o NA
above 2,500 on application
Notes : (i) This entry was quoted in published
tables.
(ii) An intermediate figure of 7~k was
quoted for the 10,000 - 20,000 range,
the 12~. figure began at the 20,000
mark.
(iii) A lower figure of 2~. was quoted for
the range 100 - 500.
,
Sin31e type discounts are additional
discounts for purchasing a considerable
quantity of one product and for placing
this order on a scheduled basis, giving
the ma~ufacturer several months warning.
Host of the same warnings regardi~g
interpretation apply here as for quantity
discounts. The discounts are given in
Fig. A.19 overleaf.
From both of these tables it can be
seen that considerable discounts can be
gained by Users. For example a producticn
firm purchasing 50,000 of one type of
component in range 2 would get a total
discount of 35~. The intention of these
discounts schedules is to encourage smaller
buyers to deal through merchants and major
'production' buyers to deal directly with the
manufacturer.
,'0
RANGE 1---
QUANTITY. 1962/3 1965/6
10,000 - 50,000 2~~/. 50/"
50,000 - 100 K 5'10 7~al..
100 K - 250 K 7~/,. 10cy.,
250 K - 500 K 10% 20'10
above 500 K on application
~NGE 2
gUAt:!TlTI 1q62/3 1965/6
2,500 - 5 K 2lt1.. 5'10
5 K - 10 K 2~i'. 7~%
10 K - 50 K 7~. 101.
50 K - 100 K 10'1a 201'.
above 100 K on application
RANGE :3---
QUANTITY 1962/3 1965/6
500 - 750 2~" 51.
750 - 1 R,. r: 5'7. 7~1.
1K-2,500 7~ la'.
1.5K- 5 K 151. 201.
above 5 K on application
R-\NGE 4-_....-.-
gIliNTITY 1962/3 1965/6
500 - 750 510 N<\
750 - 1 K 7~"/o Nt\
1 K •• 2.5 K 12!t/o NA
above 2.5 K on application
For customer orders direct to the factory
which are not scheduled the single type discounts
are roughly used, but here discotmts are only
given on an informal rather than a published
basis. Nevertheless a good order or customer
will often be able to get either 2~% or 5% off.
Only about 6% - 810 of total business comes in
this fashion so it will not be pursued any
further here.
A.2.1.2. !~ 'inf~rmal' ~~.
It is unlikely that 'blanket' terms such
as those above would be flexible. enough to meet
the varied conditions of the merchant. Thus an
informal system has arisen which 'bends' the
rules to suit particular circumstances and it
I
is this system which is going to be particularly
important in this work. Step functions such as
"the formal system are of no use in the analysis
if practical usage merely makes them continuous
again.
Ii")
/ ,, ._
The distributors.----------
There is no significant infor~al system
at this level that could be discovered, mainly
because of the fixed nature of the distributors
terms. There are frequent Ibendingsl of the
rules, but on a level which can be tgnored.
Again there are only marginal adjustments
to the formal system. A customer may be encour-
aged in the hop~ of au0ther order, or because of
reciprocal arran3ements etc. This has not been
found significant enough to include in the
analysis of the discount structure.
The merchants.---_
The merchants are the only case where the
informal structure is irnpo~tant. Consider the
Histogram Fig. A20. This shows the distribution
of discounts actl:ally received by A.A.. merchants
in 1965.
;
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This has an average of 23.6%, eighteen
months later the official figure was 25% and
a year earlier was 20%. The two main reasonS
for this discount drift are, firstly, the
increasin3 pressure for discount rises between
'official' rises makes the manufacturer
increasingly to 'givel a little. Secondly, the
existence of special conditions. A merchant
with a favourable potential will be tempted to
place more of his business, or a merchant who
holds the loyalty of a big customer account
might have more leverage. A merchant who·regularly
collects his own supplies might get 'an extra 1%'
if he comes along way, ~% if not. A merchant in.a strategic position might also be able to
command above the norrn~:, For example one AA
merchant was the only real outlet 'in the Poole!
Bournemouth area and received a 26% discount.
•r}l_t.
( .
Another merchant held a dominant position in
Sheffield and received 29%, another in Bristol
with 27~'10.
The official discount rates are changed
infrequently by a committee of the manufacturer
that meets for that sole purpose. Not every
time they meet do they decide upon a change,
changes of an offi~ial nature are expensive.
If someone is demoted, he might be lost, if
someone is promoted you give him a bigger cut
and he has even less incentive to increase
sales. There i~ no pr~tence of actin& as pure
'economic man' by the merchants. Going into a
higher discount rate means to many merchants
that they can get more money for the same
amount of work, thus why try and expand sales 7
I
Also ~hen discounts are changed, tho suite
of computer programes handling customer order
maintenance and invoicing have to be changed,
the ne~ schedules have to be circulateJ internally
and externally, price lists and sales publications
have to be changed. Thus there is an invested
interest to try and accommodate marginal chan8es
without having to officially change the rate.
,
Thus an 'informal' system arises naturally
•because of the varying power of merchants and
the establishment cost of change. The sales
manager will not readily admit that discounts
are 'bent'. Information on informal discounts
are localised within merchant affiliations.
Friendly merchants will 'let on' what they have
'forced' out of the manufacturers, it is often
something to boast about. But these affiliations
as we will discuss later are rather restrict~d
to lie within a merchant category.
Manufacturers are in the worse position
and have great difficulty in discovering what
is the 'going rate' on the informal market.
One might wonder whether this informal
system could be rem0ved by the imposition of a
continuous sliding scale. Being non-linear
this would be technically difficult to operat~,
but more importantly we must recognise that the
category classification had now achieved the
level of 'custom and practice'. There would be
substantial organisational problems from all sides
to attempt to remove this.
It is important to try and isolate these
two factors of 'drift' and 'special conditions'.
Consider cluster diagr~~ Fig. A.21 of ~~ discounts
actually agreed on invoices over a period of nine
years. This upward trend is highly significant
with a correlation of 0.74 with 90 pieces of
data.
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Over a period of time these informal
discounts become the nOun and people begin
to expect a 'few % over the list', so much
so that those with a ~ood case and plenty
of leveraBe begin to be earning up to 5%
above the list price. At a suitable time
the new rates will ba formalised, or some-
,
thing near it, and this begins the whole
process off again. Thus it can be deduced
that formal discount declarations are not a
major competitive action but only a tatical
move realigning figures as a post facto~
declaration of intent after gradual erosion
on a day ·to day basi~. One factor remains
and that concerns the part that size plays
in the special conditions. That is, in
reality can the discount be taken as a
continuous function of size or must it remain
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a step function defined on cate&ories? In
Fig. A.22 AA merchant sales are plotted
against discount received. All the outliers
that have been circled can be explained
separately by certain factors. No reason,
other than 'custom and practice'could be
discovered why discounts should alm~st always
be at the ~. marks. In Fib A.23 we have
plotted similar results for a sample of all
merchants. This completes our discussion on
discounts earned at all levels in the distri-
butive syste:n.
A.2.2. Credit Conditions.- ----
Another significant ~conomic variable in the
distributive system is the extension of credit
facilities.
Little need was found to investigate the credit
extended to Users because preliminary investigations
showed it was scarcely used as a decision variable.
Certainly, considerable credit was given to users by
manufacturers and merchants alike, but it seldom
appeared among the factors which they were willing
to trade off against each other such as di~counts,
,
delivery dates and quality. Speaking crudely and
anticipJting somewhat it could be said that actors
engased in bargaining transactions in the distri-
hutive syste~ only manage to juggle with very few
7B
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factors at one time. ~s c~edit is usually rat~d
fairly low in importance compared with, for example
discount or delivery it tends to be neglected. Early
investi~ations showed credit extensions of from a
couple of weeks to several months from manufacturer
to User. From Users to merchants it was sli&htly
shorter say, from cash transaction to six weeks in
most cases. It was also found that many of the
internal procedures of users for honouring outstanding
accounts were somewhat c~~bersome and could often
account for between a half and three-quarters of
this delay. These sort of delays in payment were
accepted as nor~al. If an outstanding account got
much too large it would seldom be used as leverage in
negotiating. It would be co~rnon infact for a purchasing
agent to be quite unaware of outstanding debts and
if a supplier mentioned it he would rather thank him
for bringin3 it to his notice than consider it an
indictment. One more "lord needs to be said about
why credit was so low on the Users list of priorities.
Purchases made for replacement or for production
have a major factor in co~on that their absence
would put at risk the efficient use of m3jor capital
equipment for the sake of components which were
comparatively cheap. Thus availability and quality
tend to gain at the expense Of suCh factors as.
credit. Regarding the 'placing of discount as more
more important we have two arguements; firstly
the possible aain from improved 'discount is
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considerably more than from creJit: for example,
a months' credit means about ~% extra discount;
secondly, the major actor involved on the user's
side in the transaction is the purchasing agent.
In most manufacturing concerns of any appreciable
size organisational tendencies to departmentalisa-
tion tend to separate the accounts department and
purchasing personnel, making for localised
information only. The purchasing agent is often
simply not aware of the credit situations unless
quite exceptional, and if he is aware of their
existence does not reali~e their financial implica-
tions.
Credit to distributors.---
Distributors are at the other end of the scale
to Users in that all their trade is in these
components and is usually from one major source.
This means that the paperwork systems for manufacturer-
distributor relations tend to become formalised and
institutionalised. It is usual for distributors to
make a blanket agreement with suppliers to pay an
.
accumulated invoice" say, every month. A few special
orders, on exceptionally large 'non-standard' for
example, or a 'call-offl might receive special treat-
ment but on the whole cre~it is removed from the
transactional process that is being investigated
here. There is little difference between distributors
as regards credit extensions and again it was found
necessary to conclude that credit was not a potent
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decision variable.
Credit extended to merchante by distributors
and manufa~turers was found to be different. The
credit facilities that merchants could enjoy varied
substantially from supplier to supplier. It thus
became an important criteria for purchasing. In
Fig. A.24 total debt outstanding is plotted against
weekly sales. In Fig. A.25 total debt/weel<.lysales
is plotted against weekly sales.
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The major facts to be gleaned from this data
are firstly the clear demonstration of the variation
in existing credit. Secondly the considerable s~~
outstanding that this overall represents. The third
point is the existence of broad boundary trends.The
top most showing that the maximu~ credit available
is not just a function of weeks but of the absolute
size as well. It appears to be much easier to gt::t:
a longer credit period if your average purchases
are fairly low. The lO\07erboundary we believe
reflects the formal procedures and administrations
that arise with laroer businesses. The fourth point
to be gleaned is that the distribution within these
boundaries is skewed to the Lover end, t~e believe
( ) IICrr
this to be a function of the decreasingly importance
of the marginal week. Thus when negotiating for 21
rather than 20 weeks actors are conscious that a 5"/0
rise is in question. When arguing for 6 rather than
5 weeks, a 20% rise is in question. This change of
Dxscale from x previously to y now gives us Dy = -x-
or the transformation x = eY, and a normal distri-
bution of x becomes skewed to a Log-normal. This
is not intended as a deep analysis of a phenomenon
but as a plausible explanation of an inconsistency
in the data. One word of warning to any researcher
repeating the experiment is that different orders in
Gifferent stages of being paid and processed will
automatically give a wide spread of weeks outstanding
from zero to the maximwn. Adjustments must be made
in collecting the data, as was done here, to stop
this obscuring the actual credit extensions. Similar
credit patterns were found with merchant-manufacturer
relationships as with merchant-distributor although
the latter tended to be a couple of weeks shorter
on the average.
An important prediction can be made from this
data. If credit was the sole purchasing criteria
then merchants would spread their purchases as wide
and as evenly as possible. It would appear'that 5
accounts of t100 a week allows much more credit than
one of £500, but discounts work against this.
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Thus in the case of the manufacttlrers purchasins
decision credit seemed to be treated as additional
to discount if it was considered at all, here the
two are opposed as counteracting forces.
Even so the data ~ffers us no explanation to
the source of the variation in credit extended.
A reason~ble question would be, does the variation
arise within the same merchant over time or rather
between different merchants, with each merchant
remaining much the same for long per.iods. Evidence
wtll be brought later to bear on this question.
A.2.3. Guaran~eed marsiU!.
, distributor may receive goods at 35% discount
and sell them to a merchant for a 27~k discount only
receiving a margin of 7~%.barely enough to cover his
own costs and certainly not allowing him to make
much profit. Similarly a manufacturer may have
agreed a 30% discount with a particularly important
User who wishes to buy through a merchant who is
only receiving 20% discount. Unless some compensatory
mechanism was developed the merchant would be losing
10% for the priviled~e of serving this customer. The
compensatory mechanism is that of 'guaranteed margins'
on transactions, The problem with describing them is
that they are a solution to more than one dile~~a.
It shall be attempted to tr3ce each of them.
·..
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The practice of manufacturers and users agreeinG
on discounts together, even though they intend trading
throu3h third parties, is an increasin3 one and some
explanations shall be listed of Hhere it has arisen.
1. Firstly, a user often requir~s that a stock
of components be nearer to him than the
manufacturer's nearest branch depot,and he is
, often unwilling to hold sufficient stocks
himself. Thus although his intention is to buy
directly from the manufacturer, he finds, in
practice, that he deals through his local
'middleman' because both he and the manufacturer
are not prepared to stock locally. This arrange-
ment is often of the 'call-off' type. It is
frequently the case that the merchants' discount
is less than the users, and a 'guaranteed margin'
ls agreed upon betwaen him and the manufacturer.
2. Another case is when a User has historically
dealt with a merchant but due to external circum-
stances the leverage that the User can command
for earning increasing large discount has risen
.
faster than the merchants' own. At this point
the merchant will approach the manufacturer and
say that he can no longer service this User with
the margin he is achieving, either he must be
given a guaranteed margin or the user will be
forced to turn to other merchants which could
~/
possibly mean other brands. A case in point
is a lar&e order from a Scottish firm, receiving
from quantity and single type discounts a gross
of 35%, was offered to a local merchant because
of the reputation for good service he had achieved
in the area. The order had previously been
through a competitors distributor. The merchant,
although an AA category, received only 22~%~
The merchant approached the manufacturer and
received a margin on that order of 5% of list
value.
3. Thirdly, central purchasin& schemes by large
corporations have led to fairly modest orders
from plants to local merchants receivin6
disproportionate discounts.
4. Reciprocal agreements on mutual purchasing
often lead to unusually high individual agr~e-
ments between users and manufacturers.
5. Fifthly, some manufacturers find it necessary
to make localised franchise arrangements where
his only merchant outlet in a certain area
services all his trade in that area. This
means that he encourages all trade in the area
to go through the merchant and is willing to pay
substantial 'guarant~ed mar6ins' to secure this.
6. The sixth explanation ls a particularly recent
one, and one which partly includes the other five.
,-·n
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The section on discounts has shown that all
have been rising steadily over the last decade.
The merchants costs have to be covered by the
margins gained and these costs have also risen
steeply, especially labour, petrol and overdraft
charges. The cverpresent fear in any distributive
system of being 'bypassed' either from above or
below has been emphasised by this tightening in
the cost situation. The establisrunent and
maintenance of this 'guaranteed margin' mechanism
is to some extent meant as an intention from users
and manufacturers alike that they respect th~
merchants sovereignty and are prepared to back
their intent with money if necessary.
7. The last explanation is a technical one that
recently 'G.M's' have been used as a more flexible
tool and is often agreed individually on orders,
releasing the discount to stand as a lon$er
term agreement. The margin situation with
distributors is much simplified and is mer~ly
a tool for adjusting the 'gearing' between
discounts given to distributors and merchants.
Havin~ received an 'across-the-board' discount
themselves and having to deal with merchants
with widely varyin3 terms, a more sensitive
tool is needed to deal with anomalies. This
is provided by the 'guaranteed margin'
mechanism.
/
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63/64
66/67
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Because many margins are agreed individually
it is difficult to extract coherent data, never-
theless Fig. A.26 exhibits how the average
guaranteed margin given to distributors has
moved over time.
LI G. A. 2§.
2TUDY FIRM CaMP ~ COMP C---CaMP B--
(i) (t) (i)
5'7.
8.75% 6%
(iii) 7%
Notes :
'1>i~ V'lOr
(i) Did~' really exist.
(ii) Unreliable.
(iii) Unknown.
The same informati.on for merchants is
given in Fig. A.27 overleaf.
go
gUDY FIRM COMP A CON? C---
57/58 ( L) (i) (i) (i)
63/64 510 (ii) 5% 5;0
66/67 5%'to 13%(iv) 8% 5%
68/69 (v) (iii) 8~
Vld no\'
Notes • (i) Di~ really exist as such••
(ii) Unreliable figures.
(iii) Unknown
(iv) See Fig.A.28 be Low,
(v) See Fig.A.29 below.
More data is available on the study firm for
66/67 and 68/69.
MERCHANTS-----
DISCOUNTS-- --
30%
30%
257.
25%
20%
20%':,
101. .
1966/67 Data for Study Firm.
t!hlill~C TYR,[ED-!§ ~B.
~Rr:ED Dl2.£Q1!~
less than 271a'7 ..
be tween 2 7 ~/. & 35%
less than 27~%
between 27~% & 35%
less than 251.
otherwise
all
all
tlARG 1 tLQ~~TI¥ill
IQ..J:1f~RQ.H<\NT
5"10
8%
5'1.
5%
5%
By 1968/69 the situation had been somewhat
simplified to :-
F 1 G ,,?r.l--.!.!--~-;;_!-
AA Merchant receives 12~%
A Herchant receives 8':;'.
all others by ne~oti3tion.
Thus for most purposes guaranteed margins will
mean a minim~~ boundary on profit mar6ins at each
level. In individual cases it will be necessary to
consider guaranteed margins as something distinct from
and more flexible than discounts. The only significant
variation about the avera3e for these margins occurs
within the AA merchant category. Displayed below in
Fig. A.30 are figures co~parable to Fig.R.Q1 for
discounts.
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This unexpected result led the analyst to
investigate whether any precise rule was used for
calculating G.M's and although this was at first
9.5
.......
denied, it was later conceded when the evidence
above was presented. Notice the sli&ht attempt
to cope pith non-linearity by drawi.n[;out the
discount scale to intervals of 1]2"/.. at the riGht
hand end. T~is concludes our discussion of
'guaranteed margins'.
As indicated in our detailed description:of
type~ of merchants the dimensions of the area
serviced will vary n~rkedly between merchants and
the gcocraphical erca served. But preliminary
investigations did show that the geographical
densities of custolilcrsdid appear to vary reasol1ubly
regularly awCl.yfrom the mer.chant as did also the mix
of customers served. One merchant's delivery area is
analysised in detail to sel~e as a standard for the
rest.
I
The merchant chosen waS in Brintol and served
the South \,lestarea. ~ was an AA merchant running
two vans,anrl annual sales of approx. £150,000 in
1965)a discount of 21'~'~'6and a guaranteed margin of
B%'~ He services users for both replacement and
production. Like many other large merchants he also
undertakes some deliveries to other smaller merchaut s
in the region. A map indicatin& tho major flo~~ of
goods to and from him measured against concentric
circles indicating nmnber of miles from Brintol, is
shcvn in Fig. A.31.
· ~
Notice at once the rapid f aLl.i.ng away in trade
on movi.ng away fr~m }3ristol, i~fact almost 50/~ of his
bu.:siness lies Hithin 10 miles of his offices. In
order to investigate this further, consider Fig. A.32
be l.ow :-
Cumulative Sales
280
2110
200
160
120
80
~o
- -- - - -__ ..---
10 50 60 70 80 9020 30' 40
, Miles
,
This sbows cumulative sales against distance
from Bristol and it is seen that over 80% of .business
lies within 30 miles. In order to see how this
~eparates into different size accounts, consider the
data in Fig. A.33 overleaf.
This ShO~o1S that 927"of business is done in the
top two categories.
9G
------------------------
ACCOUNTS
GRE:~TH-(
THAN £12K
ACCOUNTS
LESS TH-\N
£100
ACCOUNTS
BETHEEN
£l~K & £12K
ACCOUNTS
BETHEEN
.£100 & £l~K
Distance ~O. Value No.-vaiUe- No. -;\~arue No:--VarU;-...------------- --------
io miles 23 90K0.8K 18.2K 3S 3.5K 3
5K ] 34K10 20 8 0.3K 2 0.6K 3
20 30 5 0.2K 10 4.5K 12.SK 1 ',3~K4
6.3K 0 030 40 8 0.2K" 9 3.8K 3
40 50 2 O.lK 4 2K 2.SK 0 01
50 60 5 0.2K 5 2.2K 11.2K 0 03
60 70 3 a.a5K 2.3K 0 a2 0.4K 1
-----------------------------------
54 .t1.85K .t58.0K 5 .£15SK37 .£17. OKTotals 18
(18 months data)
In fact, further than this, 67% of business is
done by trading with only 5 firms in the largest
category. The largest single account of £35,000 per
annum is 23% of his total business. In Fig.A.34
overleaf ia plotted cumulative % of total business
I
against cumulative % of accounts in decreasing order
of magnitude.
Cumulative 100
Sales
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10 50~ 60%20% 30% 40%5% 10%
c~~. accounts in
decreasing order
From this material we see how heavily a typical
merchant depends on a few accounts. Of course h~avy
expenses are incurred servicing them; for example,
one account which was for replacement and production,
and was his third bi6sest account with a value of
£15,000 per annum, issued on average 240 orders per
annum. Each order paper may have requests for several
differe~t items on it, yet these had to be processed
and delivered, on average once every working day. On
the other hand the most valuable account (£35,000 per
annum) issued on average one ord~r per fortnight
and these seldom had more than a couple of items on
each. This was a good example of production type
user. A histogram of his order sizes is shown below,
Fig. A.35
LLQ. A. 35
No. of 40
orders
/ P/ ~
lK 2K 3K 4K 5K Rest
No. of compts
per order
This account was a 'call-off' account, in co~~on
with the second and fourth biggest.
This concludes the discussion about delivery
areas, except perhaps to indicate that one of his
vans was always occupied in the Bristol area, the
other doing the longer runs in rotation.
,
A.2.S. Bepresentation.
A major function of A merchant is sales
representation. Firstly the nu:nber of salesmen
that merchants employ is considered. This is
difficult to measure because of the dual role that
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many employees play. A branch manager will always
look after the good customer. A salesman in a small
merchants' will double as a clerk when necessary.
One aspect of distribution that strikes a researcher
coming from an engineering production background is
the alrr~st complete absence of restrictive practices
and demarcation agreements. Because of these diffi ..
culties it was only possible to obtain any reliable
measures from AA merchants and distributors. Fig. ~36
below indicates the number of salesmen employed by
otAA merchants ana various sizes. n1ere is practically
nothing that can be deduced '\'ithany reasonable
sharpness from this data, except to note the total
numbers involved. Given this n~~ber of salesmen
employed by the AA merchants,and assuming one or two
salesmen to b~ employed by each of the category A and
possibly B merchants there are two or three hundred
potential representatives in the field.
F 1 G~.t...12..
No. of
salesmen
--6 -- X_-. .:r- _
~ X5 - -x-- ""-- t: 'f.4 y... )( ~ 'I.. Y. X'j.
)(.
'}. ). ~ --3 y. -y.. --_.y. -'l( -2 'J. _- so.'"'~~ '.{~--_
1
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Herchant sales
in .£1,00015
I
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For information about tbe s.:llesmen,such as
what product ranges they cover, their frequency of
visits and, most importantly, who their contacts
are in User firms; this data gives almost no help.
The treatment of the effects of sal,e.srnenwill thus
have to be an implicit one; it will be included in
the measurement of the ctrengths and weakne~ses of
the purchasing relationships between merchant and
user. In as far as the salesmen are prominant
actors in this relationship this was felt to be a
valid approach.
A.2.6. ~ckhold}ng.
A primary function of merchants is to hold
stock. This is meant to serve the purpose of meeting
customers's requirements promptly, to protect the
manufacturer from a continuous stream of small orders
and to provide some economics of scale in distribution
by acting as a 'break-bulk' service.
There are two major decision areas, one of the
stocked range and the other the stocked quantity.
A.2.6.1. ~U~e ot stockhol£!~.
Local needs and requirements will mean that
the stocked range varies from region to region.
Nevertheless a broad ~onsensus does arise concerning
how popular or unpopul.ar products are and whether
they need to be stocked. Stocks of non-standards
and specials are not considered here, as they
-'--
must be decided on an individual basis.
Listinr:;the standard product rante of ab()ut
15,000 items in decreasing order of sales contrib-
ution by n~~ber, Fig. A.37 below indicates the
range atocked by merchants of different sizes.
FIG, -~_ll
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Distributors carry between 35~..and 1~5% of
the product range. The relationship between
product range and contribution to total sales
is known. For example, by a typical curve as
in Fig. A.38 overleaf.
. .
Cum. 'le 100
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figures. Thus combining these two graphs gives
--------
20 8040 60
Cum. 1" ofproduct range
This data was obtained from manufacturers
Fig. A.39.
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This data ShO,·7S nhe '%..Lof sales that they
could service from stock, and gives a curve
~·~itha shallower gradient than that fO~P
range stocked. But this is included for
theoretical interest rather th~n as a practical
result, because it makes a quite unvar-r anted
assmnption. The assumption is that if a certain
product is officially stocked then they could
service orders against it. This would only be
the case if considerable quantites were stocked.
The re~ult in practice is that a merchant w1ll
service a portion of the order immediately and
place a reverse order with the distributor or
manufacturer for the rest.
In order to deal analytically with the
stocking problem at the merchant level a broad
classification of products were made. The
classification was along two axes, the cum. %
of product range in decreasing order of importance
was one, and the size of order was the other.
This gave a market classification that crudely
accounted for the range the merchant stocked and
the production/replacement dichotomy. An empirical
histogram for this classification is given overleaf
in Fig. A.40.
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I_l_G, A~
sLz.e of
very orders
large large medium small
"/. 0 f
product Top 5'1. 0.3 1.7 6.1 27.8
range
Next lOr.. 0.05 0.9 5.9 22.3
Next 20r.. 0.0 0.11 3.1 18.4
Bottom 65'}'. 0.0 0.0 0.5 13.1
~~This gives the %~of orders falling into
each category. The sample size was 210 invoices,
and thus cannot be used safely with much confidence,
The same sample also gave a histogram for the ,..9V"CSV\~
contribution to sales from each cell, see Fig. A.41
below.
FIG, A 41-
size of
very orders
large large medium small
r.. of
product Top 5i'. 9.2 9.1 8.2 3.5
range
Next 101-. 3.1 9.2 12.1 5.6
Next 20;'. 0.0 3.4 16.1 10.5
Bottom 65% 0.0 0.0 3.1 7.8
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This data ~~il1 be considered further in
the section on stocked quanity below. The
i~nediate point to note is the substantial
proportion (81.6%) of orders classed as small
(less than 1,000 cmpts) even though their
contribution to sales is only 27 .1~1'~.
The more stock that a merchant or distrihutor
keeps the cheaper for .the manufacturer. Stockholding
allows merchants to be. break-bulk points as well
as protecting the manufacturer from the cons i.dec-
able costs associated ~vith paperwork. For the
manufacturer sell ins and delivering orders to
merchants most of the distribution costs thus
incurred are clerical rather than physical
distribution co~ts: e.g. lorry costs, drivers'
;
wages etc. It is thus important to know how the
stockholding policies of merchants affect the
resulting distribution of order sizes reaching
the manufacturer. Thus using a crude classifi-
cation of orders as above and considering. firstly
~\\.Qonly one product range)let xj~tonnage received by
a merchant,of orders of size j. Let Pkj be the
probability that an item received in a reorder of
size k finds its way into a customers order of
size j. Also let Yk be the tonnage reques;ed in
a reorder of size k. Then
10G
Thus for each merchant a set of transition
matrices pi, one for each product range, forn,a
suitable definition of their stockholding
operations.
!he product ran6es used above were suitable
for studying reorder rules for most merchants
studied. Few merchants effectively used more
than five cate30ries of products for deciding how
quickly to 'turn their stock over', and one of
these ~as always 'do not hold stock at all'.But
difficulty was experienced with fitting order
size ranges into the f6u~_ suggested above and
usually six was used. The most usual configuration
is dLsplayed in Fig. A.42 below.
,.
Order Size Range
--
A o - 99
B 100 - 499
C 500 - 999
D 1,000 - 2,499
,f'
E 2,500 - 9,999
F 10,000 - and above
-- -
/Fig.A.42 contd ••••
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The trade split within these catc~o~le~
from one merchant, which is quite typica]~ is :-
-- ----- -------_ . ..,_.._....._Category No.cmpts sold (D Sales No. Orders 1" Or-d er s...--- -------
A 52,000 1.3 1167 34.1
B 216,000 7.0 832 24.3
I"' 540,000 13.8 796 23.3'OJ
D 342,000 9.2 284 8.3
E 1,410,000 35.2 274 8.0
F 1,300,000 33.5 66 1.9
--------
The transition matrices for merchants to
which access was possible were estimated by direct
deduction from invoices. These were usually fairly
close to the stockmans stated policy. For merchants
for ~hich access was impossible the reorders we:e
known and a substantial proportion of the input
could be gained from documents sent by them to the
manufacturers for calculation of the guaranteed
margin allowance. The accounting procedure of
only paying the margins in retrospect which
required merchants to submit invoices proved a
most valuable source of data. Of course there
was some over-fittin~ occurring if only the xi
and Yi Cl = 1 •• 6) were ~vQilable and it was
necessary to estimate the 21 entries in the
dia~onal transition matrices. After some
experience it wa s found possible to set reliable
results by using the equations plus -'contextual'
information and the salemen's judgement.
Becuase of this, for the merch~nts with which
no business was traneacted and where access was
impossible, salesmen's judgement and comparative
analysis could still be used to build up a
reasonable estimate of their stocking policies.
It is worth recordin~ here that later in the
study, when the manufacturer purchased some of
these merchants thus allowing access, only one
case in twelve proved to be substantially
incorrect.
Typical results for one merchant are
shown overleaf, Fig. A.43.
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17 1. G. 1\. 6~--------
product ran3e 1 product range 2
Input Input ----
..Output A B C D E F _Q1!.tI?ut A B _c D _L F
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
C .1 0 0 0 0 0 C .4 •1 0 0 0 0
D .5 .2 .1 .1 0 0 D .6 .3 .3 .3 0 0
E .4 .8 .8 .6 .3 0 E 0 .6 .7 .6 .6 0
F 0 0 .1 .3 .7 1 F 0 0 0 .1 .4 1
----------
product range 3 product range 4
Input Input
_ Out~t A B C D-~ F ..Jh!tput A B C D E L-
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 A .6 0 0 0 0 0
B .1 0 0 0 0 0 B .3 .6 0 0 0 0
C .5 .3 .1 0 0 0 C .1 .3 .7 0 0 0
D .4 .6 .5 .4 0 0 0 0 .1 .3 1 0 0
E 0 .1 .4 .6 .8 0 E 0 0 0 0 1 0
F 0 0 0 0 .2 1 F 0 0 0 0 0 ,1
··1·10
Thus if this merchant had the foLl.owi.ng
input profile :
---
A B C D E F Totals
Product --
Range 1 10 30 30 30 50 100 250 In
2 20 40 20 50 10 0 140 l,OeO's
3 30 30 60 10 ° 0 130
4 10 30 10 0 0 0 50
He will have the following reorder
profile :
-
A B C D E F Totals
---
I 0 0 1 17 85 147 250 In
2 0 0 12 45 74 9 140
1,000's
3 0 3 30 64 33 0 130
4 6 21 17 6 0 0 50
,
Giving input/output order size distributions
as below :
Sales
100 100
f-
~
l
11
200 2.00
I---
r---
A B c o E F' A. B c D F
Order Size
This concludes the discussion of the
measurement of stockholding policies.
A.2.7. Minimum Order Sizes.------
The only place in the distributive system whe re
it was necessary to have a policy concerning order
sizes was when purchasing from the manufacturers. All
manufacturers had by 1967 adopted a policy of not
I splitting boxes I ,tnat is a whole box of several
components must be bou8ht. Minimum order values of
£5 had recently been introduced by the study firm and
competitive firm A had also recently introduced u
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similar £25 unit. From available data it would
appear that 'by-and-large' firms were keeping
to these units. The pape~vork processing co~ts
certainly amount to much more than £1 which
eliminates the 20~ profit mar3in on £5 orders.
This~ncludes the description of the
economic bargaining variables present in the
distribution system.
"' ')
To Ll.l.ust rat e the variety of organisations "7ithin
the merchant category, four typical examples Hill be
.discussed. Each example is based on an actual caSG but
name s and precise dLst LngudshLng characteristics have
been removed.
A.3.1. The 'Jobber' or 'Pirate'.- -----------
Jones of Bristol was an order-clerk for one of
the manufacturers until a few years a30. He had
known Stanton, a co~ponent buyer for one of their
customers near Bristol, by rt~alin8 with him
professionally, usually over the telephone. They had
frequently joked together about the poor service that
the manufacture was supplyinS and said how much better
they could do 'by themselves'. It was still at the
level of a joke as far as Jones was concerned when
Stanton 'phoned him one day to say that he had been
made redundant, and intended using his redundancy
payment to buy a little stock and go into business
for himself. Did Jones want to join him? Jones did
join him, together they got advertising space, note-
paper printed. and one of their garages f~tted-out
with suitable shelvings.Stanton used hf.s buyer's
contacts to bet half-a-dozen good orders whil~ Jones
bOU6ht a small van and a typewriter. Jones' wife h~d
been a spcretary and was to handle all the corrcs?ond-
ance. Jones' house was chosen as the office beccuse
he already had a telephone.Armed with these orders
Stanton ~ent to each manufacturer in turn and
demanded '~erchant terms'. He only 60t a discount
of 7~,,/o, vh i.chhe knew would not be enough for long.
Within a couple of weeks of Stanton being made
redundant business had started. As a sales clerk
at the previous firm Jones had entertained customers
and had taken them home; now many of these customers
freely transferred to the new partnership because
they wished Jones and his wife well. Their method
of operati~n was this. In the early morning they
wo~ld open correspondence and receive telephone orders,
after 'phoning customers themselves to see if they
were short of anything. A list of orders would be
made. Jones would drive to the manufacturers own
depot where there was a 'counter-trade' service.
Mrs. Jones would type invoices and Stanton would act
as a sales representative getting more orders. Jones
would request all his orders to be made up separ.ately,
waiting for them to be packaged. He would place
orders for any not ~vailable from stock. He knew all
the stoc~~en well and they often managed to fill ~n
order although there was not any 'officially'
available. Jones would be away from the manufacturer
after lunch and ,~ould deliver each of the orders
directly. Customers were ~ost impressed by this 8
hour service. Jones ke~t a few 'special' components
himself in the garage, these were the ones that he
knew production delays always occurred on. Jones
would be home by six or seven p.m. He claimed
money from customers as soon as possible, sayin8
c..c..f"IilQ \--that small merchants like himself ean.!=t afford to
give credit. He nevertheless held credit of the
order of 2 or 3 months with each of the manufacturers.
when trade had incr.eased Stanton returned to the
manufacturers and described how pleased customers
were by their service, a point which he had partic-
ularly asked customers to make to the manufacturers.
~"'t>t"He described how he did~t like having so much credit
but explained how necessary it was because of the low
discount he was offered. The researcher was at Jones'
house the evening Stanton returned to celebrate the
newly acquired 12~% and to discuss plans for expansion.
A.3.2. The Old Established Firm.- ------
Carter's of Bristol was dealing in industrial
equipment before this century begAn and the present
owner is a descendant of those founders. They came
into distributing these components right at the
beginning because the new manufacturers sought
distribution outlets with the most experience and
naturally chose them. Their main office is still
where Bristol's economic centre used to be 50 years
ago and the old building is in a bad state of repair.
They opened small sub-branches in South ~Jales and
Bridgewater many years ago and arc now wondering
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whether it is ri&ht to keep them goin~ especially
V\"\c.~ c..C(QSS k'c> s\..Jc.bc; ~Q"!'iol""
since the new Sev~ Brid3ek The mona3ing director
is a well-known figure among the 'old-boy' network
of the industry. Each branch manager still BP-es
all the orders received for that day. employees
call him Mister, and warehouse staff use the back
door. Their advertising is uninspir.ing and they
do not speculate in stocking. They will ~tock when
it has been shown there is a demand. They carry a
huge stock much of it of components seldom used
nowadays. The warehouses are crumped and not
ac~assible to new handling equipment, and much of
the old stock has seriously deteriorated. Their
old style of yearly stock evaluation and the slow
rate at which they depreciate stock means that it
is likely to stay like that for much longer. The
second in command was treated by the managing
dir.ector as someone still learning the trade,
although he had been there 23 years. The managing
director was the target of continuous minor grumbles
by the staff mainly about office conditions and him
being 'so old-fashioned'. Nevertheless, throughout
the firm and throughout the trade we found a re~pect,
we could perhaps say fondness, for him based on his
honesty and what one salesman described by ~~ying
lif you are fair to him, be will always be fair to
you'. Sadly he was a casualty of new aggressive
marketing methods. In confidence to the researcher,
'1 'i7
he spoke of his sods lack of interest and thou3ht
that he might someday sell the firm and retire
comfortably. The researcher did not demonstrate
to him that he had nothin~ to sell. The sood~ill
and loyalty shot-mby customers was not to the firm
but to himself. Even the property ,,?asin thcU,,7rong
part of to\.m". To 3nticipate, fortune did shine on
him at the last. In the scrambl,eand charige \..'ith
which section C is concerned, a panic purchase by
co~pany C greatly overvalued the goodwill and Mr.
Carter has retired comfortably. ~Jhen asked after-
vards how he would describe the objectives of his
firm, he replied that it was to act in a 'business
like and unreproachable way' to provide a 'service
to our customers and employment to our staff'.
When prompted regarding profit and grovth his only
reply was, 'yes, perhaps that's what is importent now'.
A.3.3. The 'Professional' Merchant.
_., - ---------
Based in Gloucester, Superspeed Ltd., have
seen the changes ~curring in production and have
learnt from them. ~s a manager ther~ told us -
"as mass production and flow line techniques developed,
reSUlting in industry's need for, on the one hand,
large runs and, on the other, regular intakes of
components, the whole problem of manufacture, stornge
and supply has become an Lncr eas i.r.g problem, This was
the breeding ground of the Iprofe~~ional' specialised
distributor".
This 'profc5sional' saw the distribution
channel "~erely as extension of the production line".
His job is to "break bulk" and stop the small orders
from conGesting the manufacturers operation. He
described his firm as -
••" a specUdi'l:3t,servin3 a limited area; (he) has a
specialist knowledge of (components) and an intimate
knowledge of the trends, needs and requirements of the
users in (his) area. If you prefer it (he) is part
of a market research team with a very limited market
in ,V'hichto conduct research. Logically he must
become a "professional" in '.:hexpert sense of that
word, within that area n.
He continually used this word "professional" and
it certainly meant so:nething very real for him. When
asked about the objectives of his firm, he adapted
to a large extent the language of 'big business', and
to the researcher, who having spent some months working
in and around the distribution system, it seemJbizarre
and strangely out of context. He spoke of "profit
being my major purpose" gained by "firm budge~ory
control" and "sound capital investment decisions. in
warehouse equipment". To the old style ~erchant,
warehouse equipment would be a 'cost' not an 'investment'~
'capital' is something in the bank not a fork-lift
truck. He spoke of 'marginal benefits possible from
selected sales incentives' and of 'sales targets' and
)
'five year plans'. He had sent one of his trainee
'!19
managers on market research courses and his room
was decorated with maps, graphs and photographs of
the most advanced machinery yet usinB his components.
His salesmen were trained by the manufacturers
And all his Advertising stressed the technical ability
of his staff. His relationship with customers and
suppliers vas st r-ei.gbt f orwar-dand strangely formal.
When asked ,..hether he liked ,,'orkingin this component
trade he replied that he was a distributor, that was
J........c\V'\c'rhis profession, it d-id~t matter to him ,...hat he was
distributing. The advertisin3 was clean and crisp
usually centered on statements such as -
itA new era dawns in (component) distribution" or
"The modern conception of (component) distribution".
Other merchants dismissed him as having 'too many big
ideas' when in public, but in confidenco with the
researcher, said that thiR was the way the future
lay; with "professional distributors".
Having described wha c, in all fairness, must be
considered 'Polar' types an attempt wilt be made to
delineate characteristics of an 'avera8e' type of
merchant.
Perkins of Glamorgan served the South Wales
industrial area •. He had been long established in the
merchan&_;trade and had branched out into comporlC'nts
just After the war. Most of his trade was now with
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components. He had two salesmen on the road, one
,(\ 'J~.5a.\going East the other "~est r;,oughty. He had three
sales clerks, one wa s a new l.y acquired girl trainee
and one he had recently promoted to supervise the
other two. There was one girl keep1ng stock record
cards up-to-date and two stockmen. 1\70 drivers
operated the two mini-v3ns. There was a copy-typist,
t~70 invoice clerks and an accountant. An office
'junior' did odd jobs, operated the switchboard,
acted as receptionist and served the very small
(4 or 5 a day) counter trade. These sixteen people
had a combined wage bill ~f about £15,000. He made
long distance runs usually t~,ice a week, served the
South Wales region 3 or 4 times a week and his local
area either once or twice dai,ly. He had five major
call-off accounts, the rest of his business being
spread right across the spectrum of industries and
sizes and products. His declared intent was to make
a 'reasonable' profit each year; to increase the
size of his business, if economics make this necessary;
and to sell the business ultimately to retire comfort-
ably. His intent matched his behaviour insofar.as
he in no way r.esembled the "profit maximiser" of
classical economic theory. He had certain aspiration
levels, but as long as these ve re attained he considered
business was satisfactory. He would fall reasonably
into that vague categor} that H.A. Simon has called
a 'satisf~r'. He met his competitor merchants at
variou& trade meetings but did not seem to view
them as competitors. A few accounts provided the
bulk of his trade and his only real competitive
effort was in maintaining these. There was a tacit
agreement that merchants could try and grab the
smaller customers from each others, they all knew
perfectly well that these customers kept accounts
with all the merchants in the neighbourhood anyway.
But to entice a major customer away was to go outside
'trading norms'. The model of one firm expanding
its sales at the expense of the other is barely the
~ase here. The whole affair was at a much more
personffiallevel. This was Perkins taking away a
considerable slice of one of his merchant colleague's
livelihood. If another merchant failed to keep
business up to the level required for a 17~. discount
and was reduced to 15% status, other merchants would
not seize on this as a chance for their own gain.
They would be indignant and angry to the manufacturers
representatives, and might even help him with 'bridging'
finance.
Too much must not be claimed for this merchant~
solidarity, but on the other hand, as future work '''ill
show, a model of a merchant as "economic man" is a
very poor predictor of bahaviour.
Status levels were quite marked and confidently
maintained by this sort of 'middle merchant'. These
were mostly defined in discount terms, which provided
significant aspirations fo~ merchants. Other
status variables were type of industry served with
aircraft and electronics being out in front, Rnd the
numbc r' of'production' versus 'replaccl'i,\ent'account s
handled. A merchant with the bulk of his business
placed in half-a-dozen major production accounts
was a local figure head compared with on~ whose
trade went in small lots over the counter. His
attitudes towards helpin& other merchants 'of his
own kind' would often run very stron2. For example,
many instances were recorded of one havinz an ursent
delivery when his own van was not doing that run
until the next day. He wou Ld ask another mer-chant;
who was 'doing that run' to drop his parcel off.
The same wo rked for picking up deliveries from
distributors. Another example is when a merchant
gets out of stock on a required item, another merchant
could often willingly 'fill the S~p' until replen-
ishments arrive. More will be said about this form
of co-operation in the section entitled, 'The Web
of the Merchant's Group Affiliations'.
This completes the list of examples of typ~cal
merchants.
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A..4. THE T~E:B OF THE MERCHANTS t GEOUP AFFI1~IlQ.l::i.--- ----- -
Any attempt to describe the distributive system
in terms of the economic variables of section A.2 would
be liable to render incomprehensible the behaviour of
merchants in that system. Although originally the
existence of a three-tier distributive system as described
here may have been a necessity there was no lon6er any
economic logic in maintaining it, especially with the
recent rapid increase in discount rates and the increased
credit extensions demanded by merchants. Yet the obvious
solutionjeither by-passing one or more levels or of
vertical integration towards tne market had been stead-
fastly resisted by the manufacturers for more than two
decades. Even during the change period of section C.
when the existing system was clearly cr~~bling in ruins,
fierce rearguard actio~would be fought across the board-
room tables in an attempt to vetoe any policies that
substantially affected the sovereignity of the merchants'
status quo. Considering that most of the manufacturers
and many users were multimillion t enterprises and a
typical merchant might have a dozen staff and a couple
of old vans it is a non-trivial question to ask why this
was so•. The anS\o.~erusually advanced would contain some
reference to 'merchant power'. This was not a property
of a single merchant but somethins that flowed from his
relationships with other merchants. users and suppliers.
It was a function of the collectivity of merchants and
resulted from the Solidarity of their behaviour. It was
clear that in order to be able to satisfactorily predict
and exp laLn merchant behaviour, a thorough unde r'stand i.ng
of the sources and internal dynamics of this 'merchant:
power' concept was needed. To do this a overall general
model of merchant action will be described, and then the
argument will focus on three critical arees.
A.4.1. LGe~ral Model of H~£~t Action.
Stated briefly the model is :-
1. Actions occur not in response to economic
variables per se, but rather in response to
,the actors interpretation of them. Thus action
is to be described by the actors' attitude
towards changes in the economic variables.
2. This attitude will be fashioned by the effect
of the economic variables on how he sec his role
in the distributive system. If there is a substen-
tial discrepancy between what he construes as his
present role and that which he considers desirable
his attitude is liable to be different to his
attitude if this ~as'nt the case.
3. His desirable role and what he construes as his
present role will severely influence the group
.
affiliations that he both seeks and retains.
Similarly his existing group affiliations will
substantially affect how he construes his present
role and what he c~nsiders as desirable roles.
....... }I ...
1/~ .~/
4. His group affiliations will furnish him with
a network of information t.vhichwhen supp l.cment cd
by external information will cause him to either
maintain or adapt his role.
5.The principal actions aimed at role maintenance
or adaption t.-71lloccur within the bargaining
relationship that he shares with both custo~ers
and suppliers.
6. If the role discrepancy is so Great as for him
to be unable to remove it via actions within the
bargaining relationshi~, structural chanLe is
liable to occur.
This model can be crudely summarised below :-
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Thi.smodel is s elf-cexplana tcry but sou.e
consequences will be noted. As a consequence of
1. quite different actions could uccur in response
to the same economic situation and similarly the
same actions could OCcur in response to different
economic changes. Examples of this are plent LfuL,
The refusal of a manufacturer to give art 'extra 1%'
on certain orders could be construed in peaceful
times to be an attempt to stop discount erosion.
In times of i~~inent change it could be construed
as the beginning of a policy of aggression towards
merchants. Many action~ by the manufacturers would
be taken by merchants as quite reasonable in quiet
times and yet could be considereu as the 'thin edge
of the w~dge' or a 'shot across the bows' in times of
critical ten~ion in the system.
As a consequence of 3. the merchant would be
~xpected to actively seek membership of certain
groups while being prepared to drop others. Notice
it is not claimed that the need for comparison was
the generator of these eroups. The complete opposite
ls more likely to be the case. Groups arise for
many reasons as shall be seen below. Hera it is
claimed that once in existence they provide a
convenient focus for role definition and maintenanco
on 'neutral' territory where a merchants positio~
has not been compromised a priori by the very act
of his attendance.
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Some example of the sort or information referred
to under 4. wou ld be the 'going discount rate for non-
standards', or 'merchant X has been receiving one or
two shipments a week from competitor Y'. Much of the
jnformation contained in these 'loc~l nets' will b~
accessible only to members. Thus one manufacturer
may find it imp~ssible to discover what the informal
'going rate' from another manuf~cturer is. Or a user
attempting to 'playoff' one manufacturer against
another on a price estimation may be quite ignor~nt
of the fact that the manufacturers freely talk about
his order with each other. Anticipating section C
for one moment, for most of the merchant~ the take-
over of'one of the manufacturers' three distributors
by a competitor was an accomplished fact three ~eeks
before the manufacturers' management read about it
in their morning Financial Times.
Another consequence of 4. is that certain actors
occupying keJ~.positions by being the only comnon
member of several local 'nets', have an influence
often out of all proportion to their economic position.
~vo difficulties are experienced by merchants using
these 'local nets'. Firstly, information contained
in them tends to be partial and incomplete, secondly
the reliability of much so-called information can be
dubious. As a consequence, a considerable period of
each merchants day is spent in 'filling gaps' in his
knowledge of situations or seeking confirmatory
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evidence via either a 'new ansle' or checking that
the source was 'to be trusted'.
A consequence of 5. and 6. is that structural
changes ere likely to be preceded by a considerable
period of increased pressure in the bargaining
relationship. This was certainly the ca~e with the
distributor takeover mentioned above, and if'the
'signs had been read right' it should never have
been a surprise to the management.
The model above was developed from a careful
analysis of the detailed texture of relationship
within the distributive system. Presented in the
form of abstract concepts as above it loses much
of its impact and most of its insight. To repair
this the next three sections are devoted to describe
the group affiliations, the merchants construed and
ideal roles, and the content of the bargaining
relationship respectively.
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A.4.2. g_~uP.~ ffi 1i.ation.2.,.
A.4.2.1. Betwe~ mer.chants.
The principal factors determining groupings
are geographical, size, type of industry served
and a fourth that will be termed establishment.
Of these, geographical is the most potent.
It has already been seen during discussions
of the economic veriables how locateu a merchants'
trade is. In that example 88% of trade lay within
50 miles, 80% within 30 miles and almost 50% in
the immediate vicinity. This example from the
West Country was also not r.epresentative in that
industry there was more widely dispersed than in
the Midlands or the North. A more representative
example would have been even more localised.
Merchants in the same area ,,"ouldknow each other
well, initially either by trade-fairs, deaters
meetings sponsored '>ymanufac eurers, local traders
association meetings, or they might have common
connections in the area. Small trade exhibitions
•are often a local affair such as sponsored by
Chambers of Commerce etc., and merchants would
often welcome the chance to meet in a 'neutral
atmosphere, although their advertised reason
for attendance would be to meet and attract
custom. The manufacturers sponsor dealers
meetings, mainly for public relations purpose~,
to convince merchants of how much the firm is
committed to their existence and prosperity.
Th~ merchants are much on their guard here,
they are quite aware that historically the
engineer is proud of his skill and look with
some scorn on 'middlemen' and 'shopkeepers' who
get rich on unreasonable markups on the
'sweat of his brow'. This is not a foolish notion
left by inertia from the last century, it is a
real and potent attitude. There are few merchants
who would not react wi~h c~~tion against the
label Imiddleman' and it ",as common for merchants
to deny the title vehemently even before it had
been suggestp.d.
Trade associations both local and national
playa crucial role here. The business of these
associations is usually confined to common trading
problems. A typical seasons programme would
perhaps contain a talk on the 'problem of pending
decimalisation' and ho,",'it affects business) given
bya representative of the Decimal Currency Board,
a County Surveyor would talk about plans for
redevelopment, a tax inspector might explain
the effect of S.E.T., or, rarely, a protest
meeting to decide an action against new rate
increases. These meetings provtde a. most
important function for merchants, they maintain
open the pcssibility of contact between merchants.
Even if they ,seldom attend and don't speak to
each other when they do,the opportunity for
contact is still there and can be taken advantage
of if necessary, removing the major inhibition of
one merchant having to make the first move. One
such meeting of many that the researcher a~tended,
was concerned with'decimalisation day'. Seven of
the eight merchants in the i~~ediata (10 miles
radius) area attended. ,Normally one would not
have expected to see more than two at the most.
This was three days after some discount changes
had been announced. The conversation afterwards
was heated and in terms of 'us' merchants and
'them'. All clearly had much to say and a joint
response was arranged. There had been no pre··
arranged plan to meet that evening. This was
just one of many similar meetings that must have
occurred durin$ the change pariod and served as
a key 'focus for dissen~.
Trade associations formed at a local level
tend to have membership from m~ny types of
merchant traders simply ~ecause not enough
component merch~nts exist in a small locality
to make a viable 5rouP. Newsheets distributed
by these associations tend to be primarily
advertisin6 with articles of local business
interest. Thus it is natural that local
associations tend to assist merchants in allocat-
ing business in the area between themselves»
rather than comparin~ their terms with merchants
in other areas. They are particularly useful
for maintaining and making contacts with users,
about which more will be said later.
National associations, on the other hand,
draw their membership solely from component
merchants, althou&h they are likely to admit
manufacturers and some very large users as
honorar},'::members. Their regional branch meetings
provide most of the information regarding informal
discounts and margins, and are normally we Ll,
attended by merChants. The association usually
publishes broad-sheets on specific topics of
interest, and the monthly journal often has a
'glossy' cover, devoting each issue to a different
major theme. There arc sections for rcadars'
.letters, for announcements about appointments
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and usually a digest of the technical
literature. The magazine with typically
60-80 pages is normally circulated to
ma~bers at a very low cost, and at a
prohibitively large cost to others.
Membership of the society is restricted
to those ""ho have been accepted by the
committee as sufficiently qualified' in
addition to three sponsers.
National associations also act as
spokemen on matters of public legislation,
especially with regard to such items as
price maintenance, selective employment tax,
and the numbers of hours delivery drivers
can operate each day. This politica.lj.ro~~f;'
is somewhat away fro:'!lthe mai.n .srxeam of the
material here and reference could be made to
Assael (6<3 ) for fur1:her reading and citations.
A few special associations existed which
intermeshed with thd above but did not possess
the same cohesive power as them. Examples
were the industrial marketing sections of
marketing associations. They were mainly
frequented by the 'professional' type of
merchant.
A factor which assisted geographical
affilia tions, was the exist'ence of common
1.54
connections. Apart from all the personnel
connections that frequently exist amongst
peopLe ,...ith roots in the same community,
there were often more direct connections
,,:,hichare of greater importance here.
It was common for a buyer or designer
in a user industry, if he decided to leave
that job, to consider 'setting up by himself',
and what more natural than as a merchant
utilising his eXisting connections to 'get
him started'. Due to his previous position
he is likely to know the other merchants well.
The same sort of choice was often made by
people leaving the manufacturing industry or
even a previous ~e~chant partnership splitting
up. Entry to (he marchand Ls Ing I!.arketrequired
little capital and could be undertaken fairly
easily by people with a reasonable knowledge
'of the trade', and having a few 'contacts'.
One of two things usually happened to these
people, either they carved out a particularly
small section of the market and just survived
servicing it or they left the merchant ,trade
after a couple of years often having lost their
capital. Very few got established and became
a recognised merchant, nevertheless a fair
proport~onof existing merchants had begun in
this way.
A second method of entry was for a existins
merchant in another trade to diversify, usin~
his capital and knowledge of the region to help
him over difficulti0s. This particular component
trade had only really flourished since 1945,
several of the existi~3 merchants had joined
in th;'sway. This gave them considerable
affiliations with other merchants carried over
from previous trade. The third major entry
route applied to only a few merchants although
these tended to be amonsst the biggest. This
was when a small ensineering manufacturer
gradually diversified into distribution until
the overhead cost of engineering machinery led
him to concentrate all his effort in just selling
and distributing, eventually closing down his
,,~orkshop. Again the source of local affiliations
is obvious.
; ~.ize groupings.
The second most important strata into °flhich
merchants divide is that of size. This is
paralleled.' by the discount and guaranteed
margins received. Thus AA merchants are more
liable to nave the same sort of problems, deal
with the same custo~ers and have contacts in
user firms at the same managerial level than
an AA and a small merchant are. Also the tradin&
stabilities differ somewhat. With only a couple
of staff but considerable credit small merchants
can and need to be mo re flexible in their tradLng ,
A minor recession will see a small merchant dealing
in 'other bits and pieces' or 'doing the odd job'.
On the other hand the large merchant must continue
with considerable fixed costs. An experienced
salesman or sales clerk is a valuable asset and
he does'nt think in terms of reducing costs by
laying them off, but rather seeing them as a heavy
investment in training being idle for a period.
Merchants gain considerable status satis-
faction from their discount rating, giving larger
merchants a shared sense of achievement and an
accepted hieracy of superiority. Smaller
merchants, on the other hand, treat this as a
shared sense of grievance, marvelling at how
manufacturers expect them to make a living .on
their pittance. Smaller merchants are looked
upon as 'grasping' by larger when they ask for
increased discounts, but amongst themselves this
behaviour 15 treated as 'fair game', One merchant
obtaining an increase will be used as leverage
1/ (
for the r~st. A merc~~nt achievin3 rapid
grov7th \o.,illtry and stop others following
by disassociating himself from them, yet will
find it difficult to be accepted by the larger
merchants until he can prove t~~at he does not
constitute a real threat to them. The criteria
that a merchant uses to force discount increases
varies over time, at one time he might use rising
costs, another comparability with other merchants,
or perhaps he might exploit some geographical er
other 'advantage he has. One merchant in the
Poole region received an increase because he
claimed that a Swindon Merchant "7as using the
extra 2~% he received to service the Poole region
in competition.
Soon after this increase, now that the
Poole merchant could afford to give a better
service to his local customers it became clear
to the Swindon merchant that it would soon cease
to be economical to make this run and he withdrew
from the area. Some six months later the Poole
merchant was again requesting increases usinU as
leverage that he was now the sole representation
in that area.
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The third affiliation 3rouping for merchants
is by type of industry. For most of the time
this is coincident with the geographical groupin8.
Th3 main distincticn comes when the natural
geographical region contains a sufficient n~~ber
of merchants for there to be a likelihood of sub-
group affiliations being formed. If there is no
natural sub6~ographical unit, sub3roups are often
formed based on inctust=ial type. Every case of
such subgroup development that was observed
occurred between merchants serving technologically
advanced industries e.g. aircraft, computers,
electronics and traditional heavy industries
e.g. mining, shipbuilding etc.
~2lishment-&r£upings.
The fourth grouping of merchants by
establishment type is less important. It refers
to the major 'polar types' observed in the descrip-
tions of merchants above. Thus the 'old estsblished'
merchants feel they have mora in common with ~ach
other and less with the new agressive types. The
only cases where this type was needed to explatn
.affiliation groupings was when individual merchants
were excluded from other groups which it appeared
logical they o~~ht to belong to.
Industry
J Size
'Old.Boy' ne tworks fall Lnto this catcgo ry
and were generated by either ex-emp~oyees of a
certain rnanufact~rer or the 3rouP of people who
we~e 'in the field' before 1945.
Thus Lndust ry , geography and discount eaee
(size) groupings are seen to account for the
major group affiliations. Any particular
merchant is likely to belong to several such
groups and a summary of the pos ition with the
sort of information th'lt each grouping mi&ht
contribute is shown below :-
Quality
Design
Price
Delivery
Call-offs
Quantities
Merchant
Discounts
G.M's
Promotion
Minimum order
Ne,~ customers
'Carve-ups'
Delivery
Call-offs
Local competitive
acti."n
Geography
Quantities
Personnel
information
Promotion Istablish.llent
'Behind the
scenes actions'
Reliability of
sources~------------------.-
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A.4.2.2. Bet~~~n user~.
This is the most complicated of the
areas in which to seek group affiliations.
There are a \dee range of potential users of
these components, from production assembly
lines requirin3 tens of thousands in each
batch to an amateur mechanic with a lathe
in his garage who might require one from time
to time. How to investi8ate the extent to
which they are influenced by various affilia-
tions. The task would form a major research
study into purchasing and as such cannot be
comtemplated here. Nevertheless, some of the
aspects that such a study might invOLVe shall
be indicated.
For the 'small' purchaser of these components
the affiliations most likely to sway him would be
those throu3h which promotion is channeled.
Examples might be technical associations or;as
a different example ,occupational peer group::.
e.g. Working Mens' Clubs.
Within all these groups the consensus on
the 'best brand for the money' is likely to be
we~k. Just how much brand loyalty or manufac-
turer's specificationaffect repurchase decisio~s
mu~t remain a matter for speculation.
Hi th .the •laq;cr buyer there is Qddcd
difficulty of isolating the man ,;"homak es thf.
purchase decision. Is the purchasin5 depsrt-
mont balancing out other demands or are the
desig~ ~ngineers specifications so tight as
not to allow the purchase agent any choice ?
Or have the flrlance department allowed such a
restricted budget that no-one else has any
choice other than select the cheapest avail-
able? These are dynamic not static questions,
the room for maneouvre left on a purchase
decision by various sway groups changes with
the fluctuations of almost any other or6anisa-
tional characteristic. For example, a chan~e
in the porsonalities managing departments,
'end of the year' budget restrictions, incre~sed
production downtime dUc to poor quality
components caus Lng delays etc. Group affiU.atior.'S
at this level '~ould need to include almost the
whole user organisation.
Between User organisations, Enginee1:'ine
Journals can be isolated and, most importantly,
the rapid growth of a Professional Organisation
with its own entry restrictions for Purchasing
Staff. A further important between User
affiliation that must be mentioned is group-
purchasing. The rise of corporate Br.ouP
purchasing has been'publicly much remarked upon.
It is a phenomenon that, in Engineering
Manufacturing, was p,ncouraged by corporate
acquisition and agglomeration and also by
or&anisational policies of centralisation.
,".'henthere has felt to be a need for or-gani.sa-
tional decentralisation, rather than destroy
the idea of co-op~rative group purchasing, it
has tended rather to institutionalise and
reinforce the movement by the establishment of
group purchasing as a part of a service
division.
In most companies where group purchasin~
existed, negotiations were between User and
Manufacturer, the distr.ibutive system servicing
the agreements afte~·ards. When this research
was done, group purchasing was still fairly
rare in the engineering industry but was a
growing phenomenon. Cumpar.ative research
started now would have to look at this problem
afresh.
Thus soxe aspects of possible group
affiliations at the user level have been
;
delineated, but it must stay in this rather
.unsatisfactory position. For to try and build
generalisations on users affiliations would be
Ito move too far from the research topic.
A.4.2.3. ~~U-1~£E1i~~~.
Suppliers here means either distributors
or manufacturers. For two reasons this did
not turn out to be an important area and it
shall be quickly dispensed with.
The first one is a theoretical point.
Because of their increased size and wide
coverage of users, supplicrswere less vulnerable
to the daily exigencies of trading and tended to
react with more thought.
Secondly a practical point, even at the
start of the study there were only eight or nine
organisations that could really be termed distri-
butors. As the work of section C progressed
several of these ~ere purchased by the manufac-
turers, making access to them difficult or imposs-
ible. Thus informatior. was somewhat piecemeal.
Each distributor had several branches and
thus the most important affiliation of the distri-
butor was hi~ head office. Instead of behaviour
within affiliations being informal 'custom.and
practice', there was now a considerable institu- •
tionalisation within formal organisational
procedures.
The second affiliation is again the
geographical one, and notice i~~ediately that
this grouping is quite orthogonal to that with
'1.1.1 !~
the parent company, b=anchcs were such that
two never appeared that close. Attitudes
towards competition and co-operation were
much the same as at the merchant level ~nly
less volatile. The man Lfestat J oris of this
group cohesion were quite different though.
Sanctions were only operative at the trade
level and never become personal victimisation.
The weapons were business based· such as
undercutting or poaching customers. Social
or community sanctions '....ere never used. 'Je
must remember at this point that the branch
managers were more akin to c company's middle
management than to a merchant entrepreneur.
If the business failed he lost his job, he
did'nt also loose his livelihood and accumulated
capital. If business worries assail him he can
speak either to his most senior staff or his
parent company, the merchant has to turn to
either his bank manager or wife. The branch
manager has form~l records and accounting
procedures, the merchant often does'nt really
know his financial position until the yearly
stocktaking and audit.
Manufacturers met at trade fairs or technical
symposia. Their sales staff would know each
other over the telephone if not personally.
But further than this it is impossible to claim
any power f u'lrole for z,roup::.co:runitmcnts
they might have in common. Thus overall it
is seen that the multitude of strong cohesive
influences operating at the merchant level are
match~d between neither the users nor the
suppliers. Also it is seen that user or supplier
membership of the merchant's groups is very rare.
This rules out any possibility of affiliations
occurring be~'een users and manufacturers,
relationships here being forced to be on a one-
to-one basis.
A.4.3. The Me[£hant's Cognitive Position.
The merchant's cognitive position will refer
to how he construes his role in the distributive
system. It will be investigated in two parts
concerning users and supplies, and then other
merchants.
A.4.3.1. !9war.ds.~sers and suppliers.
At one extreme merchants can identify
very closely with the needs and probl~~s of
customers, acting almost as a 'warehouso
outside the walls' as one merchant put it. ,
He will keep in close contact with the firm~
purchasing agent &nd support him in any
discussions with manufacturers. If be is
dependont on one very large customer, his
internal procedures are likely to match those
of this customer, especially the beginning and
ending of the financial year, or the formal
-- -------_----_ -_- ----__ ----
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layout of invoic0s etc. This close identi-
fication mayor may not have been formalised
with contracts and agreements, but lower level
agreements were found most frequently. Examples
would be the user offering their vehicle main-
tenance bay for the merchants use, or their
printing facilities for merchant's publicity
documents and in one case user and me~chant
placing a joint order for racking and shelving
and hence gainin3 a larger discount.
Moving away from this extreme we see the
merchant insisting on maintainin~ a certain
amount of independence. He will avoid becoming
so dependent that losing that customer could
cause his business to fail. He will still
claim that looking after the users' interests
ls the prime job of a merchant but will add the
MU"::J(~rider that this mus~nt be done at the expense of
alienating the suppliers. PDving even further
away we corne to the merchant who sees himself
as balancing out the conflicting demands of
supplier and user as 'fairly as possible'. He
;
.
will take a considerable pride in not being
unduly biased one way or the other. When he
considers the user has had a 'rough deal' over
certain deliveries h~ will support him against
the supplier. If at any time, though, he
considers the user is taking advantage of this
support to me.ke 'unreasonable' clc:1lLlnds he is
quite likely to shift his support to the
supplier. He sees the whole point of the
merchant level to present use~'s and supplier's
demands to each other I f aLrLy and squar-eLy ! ,
Moving closely to tbe supplier the merchant
will begin to act as the suppliers rcpres0ntative
in ~he mark~tplacc, protcctin~ the monufecturer
from small unprofitable orders and prOt:lotin3 not
ju~t his services but the manufacturerJ product
as well. But he won't eo 'all the way along'
with the supplier, and is prepared to back users
if ha thinks manufacturers aren't giving tho
sort of service they ou~ht to. At the oth~r
extreme, the merchant ~ccs himself as effect-
ively part of the ma.nufacturers distribution
department and considers it a critical part bf
his job to smooth the demand for tha production
facilities. IlIe identifies with the mnl1uf~cturers
problems and is likely to have close contoct '~'ith
the manufacturers marketing personnel. Some
institutionalisation of this identification may
have occurred in th~ way of franchises. dealer-
ships or agencies; or if not at least som~
contractual· tlBre<?mcntm:"\y have been exchtlng~d.
·Accounting and administr.ative procedures are
often closely tied with those of the manufllcturer
and the s arne kind of rnf orma l, assistance can
occur as between closely idcntified merchants
and users.
In practice these identifications will
permeate the whole of the merchant's or~anis~ticn.
One vivid example of this "7[\::'; two me:cch.:mtsin
Nc"rcastle situated about ~ m:i.leap ar t; ill the
same industrial belt. One served ~.thc
Tyneside shipbuiluinS industry anG the
manager's office was decorated with pictures of
ships both built and under construction. On a pil~
on the table were various journals related to
shipping. In the other merchant's office in place
of the ships vas a photograph of the mcnufacturcrs
plant and the journals covered the component
industry which supplied him. It was this example
that really focussed the researchers attention on
the critical role played by how the merchant OJ
sees his position in the distributive nyntcm
when he was invcsti3ating why those rwo merchants
had reacted in totally different ways to co~e·
competitive activity.
It would have been convencient to be able to
consider all merchants as lying somewhere between
these extremes. Unfortunately this was impossiblo,
because thc·P3seemed to be a certain indcper.dence
bet~cen the inte6rntion achieved with users and
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supp Li.crs, Some merchants saw thems eLves at
both ends of the scale at once, bein3 closely
integrated with both user and supplier. Others
Sa\-1themselves as quite itldependent of both and
totally isolated. It must not be asked how it
was possible in practice to be closely integrated
with both, the tmportant point is that this is
how the merchant construed it and this \07ascon-
firmed by both his suppliers and users. Thus it
was necessary to consider the identification and
integration of merchants with users and suppliers
as two separate variables, although complete
independenc~ cannot be claimed.
A.4.3.2. Towards other merchants.- - -
This basically reduces to a scaling of
attitudes to other merchants ranging from complete
competition to complete co-operation. At the
competitive end of the scale merchants were
bitter enemies fighting each other for any
customers they could get, undercutting ~here
necessary and taking every opportunity to
undermine the customers confidence in other
merchants. Moving along the scale, merchants
are willing to co-operate on aspects of busin~ss
above the level of trading. This is where trade
associations become valuable, maintaining open
the possibility of meetin& on neutral territory.
Midpoint on the scale competitive and co-operative
additudes are finely balanced. Merchants know
each other socially and will often help each other
out in times of difficulty, ~erhaps by supplying
the oc1 component or delivering the odd parcel.
Rules of behaviour regarding customers begin to
arise now and the most flagrant acts such ~s
poaching a major customer are condemned, yet each
side would still be proud to say he believed in
'strong heal thy competition' •
Movin'~ towards the other end of the scaleo
we find the consolidation of rules of co-operative
behaviour and the emergence of demarcation agree-
ments. Merchants have I their own customers and
specialities' and others respect these boundaries.
Poaching of any form is frowned u~on and likely to
~ake a merchant ostracised amongst peers. New-
comers in an area can stand this but families with
deep roots in a c~mmQ~ity will find the pressure
for conformity seeping through their personnel
contacts, or of those of members of their family.
This phenomenon is common enough; examples,would
be a merchant's wife complaining that 'people were
talking behind her back' or another merchant's
wife had 'cut her dead', his children would return
with stories that another merchants children had
overheard their father say 'he's getting a bit
above himself' or 'he just ought to watch himselfJJ
1r.·1./ I
if I find that he's been sniffin~ around
any of my accounts then •••• , invitations
will begin to drop off and company salesmen
will mention confidentially they are 'findin3
it difficult to keep comin3 to you, other
merchants have thr~atened to switch some of
their trade unless I stop servicing you '.
He will find that some of his orders from
the distributor have 'got lost in transit',
If the merchant persists in his expansionist
policies and the local market is a particularly
well established and stable one served by
several merchants he is likely to brins serious
victimisation on himself and his family. One
case in particular be3un with the merchant being
'cold-shouldered' in local meetin~so he stopped
goin5' then his vans started to have a suspicious
number of flat-tyres, his child was ostracised
at school and his best clerk was enticed away to
a competitor by a mixture of threats and an
improved position. His new level of trade
entitled h1~ to request an increased discount,
but he was discreetly warned by the manufactur-
ing firm that this could place him in an imposs-
ible position, Ite ignored the warning, but very
soon a couple of his bigsest customers ~ald that
they had received a very attractive offer from a
con~ortium of othar merchants which it ~ould be
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impossible to refuse unles:; he could 60 part
of the way to matching it.
At this time his health deteriorated with
the "Torry and having to do the vo r'kof his sales
clerk as well. DebatLng ,·~ithhis ,·,ifeabout ~,'hat
to do, they decided that 'it would be for the
best if we trirr~e~ our ambition a litr.le'. As
a concession he withdraw a quotation from a
customer normally serviced by another nerrchant;
whom he was trying to gain. This was recognised
by others as a signal and the pressure began to
relax. Within six ~onths of the whole affair
beginning it ~as over again, albeit with the
merchant operating at a level 10% - 15% abov~
his previous. By obscure references he indicated
that any further ambitions would be confined to
increasing trade in a neighbouring area, which
wes developing some new ligh~ industry. TIle
affair was over but was never forgotten.
This was perh~ps a particularly severe
example of the rules and norms that a professional
peer group exercises on a member when he shows
deviant behaviour. The prob'lem was how to handle
this sort of behaviour in an analytic fashion.
Some researcher~ raced with similar pr-o cesses ,
especially in production planning, say that they
are only concerned with strategic iss~es and that
1)5
these tactical display~ of l~haviou~ are ignor~d
for the sake of Gaining at least a workable
model. Thepecple who do consider these problems
usually have them as their prime focus, e.g.
industrial sociGlogists investi~Dtin3 the
legitimisation of rules of behaviour for work
groups conccrnin3 demarcation disputes. But
~hen studying strategic decision makin~ in volatile
environments, such as distribution systems, the
actions of decision makers is seldom based upon
long-term economic considerations. In these cases
strategic change is the agglomeration of series
of tactical changes each heavily dependent on the
attitudes held by actors at the time of the
decision. To cut these factors out of the analysis
would be like trying to explain why the branches
of a tree took up certain patterns while ignoring
the existence of the tt~k.
To finish off the scale there is the complete-
ly co-operative end. Here merchants act as one
voice, they 'carve up' the market amongst,them-
selves and agree on prices and discounts. They
are then free to concentrate on stopping new
entr~~ts and making sure that the manufacturer
cannot possibly So direct to the user. The
'custom and practico' described above is rigorously
enforced with heavy sanctions against cases of
infringement. This extreme is very unlikely to
come about althou:;h the attitudes that it
involves can well happen und remain for a
certain period vhen an already cooperatively
active merchant boay is threatened from
'without:.
For every order passing betw~~n user and merchant
or merchant and supplier agreement must be reached on
discounts, quanti ties, deli.very, credit extensions etc.
It is the process whereby agreement is reached tha\: is
here termed the bargaining relationship. The bargai~
might never be contested, or it may proceed by letter,
telephone or face to face. It is usually drawn out
over a period of time and interim agreements are
frequently made. Bargaining of one form or another
will occupy most of the sales clerks and salesmen's
day at both the merchant's office and the sales office
of the manufacturer.
/
The bargainins relationship is the vehicle used
by merchants to maintain or adopt their po~ition in
the distributive system. Unlike transactions intel~al
to a firm which have to be maintained regardless of
antagonism between sender and receiver, c.f. Lawrence
and Lorsch(1967); or Walton et al (\16b),there is n
serong possibility here that complete breakdown will
, '
occur and the relationship cease. It is thus in the
interests of both parties to have a finely graded
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series of stronBer and stronger bargaining
procedures so that there is adequate \larnings
to both sides that the point of total_breakdown
is being approached. This series of procedures
will be described ranked' order given by actors.
Thus~ if an agreement isn't i~~ediately found the
two sides would attempt to find some kind of com-
promise, usually on the factor about which there
is most disagreementv They could 'meet each other
half way' or 'give and take a little'.
If thi~ did~tt work satisfactorily actors
woald begin to introduce other factors to trade-off
against each other. Merchants wo~ld say to users
'we will get the goods to you now but we won't be
able to offer such generous terms' (delivery against
discount), Again, 'you can have some now and the
rest later' (delivery against quantity). Again, 'you
can have the goods but I can't extend any credit if
1 agree to those terms' (discount against credit) or
'1 can only let you have them on those terms if yOU
are prepared to take a few extra' (discount against
quantity). Notice all these are pairwise comparisons,
there was seldom found evi.dence of tryad relationshi.ps.
If trade-off such as these 'parallel' trade-offs
don't work actors may try ~hat will be' termed 'sequential'
trade-offs. Examples mtght be 'I'll get these goods to
you this time but rememoer that this is a favour if ever
I want ono in return' or'we went out of our way to keep
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you supplied last, 1 think you could give us more
flexibility now', or a3ain'if you are prepared to
place a regular order we might consider better
terms'.
If none of these llieasureswork, more dr8stic
steps rosy be needed but these begin to strain the
stability of the relationship altogether. One
example is 'stonewalling', one side refusing to
move from his established position. Where any
further progress is impossible and the decision
cannot be delayed any further a mediating authority
can be sought. The sales clerk and purchaser
might refer the matter to their respective managers,
or the manufacturers sale representative in the
area might act as 'go-between. Either way, it is a
preliminary declaration that the maintenance of the
relationship is moving out of their control.
Past this point the order may be taken elsewhere,
but in such a way as to leave open the chance of doing
business on an alternative order at a later date.
More serious than ·this is when disa3reement is
so intense as to threatr;n business trading on all
goods in the foreseeable future and the account is
effectively closed. This is a extremely rare event
outside of some structural changes occurring in the
distributive syEtcm, and is usually caused by
personality. differences bcnerated outside the
sphere of business influence.
From the analysis made within the distributive
system it was clear that merchants who identified
core closely with users would be prepared to fight
a harder bargain \lith suppliers and vice-vera.
Of course, from order to order this would fluctuate
widely, but the average trend was there.
By varying the pressure used to come to agree-
ments with users and sup~liers, an individual
merchant could manoeuvre himself into a position of
being more closely allied with either the user or
the supplier, If he wished to move into a position
of close cooperation with other merchants then it
would be necessary for him to 'fall into line'
concerning what was judged in the merchant community
to be the 'right sort of trading terms'. Conversely
if he felt no more need to be part of the merchant
community, then when an opportunity arose for him to
demonstrate his independence by accepting er rejecting
terms that the other merchant thought reasonabie, he
would take it.
With this general model of merchant action it is
now possible to explain in a descriptive way much
that previously either could not be explained or had
to be explained away using partiCtllar details about each
ca~e. Of course, the model here is still very
crude, and much merchant behaviour can only be
explained by considerin3 the special cases.
Nevertheless it was felt by analyst and manage-
ment alik~ that given the problem of attempting
to predict a merchants r~sponse to a cert~in
set of economic variables, then the prediction
could be made more accurately and more reliably
if information about his cognitive position was
known. Similarly on presenting a whole geograph-
ical region containing several merchants with the
same changes in the economic variable, it wa~
thought possible to decide which merchant '-lould
do one thing and which another by using their
individual cognitive positions.
Thus the bargaining relationship that merchants
maintain with users and suppliers provides a delicate
balance of power across the boundaries of the or3an t.s ..
at ions in the distributive gystem. Changing this
balance either reflects or generates chan3es in how
actors in the system see their roles in relation to
others.
A.5. THE INTERNAL ORG<\NIS_ll~TION OF THE CO!-'!PONPNLEIRtl, •
......-..- - - -
For completeness a very brief sum:narywill be made
of the internal operations of the component firm. Thus
consider the highly simplified diagram below;
Orders
by
Post ~
Special and
Non-Standard
Scheduled Standard
Production
Planning ~
Progressing
and
Shop loadi.ng/fInventory
Control /
or
Telephone
Standard
-~-_----Jrll' _
Review Shop
Schedulers Offices
!he Sales Office.
For standard items the sales clerks have to agree
with the customer on di.scount, delivery and quantity. He
knows the stock situation and of any replenishments already
in the pipeline. He also knows the pressure of demand on
that item and also the pcens-rre on each section of manufac-
turing. He will attempt to retain the customer's business
without jeopardising either the production of other goods
or other customer's orders. For special 0= non-standard
, 1bO
items he needs to liaise with Prnduction Planning for them
to estimate for a quota tion or for advice on whe the r' tbe
design is feasible. For scheduled standards the clerks
maintain a file of customers order~ thac have been scheduled
over a period of usually 6 to 12 months. He reviews this
frequently and issues orders from stock as necessary_
TIle clerk thus makes decisions on discount, delivery,
first delivery quantities, guaranteed margins, manufactur-
ing priorities and stock allocation.
Production Elannin?, an~QUtrol.
For special items PPC is responsible for estimation
and methods. For standard items they maintain the stocked
standard inventory. They also undertake all the progress
chasing of orders on the shop floor. Their major room
for manoeuvre is in loadings, priorities, delivery dates,
stock replenishment quantities and reorder points.
The Sh~E.!.2.Q.£.
Although the bargainin6 continues down to the individual
setter or operative, for the present purposes we can r.onsider
it finished when the scheduling clerk fixes a mcchine loading
schedule with certain priorities attached. Although' the
internal procedures of such a firm are on the surface
exceeding complex, the above simplified account shows that
the transactions continue through the firm in much the same
way as they have already travelled from the customer. Each
organisational unit within the firm has to bargain with
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the next on certain product characteristics. Also the
degree of identification and integration varies between
units in much the same way as has already been seen for
merchants. Thus at one time sales might consider it
their role to protect the produ~tion facjlities and at
another to concentrate on servicing the needs of
distributors, merchants or users. Similar data to that
drawn from the distributive syste~ was collected here,
and initially it was the intention to see how changes
-tv«.in cognitare positions and bargaining pr-ocedur-eswithin
the distributive' system were transmitteQ throush the
,
firm. \t was also the intention to Eec how the dynamics
of integration compared between autonomous organi$ational
units in distribution, and organisational subunits within
a company, with the coordination and overall control
implied by that. Although all the data was collected,
there was not enoU3h ~ime to analyse and make deductions
from it. Also it was rather away from the main stream of
this research. It is hoped to complete that work and
publish it separately at a later date.
This completes section A, the description of the
distributive system. Section B will describe the models
used to both change and predict the results of chan~es
in that system.
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B.1. INTROn\~TION.
The economic model is studied first. In the
t"o-staee model only the m3nufacturer-merchant-user
system is considered, but then the three-stage model
introduces the distributo~s. A section then describes
the linearisation of the merchant discounts~ and tpe
decomposition method is developed. The theoretical
extension to the depot case can be found in Appendix 1.
Then the d~tailed calibration of the behavioural model
is described. This followed by a section describing
some examples of its use in measurement.
The development of the economic model has previously
been published as
Discussion Paper W.17
Centre for Industrial and Business Studies
University of Warwick October 71
and some comparative computational work between decomposed
,and undecomposed models will shortly be published as an
appendix to the above.
}'irf;tly, wo s haLl, co ns Lder- the 2-star;e problem, whor-e the
distrlbutoX's are absent, then the 3-staBc pr-olLun, f'oLl.owed by a
dis cu aai on of our de c oiaposd, tion meth cd s ,
B.2.l The 2-Str1f:e Chnnnel Choice 1.~()tlel
Conai.d er' U ner-charrt s , one geoera?bicru area, one product
ran{;;e, ani an order size classification Vlith N groupines. These
restrictions can easi.Ly be dro pped dot a lp,~er stage. Use the
follOVliI'\g nota.tion.
T.. (i = 1 •• N) is total market for group i
~
S.1 (.1 = 1 •• M) is total trade throuOl im rcharrt j.
zi (i = 1 •• N) is direct sale s from manuf'ncillrer to group i.
yr (i = 1 •• N, J = 1 •• M) is sale B from manufacillrer to
merchant j falling into group i.
xi iR similarly sales to group i from merchant j.
pj is transition I stock holding poli~yl ~;atrix for merchant j.
ai too cost of delivering group i ~ rmrchant .1 per component.
Pi the cost of' delivering group i direct per component
Thus the total cost to the ml'nufacturer is:
, .
M N
t E a.1
.1=1 i=1 1
where f j 15 the dis count paid to the
j j
\'11th the corid1tiona, xi Yi z. ~ 0
, ,1."
jth merchant.
Jd '.1ani t Xi.1=1
N
xjE
1=1 1
:: = pJ ~j
ThuD sub stLtu tLnr; for y_j
C t .. tjj ,j t[_03 = ~ u p x + ~ z
J - - - -
(~up;u3-M'f'1( -c i""~ ~~~~)
1r.,\ l (
+ ..,l_
j=1
f.
J
v.h.i.ch is a mcde'L f'id.rly siniJ.[ll"' to the cl a sni.c n], 'trnl1.sportq.tion' mo.Le'L
t· .
wlth cost mat:..:1.x [aJ pJ -I;Q] .The d.:Lf'fercnce between this model, and
the cLl.ssicp.1 one is thtlt the coLumn totals S. (j :-::1 •• 1.1) ar-e decision
J
var-Lsb Io s vTith a non-linear cos t component. ]'ormil16 the LOGrangian, \'iith
the obvious definition of multipl:illrs;
t· .~J pJ
M IT M
j~1 fj(Sj) +i~1 ui(rri-zi -j~1 xi)
+
. . j M
x~) - ~ t ~~'I-.. - t
~ 1 j. ~i j=1
M
T - Z
i J=1 s .)J
then the Kuhn-Tucker condi tions giyo: ..
= 0 (1 )
81or- ; Pi - ui -Oi ; 0uZi ..
8L 81'j (Sj) + Vj ru j - ~ ~.0 Vj (3)rs ;J BSj
,\j xJ = 0 ·Vi,~ (4)1 i
e z Vi (5)i i = 0
J.lj
S Vj (6)j = 0
11.13. the llot,~;.tion pj(i) moans the i - th c o'Lumn of t':!Cl r.::·ltri..~.
( ii:,.u;;tions (1) ani 4) e:ivc tIle result ilHLt citl!er flcm x , is
J
0'...- t.....i ~)j(i\, - u. "v , 0 l' 1 • '1 1" l't -~,'t'ZGrc -, r; - L ::: ...; UC.l l.J t..1C U~U<l. op"tlIlla ....L:J CO)lU.J. ·l.on
J. J
on th e cells of' the I t.ransp or-tata on' method ,
E~2.uations (2) ani (5) tivc c:r.actly the same re S..1 I ts 1'or !!. except
that be cau ae the problem has boen fo r-muIated in a rather convenient way
the sha dow price co rr-e apond'ing to the ~ column is taJ.:en to be zero.
E(~"H~,tion3(3) and (6) Give the result, either no business passes
,throuGl mcrcl~u1ts j (Sj = 0) or ~ + Vj
ss.J
Roferriuo to the roorchant 5 with non-zero
V.
J
f'lo','/ as 'a.ctive' v:ith nobat.l on
t.~n ~ + Vj - ~ = 0 j~ A
oS.
J
Sf j + vj - ~> 0 j lA
oS
J
...
Thu5 defining the function,
G ~) on M-space represented by thc vector..§ (I.S
G ~) = tiin val~e of the 'transportation' problan wiih
these value sar S; with the direct pt\. th absorbing \
the slack danand, ,y\,p~ is. ~~ >'\c0' rc.SSI~ t\.,rCI\A~'" 0. >'Y'QJl~~
~~l(,
. The cl>ove problan recu ces to:
},~ GC!) such tm t ~t=:-b==co e.oc\... So i. h 0
U N
and l: Sj ,T = t Ti
j=1 1=1
and the optimali1;,Y con:l1tions beco:oo,
~,..(~\ Sf.
~~'!:.\U,; - 0 .EA"n - a + V. ;:,,,) .
0;.) • J JJ J > 0 ./A
J
ir.lpJ.yinG that the gradient vector on the (i.(~) surf'ace climbs away f'rorn
any op iriraum on th e boundary , a result to be expcoted , As an aside, novr
that tiY:l of.·t:1.mality condi,tions have been develol)?d the plausibili zy
of' tho result in economio terms is noted. It states tha.t, at the
opt imum, the Inarcinal dis count payne nt to a channel must cancel out
tm shadow price. The pa rruneter- ¢ gives information about the direct
cba nncL, being zero when the re is some direct f1071. In the special case
when dLscount s arc a fixed proportion, t.hri.t is, v.hen r. is 1imar, the
J
result s simplifY as bela.'n
Min Z Cj Sj + transport solutioll for Sj ~ 0 andj;:1
E S ' TJ j
. . •..•. i
This very simple linear model has tre optimality conditions;
C +-(-y5 = 0 j f: Aj j
> 0 jJA
t i pJ(i) -:ui· _Vj = 0 active
j
ex Xi
> 0 otherwise
Pi - ui = 0 active zi
> 0 otherwise
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
if xi
j is act1.vejf: A and (7); (9) eLve
C + tex j pj(i)_ui - ¢= 0
j - .
ThUs if bo~h 'i and xi
j are active
Cj ~tg"j Fj(i) -Pi = ~ = 0
Thus it can be concluded that bofu can only be active under the freak
conditions
. . t j j(i) .
Cj + ex ~.. -j3 i = 0, and in general Ii will'be active vhen
Cj+ tz. j.l;l.1(i) - Pi > 0 for all j = 1 •• tt. xi will ha active vhen
c. + \;_j pj - Plo' < 0 fer c....'1Y j and. t~c lo~in{ Cl<:. + \Y:'.l.,k(i) - (1i 1 occurs
J k
at k = j. Prom physical considerations th if; is obvious anl stcitcs H-w. t
if -t~cre c::.:i::;tno chmnel e ccnorric e of scale bus Lro ss will f10y; alone
th e path d th le asf unit cost.
'l'he Lmpor-t.anceof tho optimality conditions derived Move stem
from t.ln cff'icicncy of the search routine s tInt arc possible ere» the
curf'ace G(§)in M-sJ.U.ce of li. Thus eonsi dcrine the problem of optimum
. euC.I...Si..7(D'
G(,2) such that t~m~oand. }'! Sj ~ '1',
'. j
Then the downwarderadient direction
seeldng on the cons tz-adre d s ur-f'ace
supposd.ng §.O is a feasible point.
is given by
-\J'§. Is:so = - cl
v.here
+ v .- < 0j
dj = 0 otherwise
But every interation of tOO 'transportation' procedure gives
cp and vj (j = 1 •• n) as a by-produot (that is US ing eny dua.l variab le .
approach such as the stepping-stones method). Thus each function evaluation
gives the gradient c1irection as well.
B.2.2
Tile re~tric tLons abou t produ et ral1te run CcoCro.T)hicnl urea arc
ret aim d but. the e.na.Iy si.s extended to include tho d iztributor Icvel ,
r.r1~ re is no less of Generality ii' t\!-'3 dil'cct bypasa path
past the distributors is treated as an extra distributor with a unit
tronsition stock matrix, and [1.180 do the same for tlu direct 1YP,'l~3ing
of tre mer-chant; s , The folloviil'll.5notation ls additional to the two-staGe
model;
Let nk be tre dis tributors transition matrix
. .
. th
Letrk be total throuehput of k distributor.
Let gk (rk) be the ~scount fumtion of the kth distributor.
Let v/ik be flow of ith good from distributork to manufacturer.
Let aik b2.uni~ cos:t. of ith goods from distributor k to manufacturer.
Thus;
}.t
1;
j=1
N. jE I
1=1 1
xj ~0.i
(1)
Y"
j
y. i,.1
The ordez-pnssing relationships at the merchant level.
z- j = pj~) -1 (3)
. j
Then there are tm conservation conditions between merchants and
distributors, where Zijk 1s the amount of the 1-th good going to the
th 'k distributor from the jth merchant.
t,~iJk = ~ .. Yi,J (4) .
Ittik 1s}he emoun~of the l-th cood going to the kth distributor
then
find thcn
w.}
Dk ,I,- ~·k Vk- :
N
rk " to' 'V'k= t.i=1 ~K
(6)
(7)
'roo cost to the mnnufacturer is
E t
E 11
(sj)z 'Wk + ~ ek (rk) + }; f.
}c;:l
'~·k k:::1 j=1 J
(8)
E= ~
k=1
also
rk =~ tik = ~ ~ Zijki i j
also (3) and (4) give
~ Z'Jk = pj ~j ;.'
This has elimin<lted the variables tik and yr.
(10)
Whendis cussing ,the economic variable 5 in the dis trlbution
system it was Wicated that distri?utor discounts are always 'bla.nket'
type, just being a per-cerrtage of total business value and not being
dependent on t ctal vo1UIOOfor tre discount rat'3
Given that the mareins calmd by a distributor will be different
for each merchant traded with, we have;
~ (r) t. e' ~Ie k = 1 kj j Zijk
Where 6}<:j is the contant margin on di5t~ibutor k ,discount for'
mer-cbant; j.
The problem twa redw e s to;
E [t' _k ,tt .'Min t ~.k.D E z.'4k + r.
i=1 j=1" i
sue h that (1), (2) ana. (10) hold.
"['t' ",' t .Di(i)• J. n ...," ;:: a'.l
J.Jj,~ - ~ + Ol;:j and i'ormll16 the Lacrc:tllCiDn,
with the obvious d.efinition of multipliers ','[0 obbai.n ,
1, ~ i; Z I:. • " Z, " +
, 'k J.J!( J.J_CJ. J '
~ f. (sj) + i; u, (T, - r.x~)
J J' i J. a, l J.
- ~ ~ ;\,~
i j J.
n, _;) t
3.1k Z, ikJ.J ~
N '", '
z p~ "1 J - E J6 ,SJ
1-" il . ,j-I ' J
u ,
+11 (T - E sJ)
j=l
The ~:Ohn-'luckcr conditions nre then;
oL
:A ijk - - 71· . 0 V~ijh. lJijk = (1)l.J i,j,k
¥j - Aj
N j
1J~j 'i= 0 V1,j (2)= - IJ - v + ~ P1ioXi i j i 1=1
SL. 0£1(sj)oSJ = ("
+ V'. - ¢j - '" = 0 Vj (3)SSl J
, j i = 0 Vi,j, Ai Xj (4)
lJijk Zijk = 0 V .(s)1,j,k
¢j Sj = 0 Yj , (6)
Aswell as all the initial constraints.
Fromequa~ion (5) if Zij'land Z1j2 are both,l- 0 then
llijl = lJij2 ' = 0 which f'rom' (l)implies
~ljl = 711j~~=A1j2 ,: or even further if'
Zijk'l- 0 Y.k (~ij(i.e. distributors active ~n (i,.1) path)
then ~i.1k= 71i.1 Y k (Aij
This nonsensical, result implies that no two such Z ijk cm
exist both I- 0, excepb by the chance result of their costs ~ijk beine
equal. Thu8all the other lJijk >0, or equivalent~ aijk - 71,-t 0
1r)!.!., '
TJ 1:1 t' (')~ ,"'It 'h lln""-"(":J, ..·'O flo "-i ~".ll l,~p".' .!":,Y,'r.,:'t ".'.0 k 1·~'1.1.~.,t~+:lUS~ C_.Cili:'..J,Y, 'ne .n,; Z'!k :I:.·!, •..'.'1/'''.1 ;,.' ,,_'.'~ .__ - _ v
.. J.•J.
000 Yihich 1\3.8 nri.n.lmum L,. '] •
E J.J .:,:
I:ot )]. ,
l.J
= ' !cl; '1 (6. D. 4!1
k=1 ijk).= ijl:' p ..J.J
an:l thus z , 'I = 0 if' k J k It.
J.J <:
Thu~ in the nrlrrlrsum co sf position par-t.Ic ula r- r-eoix.cr-s rIDli}
par-t Lcr Iar' merchant S vzi,11 t"O to the same dis tri buto r ,
The pro hLen 110W r-educe s to:
Uin Z E + E f " (sj)i • p" qijJ J.J j J
such that E x~ ;::T. V.j J. J. J.
~ x~ sj V.i =J. J
wheveq , , ~ N j i;:: z. ik = ~J.J J.J • Zijk ;:: Pil Xlk 1=1
v, j
J.,
this simplifie d to:
1;-
Min E E bj i 1; (sj)Xl + fj
j 1 i J c
such tha.t ~ x~ Ti Vij ;::'J.
and z xj SJ Vji ;::i
and x~'· ~ 0
J.
vlhere the cost coefficients arc.;
~ = .~' Pii M~ [i (%:rlc
~ r=1
dk (,,' . + 0 'kJrl. 'J
This is on I almost transp:>rtati.on problan' £I.~ before, again
leav~ a corntraimd non-linear optimisation problem made easier by
usi~ equations (3) and (6) so mat;·
llj. (sj) + v - '1/1 = 0 j~ Aj •8 S J
> 0 j€ A
There is notrouble extendi~ the model to deal vd th both 3-stnc;cs
l' ,,-( .,,)
and a multiple set of ceocr':t;Jl1ical recions.
Defining r.L'~ aa t,bc mar-ke t f or pro QUGt Cr.mp i in )',;[).Ol1 1:: (~n':1
l.
dcfinilw b .. k E:tS bet'cr-e except t.lwt t.he k-h!~bx r-ef'er s tu a mercLant' n
'0 l.J
trClllsactions in the k-th regi.on, then;
MinLZ~ b k
le i j ~j
\; kwoo re I. x ..
J l.J
nk= J •a
+
,. f,4
j j
Vi,k
V. 1J, C
Vo 0 kl.,J, .
V.
J
i
x. ok ~ 0
l.J
I: sj = sj
k k
Apart from th e last' complicating' constraint set this is
separable •
B.2.3 The JJinearisation ~he Discount Pavments
Concentrating now on the functions f j (S j) which up to now
have been considered the discount payments per' merchant. l.!erchants
can be interpreted as either autonomcus nnrchants to whomthe firm
pays discounts or ownoddepots. For the former, ihe greater the Sj
the 'greater the discount rate, althou@1 charaoteristioally the rn,'\r~nal
change in the discount rate w.r.t. Sj will be decreasing. Thus fj (Sj)
in convex w.r.t. So. For depots on the other hand the cost of maintenance
. J
is charactOristically concave, reflecting eccnomdc s associated wi.th
increasing scale of oper-atd cna, Thus one may anticipate trouble vIi th
local versus global optima ",hen considering depots, and this is disrussed
further belOll.
At the momentonly autonomous roorcmnts shall be considered, ar.1
we have a convex problen •. Limar approxinations to the se discount
functions were made. Thus, as below, reS) has been a.pprox'imatedby
three lineBr segmenta;
-l'7G
f (S) d.iscountpai(l 1.0 merchan b
/
slope = 02
slope = I
I cs
The strict approximate function is
g (s) ~ 61 S for 0 ~ S , Ql
= °1 Ql + 82 (S - Ql) if Ql ' S , Q2
=81Q1 + 82(Q·.2- Ql) + 03 (s - Q2) if' Q2 ' S
But this would.require entry-restrictions on the set of basic
. .
variable a in the transportation procedure. Forillrntely this is not
necessary, far in practice the progromwill rever load the second
sef.1llentat a margi.nal, cost of 02 before tm first ee(9!lent is full,
as .81 < 82• Thus the entry restrictiolr. can be dropped and each
merchant is consdd ered as three mercbmts; tl:e first vlith a maxi.mim
capaci ty of Ql' the second ard (Qz . - Ql) anl the third unconat.red.ne d,
kr kSetting bij = bij + Or and. using in:lex r to refer to limar
segment5, tile problem becomes.
where l! l! kr Tk
r J x ij = i
1: kr sJ
i xij = kr
kr ~ ,.xij 0: V1jkr
(r = 1,2) YJ . .'" where Q~= 0
Aguin Oll\~tjlG last an; 'colJlplicatinG' conut.i-al.nt s , At every
opportunity r-e su Lt a were -;t:csted fen.' s en s lt.Lv Lt.y Lo these Li.nour-
approx ima+Lona and in only a few cases were they found particularly
sensi.td, ve , 'J:he ab ove problem can be formulated as a transportation
. type problan, thus;
0°<:':>00 .•. oo~oc:.
000
-"1 .c..
. •. 0 0 0 (;:)<:) 0 (;) .. • -:--t- c\~'N\"'\~
(ov::.000
000
•.
i
JQ..V'f'\o.vu\ c-q~,~"~\oc..~
1~.!~Q.c\ \-:.~~
\ \
\
I,
I
----·-·--~~--~nT--~
each of Lhe diagonal bl.ocko refCl.'S to 11denand area. The .(;OlUlan th~.:.lL;
Groups of const.rrd.rrt s which it had become appa rent wer-e lY!CCSf:wry; t.hLs
was tre potential in rrarl;nt k thnt co1jld be serviced. by mcrcherrt j,
kreferred to as Z J. Thus however attractive it may have been to the
firm for a ccr tai,n lIDrc!t? nt to handle a dis tant market there was
a:h'1o.ys SOlID :Limit on the trade he could capture. 'roo shadow prices on.
. the se constraints the n give a neasure of a ttr-activcness of Lncr-eaal ng
tic penetration of certain ner-ccarrt s to c ertaln mai-ke ba, Thus :rim.lly
la-
Mj = Min
LIin {=
{ "k Qj } 1Z ., r =J I'
k Qj l-"j r=2Z ., '111J r
Qj r=32= z~J
The entries in the matrix other thanthe,main dLagonal,are all
t;_ I
infeasible i.e. l.1 :: suitably large number , The top row is a dununyrow to
absorb excess caIncity. The row totals Y are the demandthat ccu Ld bep
filled ~ a certain lincar segmerrt of ne rcharrb, but cannot be be canse of
the Q~ contraints. Thus;
Sk ~-r for all k am
E sj ~ Qj Qj thus
k kr r r-~
or
Somepratical paints maybe stressed here. '£he direct shipments from
i
manuf'a.cturer to merchant are to be handled via a distributor with D a:o,a
unit ma.trix-and no discount margins to charge. Similarly v:ith direct
deliveries bypas~ing merchants a unit stock policy matrix is used and no
discount 1.S charged ;:lhen consi":"ering the depot case , because of the
associe.tcd i'd.t1:1tho depot, u:rl.nt~~pr-opor-td.ona'L cc::,t~ ()jk: ar-o ~iu::;tnot
ade(pate. It :i::3 necessary in this ea co to isol,d;c al.L tho (i.8:)ct 5J:.1I)j:i';~'!'~;
asthe diacrcllilof om of the t r-anupo r-trrl.l on 'blv<.;ki;' below dw,'} s ,
~ 0 0 D . ' ' ,._.o..=_c.:::..._:C)=_· _·_· ·_·.....:o~a1 DummyRow
M
EIs
)ODO 000 J Part of YCoo
I :.'..
Coo:::.
I
DBPOT OTHER
]'10':3 TO MERCHlUITS FLO:lS TO W~RCHA1'rrS
-
0 a
ewhere °0
ac
--- . .r-
p roue
krM.
J
The block 'other flows' was tile (b~ +.B) 'matrix as before.
l.J . r '
thedepot block has entrie s.
N NLpi;L~0(1' dri where (dri) is the matrix of the depot~
i=1 1'=1
sto ckholding policy. This follows directly from the definition of D~
l.
above. The constraints beneath the blooks reflect that the column
constraints l.rf operate on the sum of the trade to a merchant from both
the depot ani other distributors, including direct. Otherwise one pair
of' columns could total 2 x !i~r. Althou@l too contraints look tfldioualy
large, in practice the majority could be v~ry rapidly suppressed because
they never received any allocations.
This formulation allows the total thrO'..ll11Putof the depot to be
extracted as a rumafter the solution of the trlll1sportation problem.
Once e::tractp.d this sumwould be tr~atcdas an extra. I complicating constrnint I
havilll3its o.·m du a.Lmultiplier, as discussed below in section B.2.5.
Thus a multiplier Vlouldbe chosen, 'Jt say, and added to each cost entry in
the'dppot flOVlside' of the above transportation block. But this makes
anoth Cl" sim;)lif:ic u:l.ion poss.ibIe as the cost ent.r-ic s in the 'othn!:
If If
+ 0 ==
J..' )'
L..J
1=1
j
Pil
To anticipate the results of' B.2.5 slightly, the cost cntr.i.cs
are finally bjr+O + ",jr where ",jr is a dual variable on the total
- 1 r
c118.nnolfiovv. '1'hU3 instead of tho tVIO 'blocks' thlD'Ut}ltnecessary
above, they can be collapsed inix> one 'block' with cost entry equul to
N. 1'1
"J \'
Or) ~ilL
1=1 r=1
This means of course, that a cost matrix generation pass has
to be made for each due.l imeration but as this is a sories operation
it is not very time eonsunring,
Thus in summarywe have r-eturned to the original transportation
formulation, rhere the costs are re-evaluated' -for each run with a
different value of ~.
A v.ord at th Ls point must be said about t..~e size of the problem.
With K areas) J merchant s, 6 produc t rang es and tm-ee ~inear seegoonts
the ab ove problem was used with J = 10, k = 8 giving a 69 x 240 matrix.
At the tire this was substantially bigger than could be accommoda.ted
on the oomputer available. As well as arrane;i.ng for backing store
to be available it seemed reasonable to investiCf'l.te the possibilities
of decomposition, considering the rather special structure 01' t!le
matrix. Twoapproaches were tried, primp..l and dual decomposition.
13.2.1,- P:r.:i_lfWl DC(;(Jr,monH;j_on
,.;:...;_-- ·_--_ .._._----
Ii' J"10 ont r'Le s in the Y ro;; s arc r::i.v('.l1 by zk )v p _ p ()t
' \' k'(len " zp :-:Y p
for all cvl1i:itraint s p. Thus given a rem v0CtO:C zk. OV(;l" incled p, r.c
have a ser-Ie s of smaLl, tronsportation type problems Lndcxed by k, 'Yre
results of c1.c11one wi.Ll, Give shadow prices on the c oluranu Givi,n~
informati on of h0:1 to adj us t the ~~ for t he next; i terution. 'fnus U-le
problem r'educ es to the iteration;
Initial
Jt
--~~.Solve k
sub prcbLen s of
transport type l.,
Search over
kspace ~ v;rere
. k p. .ko 'z 'M ....andp p
kZ z ;: y
k P P
Optimal
The problem with this procedure is that the search is a
constrained one over 2KJ - space. Also this space beinG piecewise
lirear the g:L'adients are notwell-defir..ed on corner ridges 1eadil'llj
to a. rather inefficient search Pltterl,l. The main objection to this
primal nathod thouVl is th1.t the space is just too large; for even
I
~'1emodest figures a_.bove,160. Clearly a better IOOthodis needed.
Since this i-eeearch was oompleted recent work by Geoffrion (68) and,
G-rigordiadis am Ritter (69) have made the above approach more
i tractable.
I~ tl 1-] -, ':1 1_, t, J are c,j .. c' P·J_v:V,L·oualv +'111,',.',',.1._,. ,.18 ac·ct'!3., CO_'1l:" 1 'CU' .D.. .e «v W ,-'- " ~'u1:1" c i.J ... .J , Z
kr (.j..... ::..l_ ••
t.Jl~l'"L .:LJ .1
and the voIue of' tho ::;ubtr9J.1SlJortatiUl1 problem
J.lin z I; Z b~~.x?:
J. J k J.J ~J
such that kr-~ x..
~ :t.J
be represented by
~k(str, ; V j,r)
then the problem becomes
Hin ~ IPk
such that ~ Bj' ~ Qj - Qj = R.1 for all .1,. r=1,2
k kr· r z-l r
ForminGthe Lagrangf.an Viehave that the above oqueLs
Min [' z, i} +. \" Aj (.E S.t: - 'R_j) ]Sk, -k k Lf. ~K kr r'
j,r
by the saddle point theerem, Thus eiven a fixed value of A;' V j,r
there is the problem
}.fin '[)' ( ~ + jE AJsl - conslS.1 LJC ,r r AJ.' .~
kr
This is now sep~rableJ giving cost coefficients of ( b~ + A~ in each
cell of the transport matrix thus;
7 rows
00•••••••••••••••••••••0 ~ dummy row
3J columns Total size 21J
b.~lJ
Il both vlith k Lndex suppressed.
J
Thus t'.H~re is the folloviing ccherae;
I l~ix >.jr
Init.ial .... HSolve k;' subpr-ob Len S
~
r = 1,2
Search in >.j
Oytimnl
r
1/...,--- S~ce
This has reduced. the size of the search space to 2J, in the above
cases to 20, a major r'eductd ons , .rUso there is a byprod.uct of solvil16
the subproblem5, the subgradients of ,>.j in the 2J-space. These arer
'.'
given by the constraint slacks
(E sj - R
j)kr rk
Thus if' to 0 much is allocated. this subgr-adi.errt is -ve , To maximise,
increase'>' j which increase¢ the cost in that column, which in turn
r
reduces the amount allocated. in that column and the constraint is
better satisfied.
Another advantage ~·,this formulD.tion is that the space has only
I .
tre simple constr~l1ts ,>.~~. 0
Uther advantages 8.re;
1) The ,>.j gives a macro-control figure. Thus in effect
r
there are only J at most of interest which show the
marginal value of increasing that merchants' capncity
by one unit. In practice it was fourd tm t the dual.
varin.ble s were increasingly used far decision making
ratmr than the primal flow 0:>, which muld just be used
at the implementation stage.
2) 'i'ho pos ai.oLl.Lty oi'incoI'.l?Ol'lltine extra spur-Lone conat.rci nt r.,
For example suppose the i = j j = II- r = 2 cell in c ach
arcq cpuLd only have flam; totally a certain ar.ourrt D.
1c,2
'rhus l! x _R 7. 4 <:: D. It is onl~r necessary to add 111e
),
'-:2constraint J1(r. x ~ - D) to the above Lagr-angd.an, ll(lJ1.lst
kr k 3,4
the (bij) matrix by add.i.ng J1 to the z-eLevarrt coLLs, and \:l,p.n
search over the (2J + 1) space defined by (A~, IL). It was
i'requently found tha t there was occas i.on to consider such
constraint 5.
3)- There a re no I complicating' cons t.rrd rrt 50 in the dual space,
search is condi cbed over the +ve see;nent only.
4) Unnecessary cons traint s are not considered as they never
become +ve )thus if their duaLs begin at zero, thew never
chang e , 't'his was most Lmpor-bant, For exemp'le in the above
exnmple with 20 dimensions, se¥l0m',more than 6 or 7 were
ever positive, whdch e:.c."f.3ctlvely reduced the search space
in (..er 7 dimensions.
This dual rmthod was developed almost entirely from Takahnshi CGLt.),
but more recent work has further developed too field by Geoffrion (68)
(69) and Lasdon (68). ';,nen developin6 this work A. simple eradient method
was used, but because of the piecewise linear nnture of the surface this
proved to be most inefficient mainly because of the ambiguity of the
eradi(.:nt on ehar-p ridges. Closely following the ideas of Takahashi (61~.)
a tangential approximation method was ~eveloped.
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statinG t11.at it is re<liul'cd to find
- L'A. k ]J ( R. - 1: Z x .. )
• J k i ~J
J
kwhere tk(b .. ) is the optimum of' a transportation problem VIi th cost cocff>
~J
icients (b~j) and constraints dcflllCd by the reeion rk•
The outer raa.,d..misation is a search over a piecewise linear surface defined
on 'A-space w!lcrc~ ~ o. Fixing ~ gives an evaluation , suy <PC!:.) and also
kq. = R. -~~ x.. and hence there is the sup-
J J Ri. ~J
porting hyperplane to the surface given by
the subgradients at that point ;
CPC!:.~) + ~ - l:.~).!l~
which touches the surface at ~~ , at least.
Considering the diagram below it is .seen that if there is a series
.;" t
of such suppor-tdrig planes indexed by L , then
Max w
where ¢<z:..l.) + ~ - !::,L).!J.l. ?J W V L(L
gives an upper bound to the surface. Aloo each ¢(~l) is a lower boundo
I
I c/{)')'
I -
I
I I
I I~----------~~~,------------~---------------------J~
t. ~ ~
I .
If the op~1mumto the above problem occurs at (wi+1,~1+1) then reoptimise
, subproblems at ~i+1, which gives 0. new supporting hyperplane in the
problem ahoveo Then this is used to find a new max w1+2~ wi+1 , and so on.
i.e. at ~optimality. As the ourf'ace is piecewise linear, though, :H is oui.t.e
poasIbLe that the tBnC8ntia.l approxdmat.i on be comos exact at some point.
~'he mastGr' problem above is clearly a linear program in (w,C!) and
cou'Ld be r-ear-ranged P.S
IJax VI
~.t.
Rather tha."lhaving to generate a new row at each cycle nnd hence incrcZl50
the size of the basis matix of the master, the above L·P. was dualisod to
s.t. i~L Yi = 1.
~ i ~0
ii.JL y.q. ~£ l. J
Yi ~O
j = 1, ••m
Notice that ~he first constraint is an equality because w was not restricted
in sign.
In this form there is a fixed basis size for the master problem and one
can easily apply the column generation methods of the revised simplex
"J:algorithm. he physical interpretation of this dual master problem is that of
minimisation within a convex polytope with its vertices indexed by L, which
acts as an inner linearisation of the c.urve to be minimised.
Clearly other corners can be cub in the detailed programming of the master
problem by exploiting the simple form of the R.H.S., but theso shall. not be pursue,
her-e as they are trivially obvious.
]
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It 11[~i>be en secn tbat for tr-e depot C[I~;C t.he totul UIl'outJ1pnt
with non-convex probLcn s ar-i.sing t'ro rn the depot costs tViO ne thods
were tried.
Fir::;tly, a theorcti cal development of ~outcndij1<l.'s methoel
of feasiblB directions. This Vias never us ed in practice because
search was se'Ldcmmore than one dimensional. Only Ln one case was
a two-depot option seriously considered in Et region, ani a few
trial runs soon reduced this to effectively two one dimcnsionl'll
searches. Nevertheless the ideas are presented in Appendix one
be eause of an interesting simplification possible. The feasible
region over \,;hi.ch sear-ch Vla.S to be unlertaken had web cl. simple
structure that an analyticru. solution was possible of the quadratic
prcgramming problem required to find feasible, directions at a....
bouniary.
Secon1l.y, in practice, a simple grid scar-oh was used, with a
very crude grid. At each grid point, the depot t..hrouejlput was
com trained to be exactly a certain amount. This gave an extra
, complic nting' com traint in the dual decomposition B.2.5, and could.
be treated in tre sane wa;;r as the ' spurious' corntrcints of note 2 in
section B.2.5, by introducing just one new dual variable.
The computer program used was written originally in Fortran 4
for use on a Honeywell machine and later. rewritten in Ale,ol 60 for
use on an Elliott 4130. It used a 'transpmtation' subroutine for the
subproblem s and used 'the dual 01' the DUster problem gaimd through
tangential approximation as described immediately above.
,'1 ,', (,
I : .H..;
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CHANNEL CEOICE DECISION.----------------~----
We could not find in the literature any published
accounts of channel choice models Hhich had been used
and implemented for a series of channel choice decision~
in the sort of industrial distribution sye tem w i.t h \.,hieb.
we are concerned here. Nevertheless there we re some
accounts of channel choice or similar models that had
to be rejected as unsatisfactory for our purposes and
these shall be reviewed briefly.
Artle and nerg'.lnd.(15 9)
This paper addresses itself to the choice of
distribution channels but does so at too tactical a
level for our work. There was no need in our study
to consider such micro-questions as the 'Falesman's
waiting time per call'. So, although a sound enou~h
paper in itself, it was pitched at too detailed a level
for our work, wasn't able to consider other than a very
few decisions at one time without being completely
rebuilt and generally assumed a rather static situation.
There was no indication of the model ever havin3 been
applied.
A!!E.in~lall(58)
A theory 'relating certain characteristics of good
to the broad type of distribution required. As a
~ .
descriptive tool. it gives significant insight·, but it is
not meant to be prescriptive and cannot be adapted to be
such.
Many interesting descriptive points but although
dcQ.S. >,\D-V
he begins to develop a prescriptive model ~~ cast
this in a workable form. His model is a set of linear
equations stating that the various activities involved
in distribution must be ahar ed out between channel
alternatives to maximise revenue. As he lecves the
~opic ~here, the end result is not very helpful.
Ruckl i_n (65) '6~)
A article and book with many descriptive insights
to give into the operation of a distribution channel.
He develops a principle of 'sp~cuiation' to weigh against
Alderson's principle of 'postponement', and then investi-
gates how much this determines channel structure. No
prescriptive models are developed.
Jialderston and Ho~gatt (62)
An interesting and inforcative monograph. The
s~ulation of a distribution channel process developed
is capable of being used in many different environments.
They apply the model to the lumber industry in particular.
The results are important to the further development of
the theory of distribution channels, but we '.fishedto
have a model capable of giving results in a short period.
of time. This a simulation model seldoms does, and our
program.'t\ingmodel was quite abl\~ to do. Also the structure
of their simulation model was not well suited to our
purpose and to use simulation at all would have meant
starting from the beginning again rather than picking
up where they left off. The main purpose of their
"lode ,,;asto investigate the changes and stability
of a distribution system for en industry in general, and
as ~uch addresses itself to rather different questiuns
fro~ our o"~ work.
Consider5the economic number of intermediaries in a
distribution channel between manufacturer and user. As
-such it considers the total industry problem and is not
applicable to our case. Also .it is far too oversimplified
• .~ 't
ever to be practicable or useful.
Baligh and Richar£z (67)
This is the most important text in the economic
;
study of distribution systems yet available. The work is
thoroughly done and well presented, and studies the
cheapest distributive system given certain costs,require-
ments and rebates. Unfortunately, for our purposes, like
the previous work it considers mainly the total industry
problem, except for one chapter which is not very helpful
to us either. Also it has no parallel in its theory to
play the role·of stocktransition matrix for merchants and
distributors, and hence no classification C?f the market)iby
order size. These drawbacks made it impossibl~ to tase
<,
our work on their models although it must be stressed
that much of our early thinkine about the model was
significantly affected by this book and we owe a
great deal to it.
This paper develops a theoretical (nodal of so:ne
theoretical interest. The ba.3is of the analysis being
the varying degrees of ccntroi exercised by each level
of the distribution system 011 the others. The structure
of the channel under scrut iny is again qu&te di!ferent
~ ours and al~o m~ny points are included which are of
no real concern in our case. The,model has been pitched
at a very general level, there is,no indication of it
I;.
having been calibrated on any real model, and conse-
quer.tly no information on the proble~s that would be
bound to arise if this was attempted. This is a ~ity
because there are some Ldeas in the model that it would
be interestins to have empirical l"eVlidenceabout. In
practice we received almost no help in our own modeling
from this paper.
Conclusions.
,
This reviewed list is short and comnent on ea9h
brief,'and this is a fair assessment of our debt to
them. Published results of implemented and tested
channel choice models appears to be almost non-existent.
The material which do~s exist concerns mainly an economic
>;analysis of channel structures in general and any insi3hts
"'j (),:). ~,''-.-
we have gained about the oper~~iun of distribution
channels come chiefly from these sources.
It is hoped that the empirical results of this
thesis go a little way towards closing this gap in
the published literature. We say publ~shed, because
it is our opinion that much first class work on
distribution channels has been done within companies,
but its publication is forbidden because of the
contentious nature of the decisions and results.
B.4. THE C:\LIP.R'\ T1C'N OF TEE \LTl1'U;)~.n\L INSTl{LWd'::~!T.__________ ..... _. __ .. ..... ._ .... "" w. ..
As argued above, section A.4.1, the economic
variables within a distribution system were inadequate
as predictors of the actors' behaviour. Action occurred
partly as a fu~ction of the support the actor could
expect from others in the system, or from fear of the
actions of other 'pow~r blocks' in the system. Decisions
within the system were usually taken with incomplete
knowledge of the relevant economic variables. Access
to information concerning such things as the 'informal
discount rate' going to various units in the system was
-r
usuAlly at best second hand. What information there
was, was usually drawn from local';,nets of information',
which were characteristically maintained and serviced
by the unit's group affiliations. Secondary criteria
on the reliability of data were rife, especially
concerning 'business confidence' and 'trading goodwill' •
.Small actions by others were often exaggerated out of all
proportion by speculation on their being 'the thin edge
of the wedge' or a 'shot across the bows'.
It has also been argued that in consequence of the
above a better predictor of action would be a measure of
how each actor construed his role in the environment.
This cognitive variable would reflect his attitude
towards other actors being either a source of support or
a potential threat.
The cognitive variables rclnting to his role
vis-a-vis customers or suppliers are termed the
cognitive vertical measures. The measurement
instruments are detailed in Appendix 2 and closely
follow the discussion in section A.4.3.1. It was
considered important to preserve consistency within
the instrument throu8hout the system to facilitate
comparisons, and this has been attempted as far as
possible. A convenient metrification of the scale
was -2 to +2.
c
The cognitive variable reflecting the actors
attitude to parallel units was termed the cognitive
horizontal measure and was only relevant for merchants.
The instrument is detailed in Appendix 2 and follows
in detail the discussion in section A.4.3.2. Again
a convenient calibration was -2 to +2.
The initial measurements were made by the
researcher interviewing various actors. A certain
amount of cooperation was needed from actors while
the ideas were still in a formative stage and this
was forthcoming in most cases. The first experiment.was to compare the merchants cognitive position
vis-a-vis the user with either the user's or
salesmen's estimate of his position. (Exp.l) ~
The second experiment compared the merchants
position vis-a-vis the supplier with similar
i. ~., ( \ r"
I i,l
estimates from the other side (Exp,2) * Then
estimates of a merchant's horizontal position
were compared with est~nates made by other
merchants (E)~p.3) and also "Tith e st Lmat ec made
by seLearnen (Exp.l~). These \-1creanaly~E;d us ing
the ~'lilcoxonmatched pairs s i.gned-uank test. The
null hypothesis in this test is that the difference
be tween the pairs does not vary siBnificantly from
zero.
The numbers in this initial sample are shown
below :-
J
EXl?eriment- ~iJr.ary ;,Measurement' ..~econdar~Measurement- -
~nlcoxon
StatIStic
1 40 32 .216
2 45 39 .294
45 44 .154
4 45 42 .018
This shows that the null hypothesi~ is a long
way from being rejected in the first two experiments,
the third showing that merchants seen to agree
reasonably about each others position. Unfortunately
,
experiment 4 shows that the salesmen's estimates of
horizontal cohesion between merchants are poor
mirrors of the actual situation.
The researcher was particularly Gurprised
both with the ~se of app Ldcet i.on of' the instrurncnt
and the consistency of the results. In particular
it was found that merchants readily answer-ed the
questions in the instrument and appeared to find
them quite meaningful representations of their
attitudes. They simple found that one of the
statements in the instru~ent wac; just the sort of
sentiment that they might express any day of thp,ir
lives. The successful measurement of these
horizontal and vertical cognitive ~ariables was
attributed to two causes.
1) Firstly, they were devel~'ped in the cOfltext.in
which they were applied, usL~g the language
and nuances of everyday speech in the distributive
trade. The reseacher did not have to 'interpret'
questions, there were no form to fill in, and
the actor was quite ignorant of the quantification
underlying the questions.
;
2) Secondly, the cr~deness of the calibration led
to only distinguishing a few major categories.
Thus only substantial changes in attitudes were
measured, researcher bias possibly being a
second-order errOl.
.j ,)'?
n.4.2. Direct Versus Jn~1rcct M0asuremcnt.---------_ ..--------_
The purpose was to monitor changes in these
cognitive variables during the change period.
But durin& this period access to apply the
instruments would be frequently Lnpossibla, thus
it was critically important that af\ indirect
method of measurement was developed.
It has been seen above that the salesclerks
and salesmen can make fairly good estimates of
the merchants vertical cognitive position with
respect to suppliers. Tb~s is also the case
with respect to users, where estimates are made
I;.
by salesmen and user's purchasing agents. Thus
it was natural to use these two sources as
methods of indirect measurement of the ve rt t.cal,
position.
But as has also been seen, the salesmen's
estimates of the horizontal cognitive position
were not reliable indicators. It was thus
necessary to develop a new source for this
information.
To tackle this task it was f.irst necessary
to consider the questio~ of how it was that the
sales management of the firm claimed to know the
attitudes and states of mind of the people
engaged in the distributive system.
Typically, if options arise during the
change period that might substantially affect
the status quo of the merchant level; then the
sales management could Hell vetoe this option,
vra rrri.ngof the risk associated with taking
actions thdt could alienate even the merchants
they wished to retain. How did they gain
enough information to make them confidlnt
enough to vetoe decisions at Board level ?
It was gradually appreciated, when this was
investigated, that this knowledge was a 'feel'
or 'judgement' which had developed from a large
nu:nber of small Lnstance s, each perhaps trivial
in themselves. For example, a cancelled order
here and there, extra discount claims or smaller
quantity orders from cer.tain merchants as they
ran down their stocks. Thus their judgement was
an aggregate affect. The difficulty of sharing
these judgements with colleagues in the Boardroom,
/
was now aggravated by the impossibility of actually
'proving' anything. All they could do was to ~ite
a series of rather minor instances. The consequent
isolation of Marketing caused them to move onto the
defensive; often to overextend or overgeneralise
the strength of their judgement, and to propose
'blanket typel vetoe:z which were scarely supported
by the facts •
..
The case of these minor instances which
contributed to this aggregate Ifecl', arose out
of the day-to-day bargaining relationships between
the Salcs Office and their customers as reported
by their clerks and the similar r?lationships in
the rest of the distributive system as reported
by representatives. Thus it was considered that
there might be the beginnings of an indirect
instrument if changes in the bargains struck and
the procedures used to achieve agreement could
only be measured. The detailed description of
the bargaining relationships has already been
presented in section A.4.4. "
B.4.3. Standardisation of th~~r&ainin~ Pr~~.
Initially, .when approaching the task 0:
codifying these procedures, the complexity of
bargaining behaviour seemed so overwhelmingly
great as to prohibit ever extracting a usable
instrument. But after listening in, for
considerable periods to this process occurring,
it became increasingly clear that the rules of
conduct of this 'game' of bargaining were
tightly dra~~ end strictly adhered to. The
mechanisms which enablo a customer and merchant
to bargain and barter Until arriving at a
grudging compromise, and then to part still the
best of friends, appe.:lredat:complex as any form
;:~oo
of human interaction. Yet on closer inspection
one would be tempted to conclude that they were
~vorking from a script. There appeared to be a
consistency of behaviour i.nthe bargaining
relationship that, before it could be explo1ted,
needed to have it sources understood, and which
ought not to be accepted on its face value.
This standardisation was not enforced externally
as 'allov7able' forms of conduct, it \Olasbased on
a process of intermalisation of informal rules
found essential to adequately fulfill the task.
Five sources of this need for standardisation
were identified.
1. Standardised technology.
On any particular bargain the room for
manoeuvre was often quite restricted. Seldom
more than two of the product characteristics
would be available as decision variables on
anyone order and the degree to \vhich these
could be varied might be rather modest. This
'technological' constraint showed throuBh in
the standardised procedures. Also the trading-
off of one characteristic against another cannot
just be done at rando~. A argument concerning
the price of a special component will not be
satisfactorily settled by a compromise involving
credit extensions, the trade-off is just not
Irelevdnt. But it might be extremely relcva~t
to introduce quanti.ty into the discussion.
2. Maintenance of relationships.
Using standardised procedures means that
individual disagreements can be treated as
part of an ongoing process. The words,
gestures and responses are not new or stran8e,
they are part of the fabric of the relationship,
and doubts about continuance of the relationship
don't arise naturally from them. Bargains are
not isolated events, and it will be necessary
for the Same pair of actors to bargain on another
order some time later / o~;even the next day. If
every bargain almost led to the breakdown of the
relationship, nonnal business trading would
become 3ntolerable.
3.Consistency.
It would be careless to give the impression of
giving favours to one customer and not to another
if this was not intended, but happened because it
-is difficult to m3intain a consistent pattern of
bargaining pressure." Similarly it could under-
mine a relationship if one side 'blew hot and
"coldl simply" because consistency was difficult
to maintain. People want to 'know where they
standi. Standardised procedures are instrttnental
in mainta1~1no this consistency.
'",.' '''.
:.:' '
4. Economy of decision.
Bargaining absorbs a great deal of the day
for many people. Standardisation allows each
side to come to an agreement with the rr.i.n i.mura
of effort and time.
5. Tension reduction.
Many bus iness relationships are r-e Lnforced by
social interaction outside of business hours.
-/If every argument leading to some compromise
agreement is a unique event there is the
attendant danger that actors develop too
personal a commitme~t to the process. St~nd-
t , .._,
ardised procedures assist actors in the
necessary depersonalisation of the process
which must occur if the social relationship
is to continue. Actors can 'switch off1and
treat it as a game that is over. 'Now that's
ov~r, let go and have a drink and you can tell
me about ••••••••• 1.
B.4.4. The Procedura 1 Var.iab'.e.
Being now assured that codification was both
meaningful and possible~ the inst~ent detailed in
Appendix 2 was dsvelope~. It closely followed the
discussion in section A.4.4, the basis beins a
consensus rating of the procedures used in thA
- bargaining relationship in order of their estimated
severity. Each type was given a score given by its
')(\ .'
(._, i .:'
position in the ranking, beginning at 1 with
the least serious. Then in practice each scarp
would be weLghtied by its frequency of us e within
that particular rclat~onship.
All the transactions with a sample of 47
merchants over the previous month we re analysed
with the salesclerk and salesmen who dealt with
that transaction. The total number of transactions
were 817, but 8 of the merchants had less than 10
transactions in this period and the results for
another two were unreliable for other reasons.
Of the remaining 37 it was considered that six
had recently made a major change to stonger
cohesion, nine had made a modest change, seventeen
had remained fairly static, four had made a modest
change away from cohesion and one h~d made a major
change away. When the 37 points were plotted
there was a clear correlation between the two
measures; but more interestingly when grouped
by the changes made recently it appeared that
these affected the procedures used. See dlagrC\m
overleaf.
CH
...~2
o
+1
••-.1.
-2 E c.. c..<... p
o 4 8
A = major up B = modest up e = static D = modest dotm
E = major down
Thus although it would be tempting to use a
simple formula such as ea oI..P· this would tend
to over or under estimate CH depending on ACH,
the amount changed recently. Given another
time period's data it would thus have been
straightforward to estimate a formula for P
of the form
or solving for CHt with the position assumed statio at
k periods in the past;
k-~ i
CHt = I'(~+p)i+l Pt-i
1=0
- 2
Typical ~izes for a and pare 2 and 1
respectively so that the coefficients of Pt .-~
decay in the following fashion
i coerf. of P
t-i
0 ~~33
1 .111
2 .037
3 .012
Thus is ~"as considered reasonable to take
.k = 1 and
This simple formula was found to be reasonabl~
robust, al.though it must be stres sed that this
was used as a guide principally, all results
being cross-checked by any contextual information
available.
There were now available instruments for
measuring the cognitive positions of merchants
both directly and indirectly.
B. 5. SONE EX1\MPLES.__.------
In this section some examples of che use of the
instruments developed in B.4 will be demonstrated so
that their scope and limitations can be appreciated.
All the examples are taken from real .case studies
which occurred during the change period.
Although not entcrin3 the casework described in
section e, cognitive vertical measurements were made
for~the entire distribution chain from shop floor to
user in a way analogous to those defined for merchants.
These results are not considered in this thesis apdrt
from being mentioned in the c~amp~es below. It is
intended to analysis the results for the rest of chain
at a later date.
B.S.1. Situation_Qn£.
A distributor was purchased by a competitor.-
Merchants handling the firm's merchandise ,~ere
uncertain whether to continue trading with the
distributor under new ownership, come dtrect to
·the manufacturer or use another distributor.
There was a sharp change in attitudes amongst·
merchants and a·substantial hardening of bargain-
ing procedures almost immediately. Merchants ~et
together frequently to discuss their position and
as they did, began to gain enough confidence amonz
themselves to further increase the bargaining
pr-e s sur-c OVe1:' 1.:1-.c:next; f\:~\.; vcoks , l1crchant
cohesion was now high and vertical cooperation
had practically ceased, see below :-
cv
immediate
l>'\.>e~'c~ U\\-\... O;:d_""~
From then on merchants began to see their new
I
/.,.
roles as one-step intermediaries between
manufacturers and users revising their attitudc~
corresponding. This occurxed slowly over a period
of months and at first merchants felt it necessary
to maintain the solidarity of their "merchants'
movement". But as discount rates and credit
facilities began'to be stablised reflecting the
merchants I changed role vis-~.-vis the manufacturer.
rivalry began to weaken this movement, see below :-
c.t; \_ \, .---.,-----t-----:f--------- \v..","~1\ lcV".
/
01
Six months, or so, after the disturb~nce merchants
sav themselves as the manuf acturcr+s agents in the
ar-ea providing joint competition against other
p:coducts.
During the same period their relationships
with the users took a "di.fferentpath. Here the
underlying left to right shift was compounded ~ith
a need to gain support from users, while their
.'relationships with manufacturers were rather
strai~ed, see below :-
c.V
0'1- ...........
c...\1
Then the responsibiltty towards merchant
cohesion began to take precedence and the
cooperation between merchants and users gradually
weakened. As merchant cohesion then in it~ turn
began to weaken the merchants moved gradually into
their new role as the manufacturer's agent. '~ile
this W8E occur rLng the relnainit'.gdistributors felt
vulnerable from the manufacturers and sought to
strengthen links with mcrchant s, Both distributo!.'s
and me=chants moving to less cooperative positjons,
left the sales office to ~ry and weaken the
effect of their unreasonable demands on pr'oduc t f.on
plannin3 and control. PPC nevertheless found them-
selves forced to protect the shop floor who took
advanta3e of this protection. See the diagr~m
overleaf. As Qcrchants bezan to integrate closer
with their suppliers in the 10 - 15 weeks period,
the sales office went out of their way to assist
,this cooperation. Ihis meant that they accepted
many or.-derswh Lch they previously woul.d not have
considered. Especially present were very small
orders, a few split boxes, and some one-off
discounts ~:;rhich~vere exceptionally high. Goods
which merchants didn't stock and the previous
distributor had, were now passed straight to the
manufacturer. The consequence was that the relation-
ship between sales and PPC deteriorated as sales
t,-ied to force through rather unprofitable ord er-s ,
This should have caused PPC's attitude to the Sales
Office to harden as well as sowing the seeds of a
rift between PPC alld the shop floor. In practice
this was avoided. A special meeting accompani~d
by circulated memoranda informed PPC and the shop
floor that the company was struggling and could
barely meet its minLmum target levels. The order
was to 'close ranks' and assist marketing as much
as possible. This interference in the normal course
of events is shown within a dashed box.
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It was planned to open a depot to service two
groups of merchants which were geographically
separated. Previously they had traded directly
with the manufacturer. Apart fron geoz;re.phical
separation they were also distinct in the type of
markets they serviced. One group (say E) serviced
a new, high technology market ,..rith a few lurbe firms
and many smaller component supply firms. The market
was growing and it was thought that a shorter chain
of supply could capture most of it. The other
merchants (A say) serviced a traditional and
declinine industry made up maLn l.y of many small un its.
Initially it was considered that the depot ~10uld
service merchants but soon people began considering
the possibility of direct supply to cu~tcmcr.
this began to be talked about, A group reacted
When.
vLoLentLy feeling their trade threatened directly,
whereas B group made only a mild response. there
I
was also practically nil joint response. E~en
though plans for direct supplies were shelved it was
still difficult to channel A's trade through the
depot, they only wanted to be served direct. B on
the other hand was ready to let someone else carry
the financial and administrative cost of stocking
while'they concentrat~d on increasing their trade.
Not until the depot had managed to increase its
.: ! z .
direct cust omer account to lll~'"of the total
did some form of backlash occur as a collective
protective measure by merchants B. The 'IQ trade
through various channe Ls is shown beLow :_
~f9L£
g~Q!.
Six months after
-ie2"ill built
A from manut , 58i'o 53% 42%
A via depot 10% 18%
Direct Sales
to Customer 6'10 1% 1%from manuf ,
i:w
Direct Sales:
2%Depot-Customer -
B from manuf , 33~{' . 15~ ~3%
B via depot 13% 20%
Direct Sales
to Customer 3%from manuf.
Direct Sales: 8% 14%Depot-Customer
Total 100% 100% 100%
') -1 :.~
t.. 1 ... 1
The change in the cosniti.vc variables for group A
is shox..m be Low :-
cV
----------------/~--~-------------------·CH
/ \\/~~oJs.
and for group B;
.;-
<..V
Thus A made a sharp jmnp when they felt
directly threatened and only relaxed over a lpng
period of time when the threat wasn't substantia:ed.
B, on the other hand, took advantage of the position
afforded by not carrying the financial burden
associated with comprehensive stocking policies.
They could do this becauso the undercutting of their
trade was not the primary source of dan3cr to
them in their expanding market; they were rather
afraid of overstretching their financial resources
in an attempt to grow quickly. As they became
established and market growth slowed, thEY then
became apprehensive about the inroads made
direct depot-customer trade.
Continuing with the distinction between a
rapidly growing high technology market B and a
declining traditional market A, the diagram over-
leaf shows hi~togr&~s foi CV'positions for channels
sampled from one or the other. It is only to be
expected that such a crude definition of the A and
B dichotomy would lead to consideracle overlapping.
Nevertheless, a general pattern emerges, with the
location of channel power quite distinct.
TYPJ:<: A
CV Herch -)User
CV Merch -7' Dist
or Hanuf.
cv Dist:/M -7fHerchanu •
CV Sales Office
? PPC
~--+--'>~'Lndependence .integration
_ • indicates mean value
* sample from Sales Office personnel dealing
with A and B type markets.
It is impossible to gain muah by extendin3 the
analysis further towards the shop floor because
the A and B streams merge sufficiently to make
it uupossible to unravel them. Histograms for
merchant's CH values in each case are shown over-
leaf. Despite considerable overlappin3 the
merchants serving the separate markets fell in~o
two broad categories.
Sample
Size
15
15
15
. 8 *
?'l (.
TYP12: B---.-
-" -I 0 ..l ..~ -1. -\ 0 "'I .'{
solidarity and
cohesiveness
isolation and
independence
>
Sample size 14 for B 15 for A
B.5.4. ~ituation Fou~.
Here an example is included of a typical
analysis that might have been made before the
change period. This is taken from an example in
N.E. England including Tyne and Teesides. The
initial merchant position was as shown below :-
Merchant §.uppli.er.
Initial
position
Sa~ple Size = 17
?'j'7
Three seographical areas could be identified,
with some merchants in a position to serve more
than one.
Area 1-- Area 2--
'f.
~rea 3 Outliers
'f.. (.1:,)
Area 1 was mainly a well established engineering
and process manufacturing area with a steadily
increasing fairly stable demand, almost entirely
for replacement. Particularly relevant were
railway carriage and road haulage maintenance
plants and petrochemical 'processing units. The
area had a trade association which had fallen
somewhat into disuse, and the area was one which
would ~e difficult to penetrate by merchants fr.om
~) ,,1 ,:.)
~" I ~
was felt that potential solidarity was there if
it became necessary. There was little integration
with suppliers.
Area 2 vas a jumble of small and large engineer-ing
works needing. product Lon quantities and coal mines
requiring replacement orders. TIle area was widely
dispersed with a wide variation in attitudes and
in the ways that merchants construed their roles.
Area 3 served almost exclusively the Tyneside
shipbuilding industry and dealt with large
production quantities anci"frequent call-offs. The
industry was declining ~~d merchants maintained a
strong trade association. They also kept in close
cooperatio~ with their suppliers.
Identifying the outliers we have;
a) Large merchant servicin3 a few large accounts
for production orders. Quite remote from
suppliers, tightly integrated with his customers
but views himself as very much part of a merchant
communi.ty , and is a self-styled leader in that;
commun ity.
b) Another large merchant in a fairly remote area
servicing many minor accounts. His isolation
from other merchants and strong tnte~ration with
his supplier refle~ts exactly how he consid~~s
hi.mseLf and how others vic\.;rhim i.e. as the
manufacturer's agent in that area.
c) A borderline case in area 3. Very ~ctive
member of the merch~nts associations and
tightly integrated with his supplier. He i3
an example of what w~s called earlier ~he
'professional distributor'. He sees himself as
an extension of the manufacturer into the market
place, but also considers himself part of a
'profession' of distributors.
Thus if some direct incursion into that area
t
was being planned at the merchant lE:vel, extreme
caution would be exercised in Tyneside (Area 3)
and with any expansion that affected (a) or (c).
Area 1, Teeside, would have to be carefully
monitored to see if the solidarity expected did
Lnf act; occur. Hopefully, little need be feared
from area 2; and it would be wise to exploit
the particularly cooperative role of (b).
This~ncludes the list of examples which
have hopefully shown the scope available in the
descriptive use of the cognitive variables. The
next section e, details the use of both the economic
and attitudinal instruments during the two year
change period.
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B. G. C:01~GL1JSION 01;" SECTION B.
The intention of this section Has fourfold.
Firstly to describe the economic model in sufficient
detail for others to use the same ideas in other
distributive systems. T\-J'osuch SystClL1Sare never
going to be identical, but hopefully much of our
development, including the work on decomposition can
be reused in new situations.
Secondly our brief review of the literature shox.eed
why it ,va~ necessary to build a new theoretical model.
Thirdly we have presented details on the calibration
of the altitudinal models, again hopefully sufficient
for others to develop similar \nstrtunents.
Fourthly we have attempted to show the descript ive
pO,"7erof these models by a fe\-7examples of measurements
taken from real experience.
Reference in this section has been made to Appendix 1
for the theoretical extension of the depot case; to
Appendix 2 for the detailed instruments used and section C
fo~ the description of the models being used durins a
two year change period.
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c.r n7'J'HO])UCTIC'l~
This section constitutes e. ('..e.scriptionof tbe emp Lr-Lc aL wor'k
car-r-Led out ~.s l)~rt of'the research pr'oject in the company. The
mathene.ticel and attitudinal models developed in Rections B.2 nnn B.]~
respectively will here be used within the company and distributive
system described in section A •
The sequence of.decisions that caused the reorganisation of
the entire Ciistribution system were spread over two and n half years.
To accur~tely record all the dec1sions and revisions, the a.ctions and
reactions over this period of time would require a Ions and indisestible
chronologue. To avoid this the material has been clarified and simplified
as much as possible. These aimplii·icati.ons have been of the followine;
types. Firstly, timewise, it has been made to appear that at any one
time only c.ie set of decisions were being worked upon and when these
were made another set were ch~ged to. In reality, several analyses
would be .engE!Bedupon at anyone time and the analyst would be frequently
changing between pieces of work. ThA second silnplifica.tion has been of
geographical details. Many merchants and markets were originally inoluded
but later excluded when it was discovered that they played no signifj.cl;tnt
part in the analysis. For example, merchants who were not dealt with
originally and for which no recom:nenCl.etionswere subsequently made could'
be safely removed from consideration. Markets with a ver,y small demand
or individual scheduled orders which must go direct_~ver.Y three months
and similar cases did not constitute real decision areas and could be
removed, even though they are part of the distributive system.
;
Thirdly, most of the sensitivity analyses have been removed.
These were mainly used to test the results. Thus if a result waD .
esp~cially sensitive to chanees in certain data parameters this was
treated as a possible source of err~r and would be investigated accordin~ly.
, ' " ...
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Fourthly, only El. few at'the options investiGated ar:e J'q~c:;:,t-'?cl;
the ma.jority of' the r-equeet e m~Jl.eupon tho n.cde l \';!Jl'C minor If!C'd:ificaLicm:;
which seldom UWc1'3much difference tv the overalI pat.tern of clj_l.itrilw·~iO!t,
Fifthly, as the work developod the rnodeL u oed became more
sophisticnted. It is only the mode L in it's f'in'-il form thnt Wrts c1cscr:il)or}
in eect Lon :S.2. This section beg ins with a brief outline of the history
of the firm up to the time when the project be~an, section C.2. Section
C.3 briefly de scribes the initiation of the project. 'l'heempirical wor-k
is then embarked upon. hather than d80cribe all the chane;es in greet
detail, a compromise has been chosen. A smaller study in tho South
VltJstwhich can be isolated easily from the rest of'the work is Clescribed
first in considerable detail. Then the initial decisions occuring in
the South ",','estas part of the main natior.al study is described in 8S fine
a detail 8S is considered digestible. The work in other regions Dnd at
other times is then briefly referred to. A: summary of the position or
the firm at the end.of the two and.a half year period is then given in
the last section.
C.2 1.~f\JtT..Y CC:I~f~i\~;Y J~tG}:(~TtOt!;JD- ---
Founded just after tbG turn of the century :i.n tho U.S./I:
by the 1930! B the company dec:L1ecl ,to ctE:ve1!"k'a 'l1<trl;(~t. for' its. {;!lcineerell
components in the U.K. In order to gain a foothold rapidly) a
salesman S;nith of'f'er-e d the distribution of his goods to a firql,
Alpha, who specialised in distributing engineered components. He
also ga'le 0. three year licence to produce the conpon mt s to a
Coventry engineering firm. Just before the war Smith decided. that
the time was right to esta.blish a U.K. subsidiary. The Ameri::an
president refused the request and so Smith raised the necessary
capital and set up in business under the name of Y. He WAS
assisted by a foreman f'rom the Coventry Engineering firm, Jones
who organised the production. Thus although at this time Y was
a subsidiary of the American parent company its capital and control
were almost aubonomoue ,
rG.tllet<..u.._After 1945 bUsiness expanded rpa±d~y with Smith using
personnel contacts and his reputation for good service to develop
and intricate web of distribution outlets. These included not only
Alpha, but Beta and Gamma, merchants and retailers, often with
different tr~ding terms, involve),·in moving goods from the manuf'uc'tur'er
. )
to the market. It:..has been fairly estimated that at this time
/'
he supplied 90/95% of the U.K. market for these products. Production
methona were chaotic but the hugs stecks held in total by the
firm and all the organisations distributing managed to keep customers
supplied.
Smith and Jones kept all manageri~l power firmly in their
hands end as would be expected the distance between them and other
managerial ~taff encouraged myths and anecd cte e concernine them
which have fal!_'outlasted themselves. 'l'hisis an important point
for appreciation of the organisation aa it was when research
started. People thought dreamily of the 'good old days' when Smith
"~I,,''~,C
J' . I•.j
havin~ th~n no mRn~gerinl perogntive, important ~pcisicns
never r,,:ach8rl thsm. It was not just. [: p'cce5s uf' scc lu L
institutionalisation or a sorie s of (lefel1L:.iv8 entr·(:r:cb~Ll?ntS W}-.CIl
times turned beli th,·t led to a dev eLopmerrt of' ol'C/lnis~'.tion!l.l
and Clecision mak'i.ngrigidity. 'l'he f'orrna I isa tion of' rule sand
procedures for interna.l centr-o), and for the madrrtenance of'
relationships Vlith other organisE1tions which hod been heuristiccl1y
developed :'n Smith I sera wer-e endowed with a feeling of s anct i Ly ,
Th'9 problem of change was approached with the air of a man at,(;ut
to change his creed.
Smith and Jones were still running the company when f-mith
had a heart at tack, Partly to be ready to control the Coventry
factory should Smith go and partly to bring other European
subsidia.ries under tight.er central contro~;~ ~?e parent corporate
I
company set up a London office in 1961. Tension soon developed
between London and Coventry and it was clear that only Smith's
continued presence, albeit a, tenuouJ one by this time as he never
really recovered, was keeping the parent from exerting tighter
centralised control. Internal politics for control of the parent
.took the :heaj; ..Qut of the situation and Smith continued until
another heart attack in 1964. He was then too ill to contdnue , und
the London office took control. A new man Denison 'las put in
charge of Coventry. Jones left the company, a new man Fletcher
was at London and soon after Smith died.
By .this time the market had been entered by' seve ra I competitors
who by hard selling, discount and price cutting were making SUbstantial
inroad!! into the firm's monopoly. The parent company di spatched
exper t s t'J Coventry to install detailed ·l.'udge~y control systems in
·ac.cordance with the corporate policy' of' centralised control. 'f1'.e
effect of this was to further institutionalise ar.d formalise
existing procedures regardless of their ectual effectiveness and
~). J]
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company ~HlJ."'~ were still fi.ligbtlyincr-eaGinr: (\lthonc;htb~~n~t.l'ket
sbare w~s stee~ydeclininc. lie was aocoitious Rnd soon, 1965,
took over the international office in London, while still
cont ro.l ing Coventry. It is impossihle to ID8aiJUl'e t.he cont r-Lbutton
the.t such El man 8S Denison can make when be ha a to work in the
shadow of his The general consensus or
opinion would be that he was shortsit;hted with his polid es,
over extra.vaeant with his.budget ( he instRlled a computer, lind
built an executive extension to the manageri~l offices), and
over ambitlous personally. Yet in hindsight there is very little
specifically to illustrate this view and considerable indications
to suggest the contrary. He appointed a marketing man, fillinB
the vacuum left by Snith, he tried to mod:~rnise the control of
production and the office procedures and, most important for
this work, he began talks with all the major distributors about
the1r relationship with t.he company. These talks made it clenr
that Alpha wa.s rapidly becoffilngabsorbed into a larger British
corporp.tion and some :form of direct owner~hip was out of the
question. The talks with Beta and Gamma got· nowhere.
In 1965/66, with credit tieht in the U.K. end a slump developine
in the market, sal~s began to decline steeply. Nevertheless the
pt-oduction control was 50 chaotic that d.eliveries were e;ett1-ng
steadily worse, causing even more of a deoline in orders. U.S.
I consultants advised a cutback of 16% of the work force,' especially
indirect wOI'kers, allowing direct workers to try and clear the
backlog of work.
Durine an auortive attempt in the U.S.A. to replace the
company's president, Denison supported t.he wron~ man. He VIas now
under direct threat of dismissal. To enable himself to devote
mirl-l96G DGn:i~lOn WPS rHsm:b;sed and :i1if.by [',,:cnme 1,~!lllaGi!\~Lirector
at Coventry. At his appo intmen t t.he London cf'ficewas cl ose d,
ThH t,'!arkctinz Director had soon left after RiGby's 81)PC,j.llt'r.ent
(lS he recoGnised th!).tHieby was a production man in attitude and
expression. A considerably demoted Sales Mennger was appointed
in his place. It could also be said oi' Rie;by, t.l-at ha lacked
wide manacerial experience.
By mid-1967 be had himself' reorgRnisecl the management;
structure and it was at this time that the research cont act was
made.
Havins set the scene historically there are s3veral points
that ~ust be broueht out aGain for emphasis.
1. The obsession of the corporate par-errtfor centralised
cOlltrol,even a nen lorry r-equf red processing thl'ough the
procedures for new capital requisition.
2. Frequent change s in top management had left the company
insecure. Management not knowing how long their jobs
would last, and employees losing any confidence that
manasement knew "hat it was doing.
3. The shadow of Smith still fell long across the boardroom
table, and his ways or doing ttines still adherred to as
rituals.
4. Although Smith was a marketing man, the top management
had been steadily purged of all else except production
~d engineering orientated thinkL'8 persons. The job of
Coventry was just make sure that you produce the 'right
goods at the rieht time' and things will be fine. The
tentative movements towards the market made by Denison
had stopped, and Denison'& and his policies discredited.
It YiaS at this point that Rieby, with corporate advice,
requested help from Operational Research.
") ,):,
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When conte.ct with t.he finn \\(;1.5 mad.e the situnt:i..on\'In;.;er;
described in 'bnt I, seci;jon 3 and in tb'~ pr evLous asct Lon C.2.
Risine; t.r anspor-t costs, increasing di.scount.a,extenrled credit, t.iCht.or
manufacturing profit mar-gins , new errtr-ant s in the field combd ncd .with
an almost static totn.l market were forcing the firm to consic1sr the
restructuring of'it's m'Jlti-tier distributive system. There had of
late been several modest chflnees in the competition's distributivo
system and there was El gener'al feeling that major chances VleI'O on the
wa.y. To determine which changes were necessary in their uiatr:\,butive
system, the firm, on corporate aJ.vice, had initia.ted an Ope r-at Lone.L
Research Study.
On arrival the analyst found discuseions about the distributive
system in such a state of flux that it was not even at·~all:.clear whe the r
the sort of change anticipated was of a tact'ieal'or a strategic kind.
Polioies involving complete withJrawal ~rom distribution and a
concentration of effort on production were advance by senior production
management and some junior marketing executives with as muoh coeency
and. conviction, as other staff proposed that a modification to the sales-
force incentive scheme would. solve the present problems. Elsewhere voices
"ere raised in defence of policies to purchase a distributor or two, or
even three. Others supported purchasing merchants and bypassing
distr:i,butors, and still others conoeived of the ida of building en
entirely new distribution channel. At tbe more taotical level plans
were made for price or discount cbarges or for the strengthening of so.ne
form of franchise or dealer system. At a more strategic level there was
talk of diversification into new markets and a gradual withdrawal from
the area of er.gineering components.
From all this it should be clear that there was only ae;reement
on one point, that something was awr.y with the distributive system.
But there agreement'ended. There was no agreement on the tactical or
8trategio nature of the deoision or on the timesoale under considerc~ion
In add i t i.onno frnmewcr'k existed for evnluatin~'i tlwl eUiI:l){·,I·inS pos zri.b'Le
courses of action. To develop this f'r-emewor'k \'YBS ol.e-ir'Ly the ana)yst's
first tusk
Certain growth tar'gets we re r-equ Lr-e d by the corporation for
this tr.x, division. Even an optimistic f'orecast for the existine;
product markets over t.he next five years left a consic1erable Cap uetween
required and available buednes s, A major diversification was thu s
naoo aeary , l'here were two major areas of diversification Iossj.blc.
One was int~ msss-produced low cost items allied to the existin3
engineering components, the other was the low quantity high-cost
precision components. The recent and expec~ed growth potential of the
latter was considerably more than the fOI'mer. Also the engineering
research and development, the available production skills and the
backing ef the corporation which was movin{~in 'the hiS;h precision
direction made this the desired direction diversification. At this
stage the existing distributive system was a somewhat neutral factor
in the decision.- It,,could be expanded and developed equally well to
serve either of these markets.
The major problem with diversification into high-cost precision
components is the high risk associated with investment in research and'
development, both for machinery and personnel. In the year befol'e the
study began the company had lost £t million and was hesitant about
further investment. Thus it was deoided t.hat the only safe way to
diversity would require consolidation and improvement of the existing
product market. The existing market would then continue to provide the
bulk ef cash in flow during tho next five or ten years, and might be
run down after that if the diversification proved suocessful.
In order to ~prove the immediate cash position it was also
decided to embark on a programme of cost reduction within existing
departments.
.Continued ••••/
Thus the strccte:r.;ic lJObltloll within which the project Vias se t
was the followine.
1) A !_on{;;··termdiversification deci~ion t o move t.cwar-d s hie}l
precision components had been made ,
2) To r-educe the medium ter:u risk associated with this oecision,
the existing product marke t would be mo.intained and
st rengt.hened .•
3) To do this required both a pi-cgr-amme of cost reductions
within tbe plant and the reorganisation of the distributive
system.
4) During this reorganisation it will be necessary to maintain
as a secondar,y criterion, the future requirements of the
market into '/bicb the firm has diversified.
This study is concerned with strategies two and three.
The study beean in September 1967.
Tht")rewas an immediate decisioli to be m.a.dein tho South \·,e::.t.
Up to this time the merchants had been l;;(.rvicedby a distributor Alpha
in Bristol, BetR in Birmineham, direct from Coventry and a small amount
from 8, distributor Gamma in Lond.on , The main merchants were locatecl in
Bristol (tV!o), Glouceeter, Swindon, Poo l.e, Bath, Cardiff (two), llewport
and Swansea, making ten in all. The Bath, NeWpol't and ono of the
Bristol merchants held little stock and Viere in general fa.i:-Iysmoll
concerns. Cne of the Cardiff merchants and the Swindon one hele1 ext enadvo
stocks, with a.ll the other merchants lying somewhere between these
extremes. Tho discount curves used for these merchonts were basically
similar with minor modifications. :'01' examp.Ie, the discount rate for
the Poole merchant h~d always been 2~~ higher, because of the leverage
he exerts due to the geographical positionj:there was almost no other
way of servicing the stea~ stream of trade "from the Poole HaI~our a.nd
Bournemouth areas. Frem previous market surveys and sales data there
were satisfactory estimates of market potential for the eight pI'incipal
demand zones, viz:
1). Poole
2) Swindon
3) Swansea
including Bourne~outh and South Dorest
including about ten miles around Swindon
including Llanelli, Neath, Port Talbot and
the Morgan Works.
4) Cardiff/1Iewport inoluding Caerphilly, Pontypridd, Cwmbran,
Pontypool ar.d the lower valleys.
5) Devon being mainly Exeter, Taunton and Honiton and
Plymouth, but the total in t~~s area being
fairly small overall.
6) Gloucest(.r :1noluding Cheltenham, Stro~d, Cinderford ~nd
Lydney.
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7) Bl'istol
8) Be.th and South West Wil t sha.r-e iur.:lucl:i.nr; l.~elksham
Br-adf'o rd, Westbury, Trowbridge, Frome and Ch~-ppenham
Any significnnt demand thlt fell outside the se areas could
usually be located as speed.fic. customers and these were dealt
with individually. Ji'or example the Westland Company at Yeovil
was transferred. to the South Wil tshil'e area and. suitable adjustments
made in bhe value of' the 'goods "in order to compensa.te f'OI' the mile s
saved. The extent of' these minor adjustments must not be
exaggerated, they constituted less tha.n 3% uf the tetal in ull
areas studies, and was much less in some. The present pattern
of distribution to merchants in this area is shown below in ]'1g.
C.l The pattern of distribution to user-s for product ranges A,
Band C are shown in Fig. C.2, and t'or pr-oduc't rcnge8 D'-'S and
F in Fig. C.3 It must be noted that orders falling in the F
range would very seld.om be held by merchants but passed direotly
back to the distributor or manufacturer. Orders in this range
which were call-offs are considered in the range suitable for
the call cff quantity_
Fig
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Sales to Merchs. ABC D~' TOTN..
Swansea 140 68 208
Cardiff 1 198 80 278
Cardiff 2 l44 62 206
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DelivGr)_~s to muruhan"t.s 'Ly dlntribU~
Vnlue )/~ I-_._-- -
Alfha 922 3G.8
Bota 940 37.5
Gamma 248 9.9
Dire~t 396 15.7
! To·tal 2505 100.0
Fib. c.s
Discount.s currently paid
Swa.nsea 25%
cardiff 1 25%
Card.iff 2 25%
l:ewport 18'fo
Glo\lcester 25%
Bristol 1 27~
Bristol 2 22~fo
Bath 22~
Poole 23.!.11~"
Swindon 27~ .
'.f
The problem at thet time was a·request for a £50,000 loan
from the m~rchant at Swindon. This would provide the funds t~
expand his premises, to finance a larger stock as well as a
larger range. :Also he.could hire more salesmen and purchase
more vehicles in order to expand his business in South Wales,
Bristol and the Poole areas. He believed and could support by
crude estimates tha.ta considerable section of the morkets in
these areas were dissatisfied with the present service and would
be willing to trade with Swindon. His own sales had about doubled
in the previous five years and he had proved himself a vigorous
r)'J.C~
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entreprenr,uI'. He al re ady had a firm control over tho ~.winuon
He had El reputation Lor keerin~ a wide etccke d rnngo and for
prompt serv Lce , He proposed that he sboc Ld (leal entirely by direct
deliverie s from Coventry.
'rhe sales management; at Coventry had considered for some
time that there wa.s too much double handl~l?-gin the South West
region. ~\~13 38f; of the goods which was serviced to me rcharrts
from Beta. in Birmineham could equally well go from Coventry direct
The £350,000 tha.t Vias sent to the Bristol 1 merchent from Alpha
was clearly a waste of resources. The Alpha. depot was only a
few miles from the Bristol 1 merchant. Goins directto Bristol
1 was au+, of the question because of the strong relationship
buil t up over several years between him and ,Upha. To reduce
the market served by Bristol 1 seemed to of.ter...the only solution.. .
This could not be done directly from Coventry because of the
fragmented nature of demand in Bristol. The Bristol 2 and Bath
merchants were not well managed enough ore;anisations for Coventry
to support. Coventry also had knowledge of some liaison beginnin~
between Gloucester and one of the competitive Ir.anufacturers mE!.kin8
expansion there risky.
Another factor which concerned Coventry was the dominant
position enjoyed by Beta in South We19S, Should Beta be purchased
by 8 competitor a large section of this market could be at risk •
.Alternatively it' some of South Wales could be serviced from
Swindon, and Covontr.y later themselves purchased Beta the trade,
could easily be transferred back, alth~uehthis would have meant
unnecessary costs in'~olved in Swindon. Yet another consideration
was that it' Coventry were considerin:the purchase of Alpha or
Beta, the. price could be prohibitiv~ly higl-.because of'their
dominant position. If Covent~ had the leverage of alternative
channels to thpse areas via Swindon the
pri~o miEht be substantially reduced.
The risk of supporting SwinJon, ltf. ert f'r-omposs'i.bLe Low
return oro the loan, was the possi1ility of merchants ond distl'.tbutor:J
reacting against this encroachment by switchinr; some of their
sales to competitors. This would make Beta an even more l-Ittrac.tivc
takeover opportunity fo~ competitors.
Alternative solutions to the South V:est distribution
problem not involving EwindC"nor the purchase of distributor's
were of two types. One type involved the establishment of' El
depot in Bristol Cl' Cardiff or Gloucester. The second was the
. purchase of merchants in strategic places, e ;',. Bristol 1 or
Cardiff 1.
Tbe reaction of the South West region to major changes
was quito unknown. Most of the .channels were'woll establ:tshed
and had changed little in the last decade. The exce~tions
were the rapid growth of ~windon, the re-equippine by Gloucester
of his warehouse with modern handling equipment and the entry
of a Merchant in South Wales tradi~g ~olely w1thJapa~e8e co~ponents.
. ~, , .
Somect~ngas~ su~h as the one proposed at Swindon, it was hoped
could be cloaked by the ..traft'io reorganisation caused by the
_j" • < -<.;0 .~ t, ~ .' "
recently opened Severn Bridge and by the work begun on the J,f.4
"-. . ~ - f, ,., ~
extencion to,Bristol, espeoially, the length ft'um .near Swindon.
~ "~ ... ...... ",' •• '... " • '. • '.- ,j " , ,
There. w~~e ~learly marl~;.co~x,-seso~ a,otion open.to Coventry
manageme'!1t'supported by judgements concerning compet1tiveaction
'" 'f>' ."~ C,' '_' ,it '"" . • , • " '_ . - .,
;buttthere W!lS a,lack of an econemic framework in which to evaluate
,.~ ~ ... : ..:.. ',J; ,i, -._.'.,' ~,<;"-,,,: t~:, .",. ~ :""",_- _" '" ,,;:..' .., ..~ .,. ," ~ •
them. i.Whatwas ,requiredimmed1ately was an evaluation of the
.... ',' ~·,L.• ,," i_·,~ .•. _...•• "'. ", .. -.~ .. " t,.,,,, ,.:. "" '.",.1.",< 4..-, ."'" ., ." ; Ii· ,.'~
financial efrects of, .and l'edirection of soods imp11edby these
~~.t.~-.';"'~· ""'i ..- ~.i • .).;. \":'.4 -~ ",-4.;.;' "~ i' r'·::~~.t.>'.'_', .•/ 1 ',.'
'a~.~,er~~tiv!~. ;;[:ime}'(~~,,~<~or~,b~..7!use Swindon hc.d already received
.' • • . '.'.. ,- " ",. of. ":, ;: ~
O~'~~~':~'b~~~.m,allerloan.~ ~,o.r",,~1mi1aI~.arrangem,ents with two' other
competitors" and he was intending ,to act on these, if no decision
~ '''. .' '"" -t· -"_" ttl j,< , _"". '. .,_ , " i. ,~' ._.\~ , ..
was made promptly. by. Coventry •.
II:.( ..... ,~ .. '. '$ ..•• '" ,_~ '",.<. "....I_.-' -_
pr r cc might be substantially r educed ,
The risk of suppor ti.ng SwinJ en, HFert f'r-ompo ssi.bLc Low
return 0:; the Loan, was the possi1i1ity of merchants and distl'ibutor:>
reacting again3t this encroachment by switchinr, some of their
sales to competitors. This would make Beta an even more attractivo
takeover opportunity for competitors.
Alternative solutions to the South i':cstdistribution
problem not involving ~windC'n or the purchase of di~tributor's
were of'two types. One type involved the establishment of' a
depot in Bristol er Cardiff or Gloucester. The second was the
.purchase of merchants in strategic places, e;'e. Bristol 1 or
Cardiff 1.
The reaction of the South West region to major changes
was quito unknown. Most of the channels were'well establ:fshed
and had changed little in the last decade. The exce~tions
were the rapid growth of ~windon, the re-equippine by Gloucester
of his warehouse with modern handling equipment and the ent~
of a marchant in South Wales trading ~olely wlthJapanese co~ponents.- ':
Some ct~nges~ such as the one proposed at Swindon, it was hoped
could be cloaked by the traffic reorganisation caused by the
recently opened Severn Bridge and by the work begun on the' M.4
extention to Bristol, espeoially the length fl'um,near Swindon.
There were clearly many courses of aotion open to Covent~
maDageme'lt 'supported by judgeme~ts concerning competitive aotion
,but there was a lack of an econcmio framework in which to evaluate
them. Woot was required immediately was an evaluation of the
financial ef'rects of, and redirection of ~oods implied by these
alternatives. Time was short because Swindon hod already received
offers of smaller leans ~or similar arrangements with two other
competitors and he was intending to act on these if no decision
was made promptly by Covent~.'
The first ver-sLon of the model Vln3 used i'lith tho
dIscount structures for mer-chant s appr-ox Imeted by ~Jlrco rifco··
wise linear sections. ~o depot possibilitic9 were con3i3cr~a
on the first run. Test rune we re mt:l1eto j nve!Jt::en.1.ethe
sensitivity of the results to change s in the linear appr-oximat.Lon
to discounts and the results reassured us that this was not a
sensitive approximation. The pr-ogr-amtook less than six
minutes to 11m and so 'se were able to experdmerrt with it quite
fully. Each demund area eenerate1 a submatrix of size 35 x 6
and the entire transporta~ion block matrix was of size 280 x 73
givint:;a density (i.e. proportion ,er active cells) of 9 .~~~.
The first results we re of the seme general. form as the
existing system, Fig. C.? The first change was a considerable
simplification and rationalisetion, avoidine much of the
existing duplication. This result was expected from all proerams
run and was seldom treated as particularly significant. By
avoiding duplication, most distributive 8ystems can be improved.
We were looking for more radical alternatives if they existed.
The second change was the servicing of Swindon direct r~ther
than via Gamma in London
Thirdly, there was some shift or trad6 in South Wales to be
served directly from Coventry, this T/8S lllnrkedin the larger
orders rather than smaller. Fourthly, considerable South Wales
trade was routed via t?e merchant in Gloucester, mainly in tho
medium order size range. In order not to raise the discount
rate too high in Gloucester the program had allocated some more
I of the Glou~eeter trade to be serviced from Swindon and Bristol 1
but the discount for Bristol 1was already high, thus this new
. "
trade tor B~istol 1was compensated by Bristol 2 inc~easing
its shar-i 01' Bristol trade and the Bristol 1 shipluents to Bath
ceasing. Bristol 1 and direct shipments al~o fained Borne'of
Swindon's trade in Bristol in order to reduce Swindons discount
now that he had increased his"market in Gloucester.
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The sixth and lest pointEl:line(t from thb firnt l'iJ:.lydH
W9.S that l~lpba Vias to supply much less 1;0 i:)(Jutl: ;'i~lcs mCl'e;;:;:ntu.
Overall the similc.rity Vlith the r-e suLb s to the o!'it;innl
configuration '(ISS surprising, this could be Lnter-preted in two
ways. Firstly, that the model had built in assump td.ons
concerning the status quo which made other cor.fiel.1rt;:;jons illLpossible.
It was ascertained th'lt tlds was not the case by f'xhihitinL:
radical 61ternatives as f'e as IbIe , Secondly it cculd be interrl'ete:1
as a minor verification of the model, it certainly at least
increased the management's confidence. The cost of this new
distribution pattern was £977,000 as against £1,026,000
previously a theoretical saving of £49,000.
The main conclusionsdrawn at thi~ stage were:
1. Much of the trade now serviced by Aiph~·' and Beta, in South
Wales could be more economically sent direotly to merchants
from Covent~. This made tho p~rc~~se of Beta to serve
this area, in particular, leas attractive.
2.Sales that have been allocated to Bristol 2 and Bath
are i'lthe c-pinion of the !ales mar.eeement too grMt for
those merohants to handle. Results are np.eded with tighter
restrictions on throughput throueh these.
3. Swindon would be better served direct from Coventry. l!ot
only did this appear in the final result, but it was the
cell with the most negative dual variable when the existing
pattern was used as an initial feasible solution,
indicating .that thi~ change lias 0. particularly valuable
one'. In fact £12,000 of the savin3 came directly from
this change. Whether the Swin~on merchant was 50,'
purchased or stayed independent this saving would be made
and it was decided to ~plement this change immediately.
I') II .~-.
1_· ... )
it WE'f.' not re l t to b", wise to increase ::.I~lt~ti thrc.I1i:~h
this mercharrt to the required £Y)O K fro~n ,C21,.:::KP!'l;V Lous Iy
After some discussion it WAS decided to li~;it the :.:~,,1~~!:\
through this merchant to £200K, •
5. The advantage Lho t was made appa rerrt in the mod eL of
servicing much er South 'liale3 by a one-tier distribution
based on Gloucester, suggested that it would be wo rth
investigating a depot at the merchant l~vcl servicinB
South iVales users from the Gloucester area.
6. The absence of any strengthening of the flow t.hr-ough J,lphn
and Beta suegested that most effort be placed towards
investigatine one-tier and direct distribution.
7. Some of the highest dual variables'''were assooiated with
market constraints experienced by Swindon. This r-e suIt
was particularly interesting and would only be exaeeerated
by the intention ~f conclusion 4.to limit the Gloucester
merohant. In particular the flows to Wiltshir'e, Bristol
and Gloucester had high dual vnr~ables. A near optimal
alternative solution existed which gave Swindon a zero
~.Q..0. ~n~o.~ o.\\cxc4,\JY'\
flow to Poole instead of no flow at al~ Thus if Swindon
tried to increase his market there, as he wished to, th~
result would not be too costly for the firm although it
would not save money. It was decided to consider the
implications'of this for the next time that the Poole
merchant re~uested an increased discount bAsed on the
evidence that he alone could supply the area.
This evider.~e from the dual variables that it would be
in the firm' 8. interests for Swindon to develop into more
dif'tant markets is interestlnc plaoed alongside the
S19irdon merchants statement that "not only could (he)
se rv Lce (thorn) bet tel' but it wouId ul t:ii':~tnly be che ape r: to the
A modified version of the model .....e.!> then r-un usLng tho
change s requested under conclusion'. 2 ~md 4 above. These
81 terations only required Cl chance of A few ca.rda ench but tho
opportunity was t.aken to adjust some of' the previous data
mare;inally as more accurate records had by then been collected.
The redults of the modified problem Are shown for de'liveries to
merchants in Fig. C.lO. The throughput per merchant is shown
below in }'ig.C.8
Fig. C.8
Merchant Initial 1st Run Modified
1st Run
-
Swansea 208 ;,.180 180, --
CerJ.1f'f 1 278 230 326
Cardiff 2 206 128 164
Newport 76 100 132
G-1oucester 242 .390 (200)
Bristol 1 622 512 526
-Bristol 2 178 240 180
Bath 120 194 120
Poole • 98 88 88
Swindon 477 484 548
Direct Cov. 486 480 592;
Birmingham 35
Total 3026
£1,026 K
3026
£9TI Ie
3046 (modified data)
£994 KTotal Cost
The total going through distributors and on to,merchnnts
is shown belcw i~ Fig. C.9
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Value ~'':' Vt'lno 1/ VHJ.UI;\ 0' j,0 --_._:._-----_._--_.- ---_-._------- -------
Alpha 922 36.8 758 29.8 6J+4 26.~
- --
Beta 940 37.5 E80 26.7 548 22.3
-------
Gamma. 248 9.9 :,8 2.3 58 2.4
------- -_., -
Direct 39:1 15.7 1050 ltl.2 1204 h9.l
-- -
Tote.l 2505 99.9 2546 100.0 2454 100.0
-1------
The resulting deliveries to UEers usine the modified data
is sho~n in Fugure C.ll.
During this modified run, manaeement asked for some extra
constraints thnt the model could not h~nd1e. These wer e of two
f'orms ,
. .
a) constraints on tb'3 amount of a "product range tliat one
merchant can handle in one reeion. In £eneral this was
considered too complicating 0. constraint to apply
overall. It is quite p03sible to rewrite th~ proernm
to allow such 'capacitated flows' but the time to do
this and the extra run time needed subsequently did
not make it worthwhile. Nevertheless theI'e wore one
or two cells where it may have been important and the
analyst was asked to consider ways of allowin~ for.
such possibilities in the future.
b) constraints on certain spuriou3 subsets of the
variables. The analyst was requested for the eft'ects
of certain constraints such as the total of sales
handled in A, Band C ranges by a particular merchant
or group of merchants to bo limited. These are called
'8pur~ou8' not because they were flippantly requeBt~d
but to indicate that their structure was not in line with
the existing,model. Regret wa3 experienced'at being ~nable
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to ocpe \'lith tbe~;'3but t~.e intention YIUJ given to
injght.ue handled, as lone; as they di.dnot l3.l'i:3c ill any
cre8t qunnt.Lty or too f r equerrt Ly ,
'the brief conclusion from the f'irst run is a General
warming towards the Swinoon proposal, an incre[lsnd wa t chf'ul Lno ss
over events in Caoucester and a determinp.tion that direct sales to
me rchant.a general~"Prove more profitable than using distrihlllors.
Now the second series of runs are cconsidered.
For the second run of the progra.m it was intended to
investigate the establishment et depots. 1'his would also permit
some conclusions about purchasine; distribution channels· at the
merchant level. Clearly ifit was shown to be economical to et;tabllsh
a depot in C'_,.rdiff,then perhaps purchasing a merchant there
instead might do equally well~ Tra~sport cost data for. depots
i;. r
had been included in the 1st run program but at that stage tl1ey
had been suppressed by only allowing aero flow through them.
The technical problems invo'Ived witil handling the non-convexity
introduced by the economies of scale associated with depots 8.1'e
considered in Appendix 1. Here just the re5ults are investicated.
To overcome the difficulties associated with local verius global
optima for non-convex problems a crude grid evaluation was used on
the over~ll capacity constraint on depot throughput. It would
then be expected that when this throughput capacity is small 110
flow would be allocated to the depot.
;
At thls stage it was decided to be only practical to
investigate Cardiff, Bristol, Gloucester and Swindon as possible
locations. By this time there was only concern wjth depots at
the merchants leval to effectively compete with merchants, not
et the distributor level .to serve merohants. This was mane eelflp.nt' s
intention originally and had been reinforced by the rasu'lt s of the
1st run. To start with/the one depot cC\se WPS investigated, allowing
.each one to enter in turn while suppressi.ns the others.
2>U
oorrti.nuous line eivin;:; the cpt.Lmal, costs when the throughjJut
con3traints are Equalities, i.e. hold exact Iy , The broken line
indicates the optimal whe n constraints 8.1'e uJ1fer limits ()DIy.
It must ~c stressed thBt only the foints are from empirical data,
the joining lines ~rc merely for visual presentation. The missing
points on Lhe Cardiff, BiLs toL and Gloucester e:raphs were CHUMd
through lack of time.
Takinl'l'first the Bristol case it is seen thl1.tno improvementu
on the 'no o.epot' position is possible by forcine; any amount through
e. depot estahlished in the Bristol area. The reason und.p.rly1nethis
is that t.hedepot, by reason of the curvature of the cost curves,
would tend to try and deal with mainly local trade. Butthe bulk
of the local trade is handled by the Br'istal merchants, who. in
turn take mainly from Alpha. ~Both Alpha and Brisol 't·havo..e;xcelle.ntstc~king
policies and their combined effect results in low distribution
costs.to the Bristol area, which even the economies of scale
associated with the depot cannot match. The Bristol case was not
considered further.
Secondly, thA Cardiff area was considered. Here the best
position was a depot handling about £1 million sales. But even
this was only slightly better than nu depot At all. If warehousing
costs beg~n to rise sharply compared with discounts then it would
no Longe r remain the global optima. Ar.other aspect here is the
sensitivity of the solution. The depot has to deal with practically
all the trade in South Wales in oreler thAt it mie;ht save money. It
would be most unlikely that- the firm could mEl-noevreits channel
flows sufficiently t~ brine this about. Presented with these
results manae;ement consider it unlikely that much more than .et mill~.on
could be channelled through a Cardiff depot. If this is the case
a Cardift" depot becomes a most unattr~ctivo proposition.
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[~llJnceflt(;r lJI'Ps<::nteclthe f:Ll1anci911y most a ttrnc t+ve ('I1S0,
'beco:n:1l'f:Sch(··"l)(~:r'than the no depot case ·with £.~ million UJl'ouC;h}Jut
poin~L. Even 8. more modest estimate of, SAY, £40,000 would
ena.ble t.be establislJJli(mt cost of' the depot to be written off
in four or five years. The demand pattern resultin~ from this
location leaves no Lcc a'I trade for the Gloucester merchant , and
also t ske s a fair portion of' the South ','·p.les trrffic. This would
mean either esta.blishing a d.~pot and. cutting off supplies to
the Gloucester merchnrrt cr. pur-chasd.ng him directly. The former
would allow competition ample time to reorganise their
distribut:i on in thAt ar-ea by purchasing the merchant and there
is a significant risk that a la.rge section of the market would
be irretrievably lost. Thus the only r~al course of a ctian in... ;
this area would be to purchase the merchant even though U.e askf.ng
price might be severly'/inf1ated.
The last case was Swindon. This was almost as attI'aetive
as Gloucester f\>a.rt from requiring about£..6 million sales before
showing any sa.vings. With a depot in this area practically all
the merchants tr9de was·p9ssed through it, thus a depot here
effectively closes down that ~erchant for the firms trade. For
the same reasons as in tho Gloucester case, management considered
. .
that the ureency of the situation implied not entertaining the
option of a new depot in this area. The options left were tho
requested loan, part ownership or total ownership.
Now the two depot case is considered. In fact the three
depot case was investigated, omittins Bristol from the analysis·
because of the previous re sul tn, As the first results we.re
recorded it beceme rapidly obvious tt~8t Ce.rdU'f were never going
to enter into the solution with a non-zero flow. Thus the analysis
was restricted to the two depot case. lIere again it soon became
~ere not uS0d. At that &tage there we3 no point in continuing
the anelYfd_B. In prellH:cing the r'e sear'ch rero:ct some two ye ar s
l1.ltersome further work was clone in eve.Luat i.ng tb~ r-espcns o
surface for the two depot ca se , 'l'his is sbown in Pig. C.1h,
where the contour lines have been e;uesseo. from a few eva Luet Lons ,
The possible strote3ic cour ses uf a c'tLcn bhus remaining
·were as listed in the table below. Management soon reduced tr.e
list to A, E and F as possibles. More inf'ot'lIll_',.tionwas re~l}\lested
from the model as to the extent of the. changes in flow necessary
to gain the savings. It was decided that the changes were too
extensive to risk having them fail under F; Managemer~t decided
that bhey must he.ve controls of the outlet. No part ownership
was possible under A and the total sum wa~.tooi great a risk as an
immediate investment. The final deoision then was to attempt to
purchase a 51% shareholding in th~ Swindon merchant. Thus
approximately £80,000 was to be spent ·in Swindon which would eair~
a saving or around£25-£30,OOO annually on top of the 'modified"
1st run position. The trade through Swindon of £477 thousand
which was increased to £548 thousand by the modified 1st run must
now be speedily increased up to at least £700 thousend; t~anagement
then !'equested the following informat1.,m which would be required
for the tactical decisions associated with the expansion of the
trade through Swindon:
l~ How sensitive are these results to the overall stockinS
policy?
2. What distribution is required and which changes should
we concentrate on initially?
3. Which markets can be most profitably developed?
4. What opposition can we expect to this expansion and
how should we counter it?
We investieate each of these points in turn.
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result', to changes j.n ;)wincle'r.' s stocldnr foliey. ti:~·.r;a.::etncnt
realizecl tllet the representation of stock i.ng policy v.nt; at a
rather 8ee:J'6t~ate level yet they still felt a need to have an
indication of the SCOp0 for changc s in thE! policy at 8wimlon.
The management and the analyst jointly 8.f,ree(1011 peas.ind.s tIc
(i.e. low) and opt i.nd.s td c '(i.e. hjgh) stock'i.ng policies. The
The results aI'e shown on Fie. C.15. It can be seen tha.t the
extreme policies can save or cost up to £50\{thou:sand F.uvayfrom
the pr-evi.ous results. It must be et re s scd thllt these test
policies are extremes and any practical policy is likely to
. fall well within them. Of course if the stocking policy becomes
more optimistic the total stock held ris0s, so that there is
some analysis to be done here to achieve a ba~ance point. This.;-
detailed. analysis was clearly not the urgent concern of the firm's
Board and the results in that direction were passed to Industrial
Engineers.
The results in Fig. C.15 which did interest management wet'e
the following;
. (i) The shift in the cut-in point, that is where the trade
through the channel is sufficient to make it cheaper
o:verall than not using th~.;t channel. 'l'he optimistio
policy lowered the cut -in point by ebout £SoK\h ellie9'f'l:d.
The boundary cut-in points was characteristically not
symmetrical. Management now knew that by beginning
operations with a cceprebensfve stockine policy at Swindo:l
they could more rapidly cross the cut-in threshold.
This point they exploited in order to cross the cut-in
point earlier ~han expected by corporate Centrol.
(i1) The locus of the global minima, showing that with higher
stocks the cheapest distributiOl' pattern is aohieved
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c['rlicr. P£lrticulnrly of Ln te r-est Yill s t.ha t the
to'tbe Qri~in was rie-,ht('utnide tho area j nve btig,!~l.s d ,
Next the second question WHS cons Ld or-ed, dIRt is the
distribution pattern implied by the 0windon decision? neferrl.r.:3
to Fig. ca6 it is seen that with Swindon at optimal ntrength it i::;
m!linly Bri::.tol1 and Gloucester that have lost trade, as Vlell as a
con:~idel'c.l,hleamount of direct trade bed.ng passed through Swinclon.
Swindon has increased its trade to Gl':mcester and Brd st.o'l, and
has started t.r-admg in Poole and Cnrdiff. Notice ~specially that
Gloucester lleed no longer be constrained by the £200 thousand trade
ceiling, as only £148 thousand is required to be handled'there. One
major chAnge is Bristol 1 havinslost it.l entire Gloucester trade
to Swind.on, and this explains a Inrge part of the drop in Bristol 1
througbput. In order to know which flows to concentrate attentiont; I
on immediately the program was run again restricting the flow to
Swindon to the cut-in level, f600 thousEmd. Fig. C .18 shows the
changes th~t have oocurred from the modified 1st run to the 2nd
run with 'cut-in' le.....el re~triction at Swindon. This shows
Swinuon beginning to increase its flow to Gloucester, Ccrdiff and
Bristol. This same information oan be g~ined by observing the dual
variables associated with these cells when the modified 1st run
~olution is used as a feaiible initi~l. solution (which it is) to
the 2nd run program. The lergeet dual variable assooiated with outlet
channel in this case is olearly th~t associated with the Swindon
depot. It might be stressed that in the 2nd run of the program the
Swindon merchant has been effectively ~uFpressed.
It is common for these results to have alternl,tive optima which
have to b~ inspected but we only intend to report ones with a
particular interest. One such in this case is shown dotted in Fig.C~18.
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product ranees, Leav.i.ng f6q. thousand left to the mer-chrnrt , The
Coventry deliveries would. drop fl'Oportionatcly to £6 t housand ,
'l'bis means bhat if the Swindon merchan+ still wishes to enter
the Poole market he can do so v/ithout daml1.cin;; p'Lans fox' the
rest of the region.
The third que std.on that management asked was information
about incl'easine potential ml:1rkets. This con he eA:i.ned from ~
study of the d';1ulvariables, althoush little that is new in fact
comes to lieht. It showed that the cost of servicing Swansea and
Devon were somewhat hieh, in the Devon case higher than the profit
margin after manufacturinG. That is, we were subsidising purchase!!
in D evan to a small extent rather then me~i.ne .~ profit. Much of' our
, '
5maller Swansea tra.de was also bUl'ely makine a marginal profit.
Each of Gloucester, Bristol Swindon and So~th Wiltshire on the
other hand had considerable clArginal returns. In the case of Glo\lcester
and Bristol though the marketing staff considered that the potential
market was fair.ly thoroughly covered. In Swindon a considerable
amount of new industr,y was developing which the merchant was keepine
under close observation. /l.sfor South Wiltshire, this seem~d th~t soma
expansion was possible, and the sales staff were asked to investir,~te
this in more detail. Manaeement requested some guide tO,the Di~rcinai
cost of servicing an:increased market in this Area in order thAt we'
might know the scale of discounts that could be used to p.ttrElctnew
business. The dual variables on this market showed that initially o~e
should conc3ntrete onC, D 8.l'\dB product ranees rather than the very
small orders, but ir£ormation on how the duals chane~d a3 flows
increased 1'las·really required, Before there WAS time to 8 ttempt thi.s,
management received information that a takaovel' of the Gloucester. '
merchant by a competitor was expected soon. They requested
ini'ormCtticn on the r1istributioi1 pattern '!l:i.th the Gloucester mer-cherrt
removecl. This required cr.8.nc;:lr!j3 one number, maximurn level of' :flow
sent to zero, !.'.Dt1 r-erunrd.ng the :proGram. Ineludin::;Yiolk:ing timn and
v:a.itinj tirlie fay' an interrupt period. in the computer this took 25
minutes and cave results given in Fif. C .17. 'l'hisdiaeram only
includes the paths which have chenced from the optimal position. In
fact the information was a false alarm and the t.akeovcr did not
occur for several weeks, but the episode was'critical in gaininG
manae;ementt S confidence. Thl'] had asked A, question about a ma jar
change in tho d.istribution channels and received an answer during
the same meeting 25 minutes later.
A summary of the runs is shown in Fie. C .20.
The next question asked. by management was a prediction of
where opposition to the reorganisation \':'_S ,likely to arise and how
should it be courrtered? , This is a funde~~ntahy different type of
question to those asked above and cannot be answered in terms of the
mathematical model. Questions belonging to the same category type
as this had arisen continually since the beginning of the work and, of
course, ,..ork had begun at an early stage to answer them. Examples
of this type wight be statements such as;
i) "that might be the best thing to do but the merchants will
not let you do it"
ii) "if you try and bypass merchants, they will risa as a body
against you and cut you out of the market".
Section A.4 above considered these types or questions et some
'length, and it was found that most of them centred around the concept
of 'merchant power'. Doe~ merchant power exist, what Bcope of action
has it, what are its results, how oan it be circumnavigated?
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Swansea 20B 180 180 180 l30 l[lD
Cnrdiff 1 278 230 326 309 321 3hl
Corc1iff 2 206 128 164 125 16~. ] 1..9
Nowport 76 100 132 108 132 12E~
Gloucc3ter 242 390 (200) lq.8 190 ( 0)
Bristol 1 622 512 526 394 11-99 1/)8
Bristol 2 178 240 180 180 180 180
Both 120 194 120 94 120 94
Poole 98 88 88 64 88(~4) 64
Swindon 477 484- 548 900 600(624) 930
Direct 521 480 592 5h4 572 572
Total 3026 3026 3046 304-6 3046 304G..
Total Cost £1026 £977 £994 £940 £900 £952
-
At this stage we critically needed a model of the sourc~s,
changes and consequences of merchant power. Our existine model shows
our present situation, 'our desired optimal and some indication ef
how to mcve from the one to the other given by the dual val·iables.
But it was also clear that)behaviourly)certain position were inaccessible
and certain changes inadmissable. Ide~lly such a model would prediot
i) which paths were behaviourally admissaible
ii) which paths would alienate major sections of our
market an~or merchants.
I
'Wenow turn to the model develcped in Section A.4 and B.3.
We consider first the C~CV values for merchants shown in
figures C.21 and C.22. It is seen that Bath ha~ close identification
with his customers and suppliers although almost totally isolated
from other merchants. He is acting as a classical independent
channel. The Bristol and Sou~h Wales group are fairly centr.ally
or supl'l~81'~ end keeps Lsc'La'tod from other mer-chr.nts a functiclfl,
if nothing else, of his geogrnphical posi tiQn. Swindcm cxperienc:e::-
moderate cohesion but has little identification with his users
wants.
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.1'0'L'bis«xt.ra <1~t[( showed that tb.:e pur cbase G-lo"Jcc,.:;tcr
and to expand nt the expense of the South 'i,alesmer-chant;sllli!;';ht
have naused ccnsiderable hostility from th3W\.. By gaininr; a
major share in Swinden and then incree.sing trad 0 in South \'iales.
Bristol, Wiltshire and Poole El. weaker amount of hosti.lity might
be felt from South Wales and Bristol and perhaps very little
from Bath and Poole. But at this stage this infoI1llationeave
no in:foImation which casted doubt a a to the correctness of the
decision and quite a bit which supported it.
This was the situation at the end of the initial
period in the South '/Jest.
C.4.2 : December 1967 : The Second Phas~
Approximately twelve weeks later this problem was
returned to. The following major changes had occured.
1. As recorr~ended, a 51~owner~hiP ~f Bwindon had
been negotlqted in principle. the paperwork was to follow.
2. As recommended Swindon was served direct from
Coventry.
3. As recommended Swindoll had engaged an extra salesman who
would concentrate on the S. V!iltshire area, in order to increase
the ID9rket.
4. As recommended Swindon bad begun to t~ and
penetrate further the markets in Bristol, Wiltshire, Poole and
South Wales.
I
5. As reoomme~ded an attempt was being made to t~ and
increase the direct trade from Coventry to merchants in South
Wales.
6. Swindon trade bad increase~1g approximate annual
rat...,of £5201<, which is 3('% of the way from the initial position
to the cut-in point. Much of this increase (lq~) had come from
trade previcusly lodged with Gloucester. This policy was supported
by Coventry.
7. Agreements had been made between Coventry and SVlinr~.cn
for a detailed study of.' their stockhol<tings rrocedurea ea r-ecornmende d ,
8. Glouce ster was still in:lepenc1ent, though the rumours
persisted.
9. Beta hl1d been purchased by El competitor, but had
so far rnaint~.inedthe status quo vis-n-vis merchants ..
10. Considerable antagonism to Swindon's expansion had
been experienced from all merchants, ~alesmen consistently
reported that dissent was gathering on a larce scale. A few
orders which would naturally have been Coventry's had been p'l.aced
elsewhere by merchants.
11. Merchants in South Wales VTere beginning to refuse
to assist in the direct deliveries ratio~alisation until Swindon
was 'taken off their backs'. They had lit:tle 'dount that Swindon's
expansion was backed by Coventry even though no official
announcement had occurred.
At this time a strong demand was made by a section of the
management to stop the change program in this area. Their argument
was basically that notwithstanding the theoretical correctness of
the plan in practice it was proving impossible to undertake.
They suggested continuing the direct doliveries compaign
to S·outhWales to counter any effects from the Beta takeover. But
elsewhere they suegested retrenching and perhaps reducing S~~ndon'~
throughput to an annual rate of £500Y<. This would mean Swindon beinc
'unlikely to pay back its cost in the foreo!eeable future.
At. this time another survey of m!l'chants attitudes was
undertaken. This was done under the cove~ of a survey to investientc
some mareinal changce to the standard .,roduct range. The new cn/cv
values are.shovm in figures C.23 and C.24. The most enereetic
movement is shown by Poole who has moved from 'a self imposod isolation
being a leader in the merchant's collective front against the changes.
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This prev i.cus isclation from users 110B al so 3Lif'ted to ODC of'
determined close co-ope ration and. CO~OPGl'f. ticn 1'::Lth his ['i1lJi·<l Le s
has suff€'~0(1 in consequcnce , An eXDr.Jp16 of tb.i.b f'r-ene tLc errthusi.aum
is tha't previously Poole had never attended a. 'l'rac1er' 5 osacc i at i.on
meeting for the South V/est. During this 12 week period. be inr,tit;ated
the calling of two special meetings.
Another major deduction fI'om the C;-!jCV values is the
inc:::'~asedcohesion shown by the South ';';0.1e5 merchants acccmr-erri.ed
by their closer identification with users. It is impossible here
to separate the two issued of'Swindon's expansion suplJorteu by
Coventry and 'Beta's takeover.
The change seemed to hardly affect Bath and the only
change reflected by Gloucester was an attempt to move closer to
the requirements of his customers. t_. . i
Swindon, as would be expected, is experip.rtcing isolation;
but appears to be compensating by close co~operation with both
Users and SupplieS, i.e. Covent~.
The two merchants in Bristol provide a particularly
interesting case to the extent that they seem to have been ~c~rce1y
affected by the mercherrt movement in South Wales, if anything, moving
~81ightly to,s more i8~lated position. Bristol1 has attempted to move
closer to his customers and slightly away from his suppliers. Bristol
2 has weakened his co-operation with suppliers slightly.
Overall there is clearly somE tension present in this region
'and there has been a ce'rtain degree of •closing of tho renks '
betYleen merchants. The' South Wn1es situation iA particul e.rly serious
with mercnants being encouraeed by Coventry to ~o direct while at the
same time finding u~~rs bein~ entioed away by Swindon who is clearly
supported by Covent~ also.
Ar. intere~tine symptom of the merchant movement were two
letters reoeived by Coyentry,complaining of the expansionist plan5
f 11 .::\., i 1 )-lst of t\.I"·-lrname a T~'1"'S (·1c,.,n.on3tr"tp'~ aO. OY1(.'l lYY E~. ;:~Tre( ...... JJ~.... .Icc.' '';,' • ..oL. ,. ,_' ~
sense of Croup feelinr; not previously existinS.
UsinG this Lnf'onmst Lon the Coventry management mn dc tho
followi.ng decisions.
1. 'ro stop attempts by Swinnon to expand f\\!'th~:rin the
Poole area. It was known that this area was not. verJ
profitable and rchat; the decision to expand there was
mainly as a concession t.o Swindon who was keen on the
idea.
2. To slow daVin considerably, exransion by 3winuon In
South Wales and to use this as a lever to gain mcrchunt's
trade and confidence. This confidence will ha
..
especiallY, required when,as expected, the compe t.Lt.ora
who purchased Beta will also purchase Gloucester and
use it as base for direct sales to users. It will then
be possible to encourage the merchant cohesion
experienced now and use it as a weapon to stop the
loss of t~ade expected when Beta has been recoBnised
and stocked with the competitor's products.
3. Expansion in Gloucester will continue and 8ale5men will
be inst~loted to 'leak' that this is because of the
expected takeover.
4. Expansion in Bristol and S. Wiltshire to continue at tho
same strength.
5. An Organisation and Methods study will be made in
Swindon to try and cut ofric~ costs.
Thus the ~ay that the deoi8i~ns made with the attitudinal
data differed fr~~ that without was in the precision made possiblo
by the use of a sharper, instrument of analysis;
The a.nalysis isolated South Wales and POOIA as the main
sources of.' mer-chant oohe s ion [:nel dissent, and atteckod this rrul)J.em
in dC3tail ro.tb<;d.·t.h-mby 8. "blanket ' policy of withi.l;.'f~wE:l.
over the next twelve months, Gloucester W!"l~ pur cha aed by
the competitor as a depo t in the South West to SOl"'VO mainly South
Wales. Bristol 1promptly switched all his trade to ·Alpha. Coventry
immediately stopped shipments to Gloucester and promised G-loucEi:it€r'z
users an excel.Lenf service with an added discount from Swind.on. 1,:Qs·t;
of the Glcuceeter trade VIas rete.ined. The mer-charrtnntae;onism lf1el t cd
away in South Wales and most of'the Bete. trocle to South Wales was encour-
aged to come direct. Swindon extended markets in Bristol 1,
Gloucester··'and V!iltshire achd evLng an annual flow rate of £730K.
The Bath merchant was forced to diversify into an associated field
of agricultural components because of his drop in trade. A third
small survey showed the CH/CV positions of'the merchants as in Eig.C.25 & C.26
Notice that considerable cohesion still persists but they are more
integrated in their relationships wi";h supplies. Considerable bitterness
remained between Bristol 1 and Swindon, but Bristol 1 was in a
difficult position. Theirs was an old established f'irm with a manager/
owner about to retire. Their business was steadily declining in
volume end the firm was not an attractive takeover proposal. This
merchant and his major supplier Alpha were clearly going to be a
provlem in this future. This fourth phase shall be returned to, after
describing other work undertaken in the meantime.
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There \'.'HS an :1l"1mediHte na t i.cno.I p rob l.ern concer-ned with tk~
continued existencG and ownership of the distributors. J..s exp.Lained
there were. three pr:il1cil;cl distributors !,lrha, Beta end Ganuna ,
Beta. and Gemma dealt a'ln-os t exclusively with the firm's c omponenb s ,
whereas l\lphecarriecJ competitive Li.ne s )as well, as [.nother groul' of
product s which shall be referred to a s oc-rruducts. A1rha had br-anches
in Bristol, Bi.rmingham, London, l1ewcastle, Glasgow, ?I:anchester and
Leeds. Beta had only one branch in Birmingham; Gemma had branches
in London and Birmingham. Fig. C.27 gives the flows through
thesJ2. distributors as well as direct deliveries for each region
of the country. It can be. seen that Beta is the domin[~nt Oupplicr
followed by Gamma. Note in particular the small contribution
from direct sal~s.
-r .;
Figt:.27
OUTLET ALPHA BETA GAMMA DIRECT TOTALS
REGION .--.
South 922 975 248 881 3026
West
South 540 1,880 2,140 470 5030East
Midlands 1,104 2,470 1,405 4PO 5460
North 848 1,120 1,568 384 3920
scotland 226 375 418 185 1204
I
TOTALS 3,640 6,820 5,780 2,400 18,640
The characteristics of each distlibutor are brief'ly,
Alpha 1)' part of a larger concorn
2) has good management training etc.
3) de aLs in o.lterrwtive product raneo of
",-proJ.ucts to the extent of 45;~er the! r
turnover.
4) owns two merchant cutlets and ic thua in
partial competition with thei~ customers.
5) has experienced low erowth recently end would
like to enter new markets.
6) The distribution pattern for co-prcduct s is
somewhat different in qUllntlies pUI'chal'\ed
althoueh almo8t identical :inoutlets useu..
7) trade mainly with middle size merchant~.
8) medium merchant penetration
Beth 1) autonomous company
2) Apart from ons person, no valuable management;
but has been run enti~ely,profitably by him.
3) has maintained market share through diffioult
trading period.
4) trade especially oonoentrated on larger me~chent8.
5) higher merchant penetration, i.e. tends to have
a large share of a merchant's business if he
does a~ at all with him.
reputation for prompt deliveries.
autonomous com~~nY
rather poor management
slightly declined market share recently.
trade especially with smaller merchants.
low merchant penetration but very large
number of accounts.
reputation founded on goodwill towards
6)
Gamma 1)
2)
3)
I 4)
5)
I
6)
present owners •
.The Coventry management considered the existing three-tier
system was lead~ng to an \\nnecessar,ywaste of resources.
They believe(l t.hat oonpe tLt or-s thought this [In:1 tho t some change c
ID;-""htbe Lmmi.ne nb , It was neces se ry to t rv find. eva luate t-he e.f'f'2Cts
~·l') ...
of. alternative policies. The ma.icr policies unde r con:,:id(H'f;l.tion wore ,
1. Purchase one or more distributors
2. Purchase strategically located merchants and by pass
distributors.
3 .E3tablish, via depots, an a.ltel'native distributive system
and by pass distributors a!l.d/or merchants.
In order to inves:t~gate this problem and bearing in mind its
urgency, a first model of the national distributive system was
attempted. This neglected Scotland and the South West, bo~h being
rather specia.l cases, end concentrated 011 the ether three reel.ons.
Each one shu110 be investigated in turn; the analysis combined at the
end. In fact all three were investigated simultaneously ,,0
, • 0
Th~ South East : Initial Study
The demand areas for this region were taken as;
C'rl'ord
Bedford
Cambrid.ge
Luton
Ipswich
Chelmsford
Luton
st. Albans
Harlow Croydon
S.E.Essex Brighton
Medwr.y towns Kingston
.:Dover ~ Guildford
Reigate Solent
Greenwich Uxbridge
W. Ham ~ Reading
Central London Watford
Data was available for these 24 regions separately, but in.
°praotice they were always aggregated to never more than 12 regions.
There were 17·principal merchants with total throuehputs as
shown in Fig. C .28.
The flows from distributors to merchants are displaye~ in
Fig. C.29; and the·flows to users for all ranges are shwon in Fig.
0.30 •...
For clarity thp actual quantities have had to b~ omitted.
17';,... C ?11 Age ]) :-:'~ 1\OI1.Al~S D1 ~Ct\UIrI'~ .....tJ· ......
Oxf'cr'd r 21 11 32 12;'/~
::ivlent I+S lA 9'2 2"';-.V/V
Uxbridge 205 115 320 2;;f~
Kine;ston 84- 78 162 1")2·1t1.'" r J
7Jatfcrd 165 45 210 22i)~
St. Albans 298 366 664 29~{,
Luton 302 226 28 27~%
Harlow 312 202 514 27?i7~
London I 61 21 82 lSI;
London 2 362 186 548 27-1%
London 3 1!..2 98 240 22~~
London 4 63 42 105 20;'10
Reieate 78 97 165 22~
W.Ham 1 252 183 435 '.. 23~
W. Ham 2 67 38 105 2~
S.E.Essex 95 42 137 2~
Rochester 52 33 85 17~
.... ', ,:.,' \
r", • .
TOTALS 2,597 1,827 4,424
A detail for one merchant at St. Albans is shown in
Fig. C.31 to help clarify the situation. Thus this merchant takes
deliveries from;
Beta £240 ~
Gamma
Direct £110 I.(
£6641,(,
and deliveries as sh~, the residual servicing the local area.
The first run of the progrem used twelve ecereeate demand
zones. No own depots were allowed but all distributors were present.
The results of these programs a r-e shown in Fie;.C.32, which shows
......:,"deliveries to merchants; Fig. C .33, showing deliveries to users for
,.- ,.,
ranges 1'., 13, e..nd Fir;. C.3ft t.he sS.rIIe for l'Hll[;er.; !';, F.
The merchant tb'Olfuts e re shown irl F:i.r> C .35.
Merchant
Initial
Flow
1st run
results l'lod:tfiedRun
Ohange s
- -
Oxford 32 12 -20 12
Solent 92 80 -12 80
Uxbridge 320 292 -28 240 -80
Kingston 162 .: 92' -70· .... ' ]1+-4
Watf'ord 210 275 +65* 280 +70
st. Albans 664 462 -202* 512 -152
Luton 578 406 -172'" 476 -102
Harlow 514 '432 -82* 468
London 1 82 170 +88* 100
London 2 598 372 -176· '464 -13.'.
London 3 240 152 -88* 156 -84
London 4 105 180 +75* 140
Reigate 165 160 -5 166
W.1Iam. 1 435 390 -45 395
Vi. Ham 2 105 135 +20 135
"
S.E. Essex 137 . 122 -15 122
Roohester 85 65 -20 65
Direct Alpha 94 138 +44 146 +52 .Direct Beta 0 244 +244* 0
Direct Gamma 42 296 +254* 308 +266
Direct COV. 370 . 560 +90'" 621 +251
-
Merchant 4,524- 3,797 -727 3,955Total -579
"
).TOTAL . 5,030 5,030 0 5,030
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results ana the act.ual situntion. The Inajor flO'.·, cLnn[:e~.;~those
above £50, 000 have been IJwrke(l thus ~'. The most sit:nit'ic;'int clwr.c;c, ,'~
are the Lnor-eased direct flows from uisl;ribut.urs to U51:::)'5. ':l,'tJQse
to Users to Merchants 'l'otnl
----------_._
Alpha 138 932 1070
Beta 244 1180 1424
GE1mma 296 1548 l8l.4
692Direct Cov , 560 132
1238 3792 5030Totals
Thus for Alpha it in seen that dirert flows havo incrcased
by £44K while deliveries to merchants have il1crea~ed by almost £500\.-\
i.. ;
Management considered that althc'..lgh in principle they accepted that this
increase mieht lead to a cheaper overall pol:cy it was far removed
from being practical. In the 5~ort ter:n,,}he :AIFhll. organise,tion in
London could not handle this quantity. Two decision were t~UI3made,
firstly, a re-run with a limit of .£800\(on the total flow through
Alpha, secondly an investieation of the area in which Alpha's
London depot is situated for the possible ostablishment of a depot.
When considering Beta it is seen that although the direct
shipments to users have increased, the overall flow has droPl-ed ,shal'ply.
It was Be1c.ts policy to deal almost exclusively with merohflnts, and
management cons'tdered the direct-user flow indicated to be an anomaly
of the model , ~';hich is to be suppressed on 0. rc-run.
Of the remaining merchan't deliveries a rather high proportion were of
A, B, C product ranges Jwhen Beta! a. policy' is to try' and de.al' ~olQly with
larger order~. It was decided not to take any action concerning this
at that time.
Turning to Gamma's results it is seen that overall there
drop put the direct sales htlve increased substantially
C';
a m'l5ol' chan ,e to contemplate they could. find not-Line int.l'in!1:Lc~illy
Consid'~r'5.n(:'nex c tbe merchant'::; results ;'l~n"gernent v.ere
surpl'ised tu :;co the r-ecommenda t i.on to reduce Eill{;ston's t.l'ao.e H3
thoy had recently under-taken to try and assist this mer-chant who
was tryine to expand at tbe expense of Uxbride;e. Uxbridge was
partly owned by a. compe tdt.or and it V'!asmarie~ements intention to
try Rnd reduce their dependence on him. The prOe;l'am,thoueh,
slightly reduced Uxbridge's ·sales, eave some of that area's seIe s
to '/,'atford,but the bulk to direct shipments f'z-om GAmma.. 'l'hus
Kingston sales in the Uxbridge area were cut as also were seme
local c:.eliveries\1h1ch were transferred to Gamma dil'ect. Munugeillent
then said that at the t.ime they had cone Ldea-ed the !;wo,possibili ties
of direct from Gamma or supporting Kingston, and pad decided on the
-: ;
latter to show to merchants a policy of support rether than
competition.
At this stage we decided on a re-run with the total sales
to Uxbr'Ldge constrained to £240 I<.
Management agreed that a substantial reduct.Lon in tho trade
with St. Albans and Luton would be desirable because of their very
hieh discounts. Also they aereed that the best way of achievine
this would bA as in the proeram results, thet is to transfer some of
the very Lar-ge bulk production orders from that area , particu18rl~"
from the motor manufacturers to direct accounts, either with Coventry .
or Beta. But, they argued, this is impossible for two reasons.
Firstly, the orders are often oall.;.offs. S~condly the strons
relationship between the merchants and the laree userR in these
areaS. The first point it was aereed oueht to be considered and it
WI1~ agreed to transfer some orders in larger ranees to smaller oneti
oonsistent.with the usual call-ofrs quantities. The second point
is of the type oonsidered below under. the attitudinal data.
and r;rocedures v.or e stl:'8tcbcd nt present; it W8!j thought he ~ws only
man8[';in~ his present LeveL of ac tdv Lty because he kept ebnononlly
hiGh s t.ocks , It Vi?S a[';reccl to limit his total to J~lOO~. London 1+
was limited to ;:14·0\{ for t.he same reasons. It VtaS 8.150 thoul~ht that
Rochester mip;pt be purcha.sed by a. competitor RO that results there
were encouragine.
'l'akine: a.ll these considerations into account the pr-ogr-amwas
re-run. The results are shown in the last two cofunne of Fie. C.35,
the last column showing changes above £50\(. Tho totflls thro\le;h
distributors are now as bolc'7j
to Users to Merchants Total
Gamma
Direct
146 65!,. 800
0 1262 1262
308 1743 2051
COV. 621 296 917
1075 3955 5030 .-
AlphA.
Beta
TOTJ.LS
The overall policy euidance deoisions made from these runs
were, oonsidering the structure of the channels or status quo, that
flow organisation requires changing in the followinc principal
directions.
1) A reduoti~n of about £460¥\1n the trade through Beta
for economio reasons •
.2) An increase of about £260\\ in the trade through Alpha
for economia reasons, althoush this would have been
18.l'gerexcept for physical and organisational reasons.
"') (~-. /'
L', I
Coventr;'i, ,t250 K of' this to boc:onG(~rnc:c1 \;ith clirflct
acccunt s and £200\\ with mer'ch-m t acc ounts , 1'hi5 hns
irr:port(;nt policy implication:1. ilIl increase of' this
scale is effectively to serve notice t.hat Coventry i.~l
quite pr'epared to <Ustribute to all levels 4 discount
r-Lsee make this an economic p rop LsLtLon,
4) Flows ought to be reduced to t.he Luton - lI~::,low - ;;t.lI1bans
merchants but a major problem arises as to how thit~ :=.. s
possible.
5) Some of the London merchant trade is better served.
direct from Gamma and Alpha.
6) Given a free choice and a suitable price, Gammamieht
constitute the best purchase. Alpha Vlould be second
but considerable extensions mir.ht be;necessar,y.
The resultant costs of the first and modified runs are shown
in the table below
1st Run;
,£1,872 v{
£1,694 \t{
£1,746 \Z
Initial position;
lI.oC:ified Run;
It was now necessary to investigate the effect of establishint~
depots in the region and the test areas were chosen, in consultation
with management. as st. Albans, Kingston, W.Hemand London, Notice
that there is little point in considering any point as a ,possible
site, as for example in :plant loca.tion" problems, because .the
availability of local markets 'is a so much more sensitive aspect to
the prQble~ then transport costs.fnitiallyonc depot at a time was
considered. The results will be presented i14 the same way as in the
South ',','est Study.
InF1g~ C.36 and Fig. C.37 are graphed the results for the four
areas.
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it li(!ver'be carne lbar heinE: [,1; economic pr-oposi.t.Lon ,
All that, v:r.s rea11y hf-ll"'I'enojnc wr,.s t112.t the. trodc cf tho
ERst London mercl1~nts WDS beinG trannferl'ed to r l.oat the devote
The cl~itical areas in tbe Forth end South were ba'oly affected.
The Cent.ral London depot was aLao rejected but ~fter much
more (;onsideration. The reason it barely ~ver became ecr:nomic was
because of the substantial esta.blishment overhel:ldsof runnine central
London property. By the time anougb trado has been s','dtchedto it
to b:t:in~ the unit cost per component to a economic level, it wa a
becomin~ necessary to travel further afield to gain this extra trado.
, .
Consequently the contribution to unit cost from transport costs
begins to move the graph upward acain. Nevertheless there were
business r-e aaons for find.ing cent raI London an attractive proposition,
especially the possibility of extending a posslble",deFot ,to also
contain corporate headquarters offices. Against this, the transport
m~naeer indicated the impossible traffic condition~ thnt would be
experienced and it was really this factor along with the results for
St. Albans and Kingston that secured mana.gement's ju~ent to reject
this alternative.
st. Albans was the financially most attraotive propcsition,. "
it~was the cheapest~· had'·e:,_.ldwcut-in·poi~t.of"£800Kand remained the
cheapest ovcr a wide range until ov"J";'2,GOOK • Com~ared with this
Kingstvn never became quite as economic, had a higher cut-in point of
£840Kand ceased to be cheaper at about .£2,3001<. Nevertheless the"
resultant costs, of the two were sufficiently olose to'make a study of
seconde.ry criteria necessary. If' these depot. loca.tions were being
considered. as indicators towards purchase decioions for Alpha' or Gamma.
then the situation is somewhat different. The flow to Alpha had
already been restricted to .t800.(for organisational reasons. Thus
using the present facilities to'the limit would leave it only just
cut-in point, and major extensions to the property would have to be
user cohe eion ii>~he ct ronge st , [Jut more Viill "t,r; as id of' this beLov,
is the greetest of all three distributors.
For Kin._;ston the last two points work in i-eve rse , the r.:rF;8
is more conduc.Ive to chang., but present ur.e:r penetration is 10Vi. On
the other hand the Gammadepot w~s used to hendlin~ trade of the
magnd.tude required for efficient,. op~rations. 'i'he ne rcbant flows
for these two cases are shown below. These are shown for both cu t-d n
and optimal values. The artificially constrained flows ar-e mar-ked
thus '"
Fig. c .38
Merchant
Oxford
Solent
Uxbridge
Kingston
Wa.tford
St. Albans
Luton
Ha.r1ow
'London 1
London 2
I
London 3
London 4
Reigatll
W.Ham 1
W.Ham 2
S.E.Essex
Initial
Flow KinestonCut in Kingston S~. Albans St. AlbansOptimal ':Cut in Optimal.
32
92
320
162
12
80
12
80
12 .
80
240~
146
215
384
482
493
12
80
205
llt.4
164
292
361
464
215
86
165
42
182210 220
664
578
514
82
591
540
514
565
520
482
100 • 100 II! 100 • 100 •
598
240
105
165
435
421
130
130
260
105
95
150
370
135
122
562
184
441
162
130
166
140 •.
160 166
410
135
122
372
120
122
340
106
122
105
137
Table Continued •••.(
PochE:stcl' 85 65 65 65 Gr':;
_,._-----------
Dir. .f.lpha 94. 82 0 20 0
Dir. Beta
\
0 o ~ o '" 0* 0*
Dil'. Gamma 42 0 0 22 4
305 92Direct Coventry 370 177 20
3,883 3,3543,931 3,450Merchimt Tot-a 4,524
5,930 5,0305,030 5,030TOTAL 5,030
The evaluated outcomes of all of these alternatives were
presented to management in the same form as described in the South
West case. These took particulnr notice of the ca~h flows having quite
a different profits in the case of the purchase of a merchant/distributor
compared to that for a depot.
These options were shortlisted using roughly the following
criteria.
1) Expected savings sUbstantial enough to be worth makine
the chanGe.
2) Is the liquidity position of the firm such as to make the
expected cash flow reasible~ This was particularly.. .
relevant beoause of the U.S.A. capital export restrictions
operating at the time made it necessary to loq,d'.•as much
of the cost as possible against the expense and maintenanoe
acoounts.
3) . , Is the level of risk acceptnble~
4) Is action possible within the required time scale1
5) Do certain initialisation actions leave open the
possibility of moving to several strategic options et
a later stage'l
concluJ.ed Ir-om t.he eo before se ei.ng bow they change over time, but
U General conclusion woul.d be tha t horizontal c ohe sLcn is weak between
channe'l s and raost channe La S€8 tll(;!ffiSelves fairly evenly placed betw~en
the demc'nds of supplier and user. Of the o~op'nphical out.Ld.e ra
Hochester and Solent identify more cl.osoly \';ith users t.he.n SUPl;lier5.
Oxf'ord , rie;ht on the boundary of the recion, has strong supj Ldor links
but is r6ther distant from his Users.
Using this information and supportative information of a
similar type f rorathe ;.fidlandsand Nor-th the 1'ollcr.vinedecisions Vlere
recommended ~t the initial stage.
I.Continue financial SUI-lJortfor KinGston
I • i
2. Open negotiations with Gamma fI.S to a purchase
3. Begin to increase Gamma floVi but not substantially enouGh
to increase Gamma's barGaininG; poV/cr. Make it clear to
Gamma what the policy is.
4. Decrease sharply the flow throuGh Beta, this having a high
dual variable.
5. Investieate possibility of major mrrket inoreases in Solent
area.
6. Begin capital requisitivn procedures.
7. S~bstantial increases in the direct trade to Coventry from
both merchant and user acccunt.s, as shown in the modified
~ln. T~o8e in North London ~o remain, those in the nouth
for possible tre.nsference to Gamma Et a later date.
This conoludes the detailed desoription of the initial study in
the South Ea.at.
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LONDON 1 SOLENT
ROCHESTER
ST. ALBAN~ LUTeN. UXBRIDGE" . . .
I
; .. .
Y.INGSTON LONDON 3 RARI,OVl
LONDON 2 REIGA'l'E
LONDON 4 S.E. ESSS: W£ST HA'!..
•
Oi..FOIID. 'fIATFORD
•. .
-2. C.H'~\' o. +\
in ('on~;jrJr'!r'80le dGtail, heric ef or th cnly en nut-line of the s tudd.e s
I!woe in t.he other r-e g.ions shall be p!'esented.
De(iwndin this area 'Nfl,S ase:regated to 17 resions as
below:
Birmine;ham (l~orth & South) Loughbor-ough 0: Derby
stoke on Trent
Le Lc e s t.e r' TWllworth
Itorthamptcl1 Wol ve rhemp ton
Nottingham \','als~ll
Peterborough & East Coast Vlest Bromw.Lch
L3arnineton, WRrwick & Stratford Smethwick
Nune aton 8: Bedworth Shropshire
~;: .
\'lednesbury
There ~ere 21 principal merchants with anImal sales as
showi. in. Fig. C .41. A rough diagram of flows from distributors
to merchants is ,shown in'Fig. C.42.
The first program run did not include the depot case, and .
the results were inspected for abnormalities as in previous regions.
When ~anQgement had made t~e changes they though fit the model
was rerun with the results as shown in the last two columns of Fig.
C.41.
The only depot options that were considered plausible at '.
that time was one in either North West 01' South Birmingham,
Initial investjgations showed tm t th.. savings would not be
exceptionally greab , At the same time the possibility of raising
enough finance. esta.blishing the depot while still retaining most
of tha 1f.erchantaccounts was thought to be thin. Nevertheless
the findings did show that if the purchase of 8 distributor or
merchant was contemplated, then the best buy would be one in North
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?he required change iii distributor' r l.ows fl'Or:! the l'lcJdiI'ieo
pr-ogra:n as shown in Fig. C.~. below.
Fit:;. C.~
rrevious
Coventry Direct User 110
1298
1421
1304
437
920
5460 q\\ ';'1)..\.
.Alpha 1104
Beta 2470
Gamma. 1406
Coventry direct to Mercha.nts 370
TOTAL 5460
The cost of the modified program·was·£1,780K as again~t
the previous cost of £1,9l0K; a theoretical redu~tion of £130K.
The cognitive variables within the merchant system did
give some insight into the Midlands situation. These are
displayed below in Fig. C.45 & C.46.
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C oun t ry
of n.er-ch-m t s and the b·:;~;t orgnni3ccl b;J n. mcr-chau t body in the
U.K. 'l'hey <):::'0 nIl m~ll e stablisbec1 traders, most with roots
in the SJf.l)] J ccale foundry and e ng Ine e r-i.ng business. When
the smell concer-ns v:e:o no longer econcruic, many diversified
into fHctcring, ana th8nce into the mez-chandd sdrig business.
'I'hey are in tie;ht control of tl!eir- local market end seldom
~ake deliveries more than ten miles from baso. They feel
themselves well integrpted with both Users and Suppliers and
generally £'0(:1 conf'Lderrt in their market position.
Secondly, the East Jadlands Group, including Peterborough,
Leicester, Northampton and to- some extent Coventry and
Nottingham. J!.erchant chesion Ls very low:here and there is
a considerable variance in the degree of inteerlltion felt by
members. But notice that Peterborough, Leicestrr and Nor-thampton
form a sub-group with strong ~up~lier affiliations. The East
Midlands ar-ea is widely dispersed both ·:t@~Cl'aphioally and by
produot usage, but demand is almost entirely vd thin the ..
replaoement type. This is except flJT Coventry, of course, with
El high demand for production quantities. l!erchants are usually
ex-salesmen starting their own business e.g. the one in Peterborough
Krcdv~ jt~previously worked in Perkins, diversU'ied ipeeks .dealing in,
agricultural implements as well, or new 6ntrants of the 'professional'
type.
1'he third group are the remainder, Derlaston and Stoke ,dth
very low cohesion with other merchantd and little.integration
with either users or suppliers. Both relied heAvily on a local
I
captured marke t and had entered merchandising from small soale
engineerin,.
;U'j.
f J t ) ". LOn(,IJ •or Crl('l [lure 1')3~; of n.er'cha n t s or d i s ir-i.but.or-s , r.or ~~ t he ;,;:,vln:.;s
like Iy fro:n a dOllct justify havirlg this AS EJ. hiGh priority in tJ-:e
short term. l:overthcless ji' con sider'e td ons in other regioLl.\ i!J,!~e
the purchas e of' a dist.ributor likely th·:m it is pref'e z-abIy not
Beta. The r'ev Lsed plan r-emoved mos t of 13eto!.El Loc eI b'nde {Ina
his dilltant h'ede is retad.ned only by his efficiency, which
ought to be able to be matched by the Coventry mttnllfllctUI'Cr.
eut of the obhor two)Gllm:nais the leAst desirable, hovine
exceptionRlly SMall premises in a rather inconvenient pert of
Birmingham, and 110 real manaeerial talent. ··AlphAon the other
hand car r'ie s rather too much in the way of establishment. It has
an overspacious WArehouse with vehicle mtilnt~nance bays included,
considerable, mech!'.nical handling equipment and a large showroom
for C(.-products.· It has also a quite able me.neeedill staff.
2. The only area where purchases of' merchants would.
rea~ly be justified would be in the North Birmineham/Bleck
Country erea. At this staee it was felt to be much too serious
a risk to poseibly antesoniM thA strong merchant troup here.
3. Direct sales from the manufacturer to the User
should be encouraged , Of the increase of £327K eiven by the
modified run £85K lies in the Black Count~ and oueht not to
be solicited. Another £170K,approximately)is spread in small
, parcels across the entire region and ean be discounted. The
remaining £17CK are from Users in East Birmineham, Coventry and
the Easttf.!dlands and it was recommenned that attempts be made
to incr~ase this direct flow.
4. Direct Soles to merchants ought also to be
encouraged. The ri.::e of .£550K recommended by tho model, though I
was thought to be somewhat optimistio. A breakdown showed the
t\..l J.,....' ·1, t \.. - .. - 'I"" -.J' ~ ,~+" ..r' ~,.r ,. ," Y'>•• f.•1, l···.t·r•(~~:'.'1.r.n),',',J-.r n.ll t.l;e '.n·. ",'t. J...I .....;..... IU:'~ ... ,I\;...';\': •.• ~",I.\j ~(:lJ."'oJ ':;. It/'''').] 01 v 't ." 0;;._
trnnsferr8~ from Bet~.
5. Goo<l mareinel profits f\l'e to be r:aiw-d in the F.llst
Yidl9.nd s if the mar'ke t is there. This was deduced from tbo
dua I vur-i.ab.l.e s of the model. It Vias recommended tba t Ilttentir_n
be conccnt rated on increasing sales in this aiee ,
6. Althouf:h the model recommends reduction in the flows
through BirminGham 1, 2, Wednesbury, West Bromwd.ch land
Wolverhampton 1 arr.ountineto a tota.l of £538K, the coenitivc
datu supp or-ted the ms.X:ketingdirector's veto on nny action on
this front.
7. Immediate attempts can be made t? effect the
.;- r •
reductions recommended for Coventr,y 1, Binnineham 4 end ~orthampton.
The coenitive data shows each of them to be fairly isolated
merchants. This was another example where the cognitive data
vms used (lS a finer tool then previously available. Previously
both Covent~J and Birmingham would have been grouped as under (6),
8wellinr, the fit,ure by £280K.
This ends the recommendations for the Midlands.
';.':·~GT~():,r:·t1; ! In·:~-ti~!l ~;tu:~:t"........_.__ ._--,..•__ .__ .._-
i.'nnchester
Bolton
I.iv~rpool/Gb~st9r/
r:ortb 'j;'?l~'/
BU!'.ir/Rochc1eLo
Shof'f Le.Ld
Pr"::.ton
Blackburn
Accrinijton
Lanca st e r-
LC~'(13
York
Humber I'!sblllry
Ih r'I irwton
Tees:,!id&
Tynesic.c
Barrow
'l'here were 33 prir,cip.e.l mer-chant.s with annua L f;()les as
ShOVlU in Fie. C.46. A rough diner-am indicatir.e f'Lows froo
SUPI-liers to merchants is shown in Fig. C.47. This r egd on had the
greatest number of' merchants and demand areas even though the
total demand was smaller than in either the South or tl.o ~1~i(Uends ,
The demand in this reeion was prime.rily for '.reph.cernent go od a and
merchants tended to operate on rather a lccal level. Apart from
two cases there is a mar-ked absence of very La ree merchants .such
as are found in both the South end the Midlands. 1,~erchants in this
region are also frequently spec:!.alists in the needs of' their
particular industry, which is reflected in their ranee c:r stocked
items.
The first proer~m results obtained for the non-depot case
were di::Jcussed with management and the proeram sliitab1y modified to
be more realistic. The modified tgsults ~re shown in the lest two
columns of' Fig. C.47. The only depot cases that were considered worthy
Of attention were in Keighley, Halifax or Rochd~le for the one-depot
}.' ...
. ,',.:. '.: ..-case and Leeds' or' Sheff'ield
., , . L.. '. ...~. . . ~.':" ~ ,
, ~e;pot case. ..! ..... :..
and Manchester or Liverpool for the two
• ~ ..•• : •• j
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Fig. C.4-7 Modified Progrnm Lcsults
AnnuaL Usaf'ie DizCGunt }' Low }.!a io .. C.','inl't:3
Lancaster 67 lS% 80
Barnsley 83 l7~ 110
Barrow in
~'urness 23 l2~ 32
Bolton ll..S 20% 189 +44
Bradf'ord 162 20';; 124 -38
Chester 31 15~ 40
Chesterf'ield 82 16% 84
Darlington 74 ·,16% 125 +51
Doncaster 104 '",18% ·l23
Gateshead 84 17~ 62
Grimsby 25 12~ 20
Halifax 94 17~ 102";
Huddersfield 58 15% 83
Hull 52 1.5% 84
Keighley 52 l5~ 84
Leeds 1 108 20ft 150
Leeds 2 156 20J' 172
Liverpool 1 184 " ?o;b 102 -82
Liverpool 2 161 20% 90 -71"
Vanchester 1 74 16~ 102
Vanchester 2 168 20% 129 -39
Vanehester 3 152 20;& 128
.Manchester 4 ' 98 17~ 110
Viddleborough 110 17~ 132
Newcastle 1 96 17tJ~ 92
Newcastle 2 54 1.5'% 68
Preston 362 25% 202 -162
Rochdale 81 17~ 124- +43
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;{odified progr-am results
Annual Discount ~'low I/Eljor ChflnCf's
Usage
Salford 124 18j; 183 +39
Sheffield 1 166 2qi~ 212 +46
Sheffield 2 414 26% 246 -168
Stockton
on Tees 112 17/10 138
York 32 13~ 40
TOTAL 3810 3712
. ./
..
.'

3'10
The r'esu.Lts of the modified run could be rather misloadinG
and eive the impression that tIlepresent situution is pretty r.eal'
optimal' apnrt from a f~w d~V'iant f'Lows, ~l'hiswould be a wronG
concluSion, and az'Lsed because of the considerable number of
qualifications end modifications that manc.gement found n~cess.!lry
to make after the first run. These \'lereof mainly two types,
.firstly the distance effect. Because of the pnrticula1'ly local
nllture of m~rc!Jandisine in this region many results simply model
the f~ct that most of the trade local to a merchent will be handled
by him as at present. The exceptions to this in the results ere
either where more than one merchant services an area and hence the proE;rem j',' '"
has some room !'ormanoeuvre "there,:or the case of Sheffie2d 2 and
Preston, the only two merchants in the regions that cover a wide
I
territory. -.
1
The second main types of modifications were within order
sizes andproduct ranges. We were askod to try and accomodate certain
subset restrictions such as, the merchants around Leeds, 8sy.'Bradtorc.
Keiehtley, Halifax and P.uddersfield, would not handle more than a ver,y
small peroentage of orders for large products in this region. It·was
. .
traditional for the Leeds 1 and Leeds 2 merchent to do all the tradin,
tor there. By the time the analyst studied this Northern retion
decompositIon methods were bein. aPI-lied 0:1 the model because;
a) the model exceeded core capacity.
b) random access storage was not easily available on the
,com;uter used.
But ~s is explatned in Section B.2, ~sing decomposition gives
an opportunity to consider suoh 'spurious' constraints. In fact ~h~
time sav~g using decomposition seemed to be. so significant as to make
it a permanent faature of the model. Unfortunately in the day-to-day, "
bustle of the change period any comparative work was out of the question.
This had to be temporarily shelved.
The optiwal ,Pattern vre s the two der,ot CUS(;, ',iith ccpot s in
)!;anchester and Leeds. It' 5 ne ar est rival was one dOi;ot only in
Keieh1ey or Hal rrax, l·he. Manchester and. Leeds r1er-uts wou'Ld serve
both merchants and user s , If restricted to mer-chant-s only then this
option became much less attractive •. A simple schedule of results is
shown below in Fig. C.48. trano.eement considered from these results that
it was certainly worth thil',king in terms of a depot rather than just
a reoreanisation of the existinc system.
Fie. c .48
Option
Manchester & Leeds send.ng
Merchants and Users.
Halifax serving llerchants &
Users
Keighley serving lferchants &
Users
Keighley serving Merchants
only
Manchester & Sheffield
serving Merchants & Users
Halifax serving Merchants only
Liverpool & Leeds serving both
~anchester & Leeds serving
Merchants only
Reorganise flows in present
structure
Initial position
Cost
Now consider the cognitive data below_
I
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£K
1,374
1,408
1,412
1,428
1,430
).,450,
1,454
1,491
1,532
1,612
r'ie. C .49
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The characteristic eroupine;s of merchants here are firntly
the Leeds groups including Keighley, Halifax, Bradford £..nd
Huddersfield. This group of six merchants plus four smaller
merchants not considered here)isolated by Industry tYi)e and
geography,have developed into a close knit community with
well established norms of behaviour. With one exception they
were founded by ex-workers in the woolllen industry maihly between
1830 and 1890, although they we re not necessarily fCflnded to
trade in the engineered component market~ They are close to users
but remain on co-operative terms with suppliers.
The second group is the nino principal merchants in }.~anchesterJ
Liverpool, Salford, Rochdale and Bolton serving the SELNEC
conurbation. ·Here industry is more fractionated with many new
manufacturing plants, e.g. I.C..I, Shell and V~uxhall. Cohesion is
still sUbstantial but weaker than in the previous region. The
vertical integrations and identifications 'are ···alsomore voried
and less consistant. One gains the impression that cohesion could
collapse under the right pressure. lurther North there is the
Ribble va11y~ towns of Pre~n, Blackburn, Burnley and Accrington.
Although there are major merchants in all of these towns the whole
area.is dominated by the Preston merchant. He was until recently
has 1a manufacturere buy now turned to faotoring; only about lqw of his
trade is in goods he had made, and another 3~ is in factored goods
which, under licence, he buys in bulk and packages under his own
label.
Next is the North East, a region of diverse 'industrial activity
I and localloya1ties. Cohesion is low and vertical integration
varied. It could·never be said that the merchants of the region
co~situtad an informal association. If cne was looking for signs
of cohesion the natural place would b~ within the TyneGide and
Teeside but this does not appear to be the case. The only
indication of cohesion was Darlington who attempted to identify
himself with Leeds,although he was not really accepted by them, and
..
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a certain degree of 'within industry' co-operation. 1,5 an examp Le ,
Gateshead who mainly serviced the Durhaar mining Dl'ea had more
to do with Darlington, who also had ecns Lder-ab'l e rr:ininzbus i.ness,
than with either of Newcastle 1 or 2 "ho l'rimarily serviced the
shipyards and the newly located industri~s.
The Sheffield area including Doncaster, Rotbel'hs.mand
Chesterfield, but exclu'.;.in~Barnsley, we re another' tie;ht group
around the steel industry but without the intense local feeling
of the Leeds group.
LastlfY, there are the outliers, Lancaster, Barrow, YorK,
Grimsby, Hull and Chester all mostly isolated and each really a
seFarate case in themselves.
Given this new information the following recommendations were
made for this region.
1) That establishing depots or purch~{sing merchants in order
to service users directly should not be contemplated.in any of
SELNGC, Leeds or Sheffield areas, at least in the short term.
This is because of the strong merchant cohe~ion in these regions
and of their integration with users posing too great a risk of
loss of business.
2) That it would be worthwhile though to consider an
establishment to service merchants. Beta has no depots in the
reiion, Alpha has one at }.~anchester and t~el'lcastle,Ga~s
salesmen in the region has begun to keep small stocks of locally
needed item! in a couple of garages he has rented. Thus Alpha
I .seemed to be the most attractive and Beta the least. By this time
the S.E. region had begun to erfectively force the final decision
away from Al~ha end towards Gamma, mainly because of the time
scale involved and because of ~-products. Another problem in
this region was Alpba owning merchants outlets in both Manchost~r
and Sheffield and there would be problems regarding these, all
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of wl'lichwould. take time to solve.
Perhaps the mo st crucial reason fer preferrtne G~Jr.IW in
this region is that at present it cont rc'ls abcut 40f0 of t.he trf1de
in th'3 region. VlherM.3 Alpha even with tVIO depots has only 2~
Over 70% of the trade through Alpha's depots in this region beir~
o(.-products.
Thus given Gamma as the most likely choice now but wishine
to keep open the option of aLso purchasing .Alpha a later stage
management considered that the establishment of a depot at Keighley or
Halifax serving merchants only was the best option.
3) Of these two Keighley was a cheaper solution and also
land prices were considerably Le ss than Halifax. Ae;inst this WAS
the small enterprise of Gamma salesmen, which was et Halti'ax.
Also bad weather access to P.alifax from the Ml end across the.;- ;
Pennines to Selnec by the A.58 at present and the Transpennine
motorway, thE'n under construction ..passin~ near to Halifax made
this the final choice. Thus; as negotiations proceeded with Gemma,
soundings were to be made in the Halifax region for suitable
warehouse premises.
4) Informal approachet should be made in the North East
to see ~hich of the merchants there would be most attractive either
to purchase or give franchises to. This was prompted by a belief
that considerable extra trade w~s possible from this region and that
it would be profitable to service it. The latter information
being given by the dual variables.
;
These investigations must bear .in mind the possible future
. .purchase of Alpha and his depot in Newcastle. Of the existing
merchants Darline;ton would seem to be the most attractive, and it
was i:ltended in this situation to exploit the lack of strong
merchant cohesion in the area.
5) Attempts must be made to reduce the influence and trade
~. '.of Pre5ton, who with a 2~~ discount is making distribution in that
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area very expensive. Just how this is clone is uncertain (;[\!Jecielly
because of'his stron~ involvement with users. It was recommended
that the analyst, the sales mane ger and two ssIe smen r-eapons ib'lef or:
that area consider the problem at some length over the next new months.
6) Much of the tre.dG in the Selnec regia:) ought to be
delivered direct fran the manufacturer. This a,pplie~ particularly to
large production orders, which should be removed from the care of
the Liverpool merchants and Manchester two and three.
7) Although the program recommends a major reductions in the
trade handled by Sheffield 2, no attempt must be made to i~plement
this until the disturbance caused by the possible takeover of Gamma
has settled.
8) Tiaae ~Pftssln,through Beta should be bypassed and eoods sent
direct to merchants wherever possible •.
This ends the recommendations for the North and is also the
end of the initial period. There was now a gap of 3 or 4 months
while these recommendations were implemented •
• <
I
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c.6 .TAKUt.RY 1968 SECONT) PE.~SE
Introduction
This time has been chosen as the second phase, because it
was now that the decision wasbalanced or.a kniferoge. Also,
another survey using ~he indirect instrument had recently been
carried out, and all the information that was likely overt to
be available was assembled.
The actual,situation,'of'course, had developed and ma.tured
over the previous months and several actorsl had got the~s~lves
tots.lly c~mitted to one view. There was no longer a desire to
explore all alternatives and jointly decide on the best available,
now all the decision makers'felt themselves on the def'ensiveand
identified with certain courses of' action. It was now that the
interplay of'information from both economic and attitudinal data
became of prime importance. t;" to,
C.6.1 The South ~ast
The results of the initial decisions were;
1. Kingston in fact requested very little financial support,
appeared to raise capital by lowering stocking position.
2. Price of approximately £0.5 million agreed for G~mma.
Accounting details now being settled, plus complioating issues et
assets owned by Gamma which are not really wanted. Although nothinc
official had been announced most of the market and Gamma'·s general
staff were aware of the situation~
3. Start made on increasing Gamma's trade with merchants
mainly with thos~disccuraged to deal with Beta. The policyof'
oincreasine Gamma's direot user trade having to be stopped because
of other merchant pressure.
4. A start mad, on decreasing flow to Beta. After·one month
Be'ta purchased ,by competitor. Immediately, there wa.sa campaign
to save this trade by offering good terms throueh any of the
:ohannels, direot, Alpha or Gamma.
Initially Beta had El. £1,880 t.housend trade with mercharrt s, It
was esitmated that 4 months later i.e. 3 months eSter Beta takeover
.the annual rate of'trade had split as beLcw ,
£K-
Retained by Beta 1,470
Direct - CoventrJ 90
Gained by Gamma 180
Gained by Alpha 140
Total 1,880
Of t.hatretained by Beta, it was crudely esitmated'that
£120K was committed to Coventry's products for reasons of
technological incompatability. Another £250K were also 80
committed in the short run, although redesigning was possible.
And between £200K - £500K further could be retained by Coventr.y
. 0."" •from product lOyalty. Thus~immediate action:of Marketing was to
visit as many large users as possible to ensure them of continued
support and technical sarvice; and, in difficult cases, to drop
·hints of discount rises.
ITo retain merchants trade, Coventr.1 increased all AA merchants
.discount ratll~to 27~ if they were not above this d.ready. This
decision was against the advice of the analyst ~ who considered
thBt 'blanket' moves of ~ sort in this situation were inappropri~te
and certain to encouraee merchant solidarity. With Beta's takeover
this solidarity might help Coventry marginally, but Coventry's own
chan~es were likely to be rather more dr.astie. At that stage every
tool that could be used against an 1ndividllalmerohant would be
.l?eeded. Merchants who had received an incrAase soon foreet thet they
had, others )who had already had a 2~~ disccunt or more )remained ~it ter.. ' . ,. .
for a long time rem~ering that they worked hard to reach 25%.
5. No start was m!\debefore Beta's takeover and no manpower
available to do it afterwards.
6. These were begun with little success, until corpor-at.o
H.Q. heard of Beta's takeover and recognised the seriousness
.of the pesition. Th~proc~dure s then ran smoothly.
7. This action was submerged within the need to retain
Beta's trade, which thus ful!'ille~ this extra f'unctdon,
Other actions during this period were;
1. The Solent mercr..l'lntwas purchased by a competitor.
AlthouGh he gave assurances that he would continue to stock all
brands within the foreseeable future it was clearly goin~ to be
unsatisfactol~ in the long run to try and service the expanding
market thel'ethrough a competitor's distribution channel.
2. st. Albans had begun to stock altern~tive brands to
Coventry~, when previously it carried only the one brand. The
quantities involved are minimal and is presumably to be
interpreted as a threet, but with St. Alban~ having over £i million
of Covent~'s trade and being a leader in the ~erchant community,
the situation had to be carefully watched.
,. Severe merchant response to the takeover of Beta, ks
demonstrated by Beta already having lost over 2~ of his merchant
trade, with almost another 2~ committed to leavinc. ~erchant
response mainly focused by geographical area, especially North
(London, st. Albans and Watford) and the East (S.E. Essex, the
Hams and Harlow).
4. The Marketing and Finance directors on Coventry board
coming under direct criticism for continuing with the policy,
which could affect them the same as it did Beta. Marketing's own
s~lesmen and sales clerks were the mainsprine of this criticism
but supported by engineering and production personnel.
The principal decision at this·time in this rec~on was whether
or not to proceed. with the purchase of Gamma. The model was rerun
8uitably modified by Beta's absence, the relevant discount changes
and with the knowl.edge that the purchase of .Alpha W(iS impossiblo
in the si".ortterm, the clear- favourite in economic terms Vias to
purch?se G,::r.una. But in the lieht of the fiHr'ce reaction exr·'eriene'?:d
from merchants because of Beta's takeover opposition VIaS grOY1~nG to
any attempt at vertical integration~ The new cognitive data is
shown below in Ji'igurcsC.5l and C.52.
This data shows that the core of merchant dissent is
focufied on the two areas around st. Albans, the 4issent leader, and
Harlow. The twa groups had begun to meet regularly and were
developing plans for joint action in th~ case of any further
incursion on their territory. Thi3s.~two groups were essentially
separate but had had one joint meeting and had now institutionalised
a habit of' sending a representative of one to the other. Al thouc;h
collective action had arisen within the neutl'alterritory of the
merchant traders association, meetings 'were;,flow',heldin members houses.
It would ap}ear that little collective identity was felt by
Oxford, Kingston, Rochester, Re~gate, London 1 and Solent. The
position of London in general was quite a surprise. Al though from
the outside one might consider London to be a natural focus for
dissent in fact because of the lack of a~ common industrial purpose
this is not the case. London 3 is in the East End and identifies
with that group, London 1 is in the Croydon district and relatively
isolated, London 2 and 4 both keep to themselves serving their own
local districts.
Using this data mana£ement felt that the purchase or Gamma
with its depot in the west of London could be undertaken with the
~ollowing provisos.
1) It must service the merchant not the user level
primarily.
2) The St. Albans and Harlow territories must be sup}orted
and respected.
,.
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With these provisos acting as new constrnints the model
wa.s rerun. The results showed us thllt to keep the purchase of
Gamma an economic propisition trade would have to be taken from
merchants in the South and V(est or the region. Thus the following
decisions were made.
C.6.2
1) Finalise the purchase of Gemma.
2) step up erosion of Beta t s rae rcharrt trade.
3) Arrange visits to the Harlow and St. Albans group
to explein the situetion.
4) Remove support from Kingston.
5) Begin to erode the trade of Rochester, Re~gate,
London 1 and 4, Oxford, Kingston and Uxbridge.
6) Respect the position or Solent until alternative
The Midlands
The following actions had been taken during these months
and since the final decision to purchase Gamma had been made.
1) Direct trade had been expanded in the East Midlands to
, ;
Users.
2) Direct flows to the Leicester and Nottineham merchants
had been encouraged and, had '.ncreased by 25% of the
annual flow.
3) A fierce campaign had been waged to secure as much as
possible of Beta's trade after the takeover. This had
, 'not been so successful as in the South due primarily
to this being Beta's home ground, but considerable
.gains had been made in the Black Country and
maufacturers-merchantrel~tions thsre were con8equently
extremely gClod.
,4) The 'bargaining with Birmingham 4, Coventry 1 and
Northampton had been made much tougher and rna!!)
direot orders to Users solicited. had be en gained.
,Perha.ps, 15'l~of the required decrease in the annual
flow rate had been achieved.
The model was now run again using the new discount rates,
and the princip~l effects of Beta's takeover. This time the purchase
of Gamma was assurred and no option on other purchases wel'e included.
The results eeain showed that as much of the Black Country trade as
possible ought to ~o direct to users. The East Midlands pressure
ought to be continued and as much of South Binningham's trade 'as
,possible ou~ht to go direct from users either through the snaIl
Gamma depot or straight to the factor,. The dual variable on the
Gamma depot sizetwas:.particularly large showing that considerable
'_. i
,savings could be made if bigger premises were available. The cognitive
data is shown in Fig. C.53 and C.54 below.
In this case little was learnt th$',twas new. The North
Birmingham and Black Country group' was strongly cohesive but still
well integrated with both suppliers and users. An expected backlash had
occurred from the East Midlands especially Northampton and Peterborough.
but the cohesion was still rather weak.
The only way that this data af£ected the decisions recommended
'by the model was to confirm managements deoision not to try and expand
direct users trade in the Black Country. There was considerable
opposition to continuing' expansion in the East Midlands and in this case, , '
the cognitive data was used by both sides. Cne to demonstrate how far
, . . .
S¢lidarity had changed, 'the'other'to demonstrate that ~ven so it was still
weak. "The final decision was made to conti~ue exPansion in this area bu't
the frf!quency of reviews of"this· policy.
Fir,. C.2.2
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c.6.3
The following: actions had occurred durin~ the ir.tervenins
months during wt:ich Beta's takeover hud occured ,
1) A major campaign to capture as much as possible of
Beta's trade had'been undertaken since the takeover. In
terms of the annua.l rate it was estimfl.tedthat the
situation was as below.
£K-
Retained by Beta 792
Gained by Alpha
.
194
94
40
Direct - Coventry
. Gained by Gamma
-
TOTAL 1.120
-r .;
Of that retained by Beta it ~as estimated that £70K was
committed to Coventry's products for technoldgical r-ea ecne and
another£50K 50 committed in the short run. Loyalty was more
difficult to estimate but it was unlikely to exceed ~n annual
rate of £50K. •
Sales staff visited all the big users and all the merc}ants
in the area assuring them of continued support from Coventry. The
same'incr'3ase to 25%for all· AAmerchants' discounts were given for
those not at this figure. Again this was a~ainst the advice of the
analyst as discussed previously.
2) Considerable increases in direct shipmen'ts had "be en gained
I
in the Souti1 of the Selnec region as I·reoomlI'end. },!uchof' this was
~ith the' support of the Liverpool and l1enchester merc~ants who "ere,
beginning to find that use.r· discount erosion had so diminished tl:le~r
.margins as t\) make some of the account s ' of" doubtful profitability to
serviced at a.local level •.
3) . access or a' ma'jor
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road had been based near Hali1'ex and orpe.rtlhad been p11.tced
for shelving and other equipment. One of the salesmen
responsible for the are a was effectively organising this on
:the spot.
4) Shortly after negotiatio~s had opened with Dnrlincton
as to the possibility of a Franchise with him, he was purer ased
by a. competitor. This left Coventry extrtlmely vulnerablE in the
area and increased the urgency for. the depot in Halifax. It was
also another weight in favour of the purchase of Alpha, but by now
the evidence had come down so strongly on the side of Gamma that
it made little difference. Very little of Darlington"s trade
could be persuaded to either &0 direct, 'uuderstandly as the line
of communication waa too long, or to deal with other merchants.
5) There had been strong merchant re~ction to Beta's
takeover generally but one merct.&nt Sheffield 2 had strongly
supported the move. He had switched some more bf his trade to
Beta and was beginnin, to try 'and persuade users to change to the
alternative products. Other than ~im being a close friend of
Beta's owner, no reason could be found for this. The consequenco
ot his loyalty was that he causedasignif':ica.nt'antap;onism against
, .
himself from other merchants and consequently suffered from
considerable isolation.
6) Y.anchester 4 was purchased by another competitor, but up
. .. .
until this time little change had become apparent in the flows •.
. . . . .
He never had been tightly1ntegrated with other merchants and little, '
change was apparent here also.
~
7) Preston led a campaign of merchant lJ1'otec\;eeainst
the establisi:ment of the Halifax depot which he olaimed was
,threatenine him directly. UFon investigation it seemed doubtful'
how much the other merchants, Bolton Keighley. Rochdale and Salfo'nl
At this time the only actions had been in tht'
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form of tbreats to witndraw business etc ,, no actua.l moves had
occurred.
8) Because of the a}parent threat to the Leeds vrea.
merchE'.nts,by the Ha.lifax depot, a special Public Relations
exercise had been mounted there which culmina.ted in the signing
of an agreement with the local Tra.ders .Association which offered
financial supf-ort for the establishment of a local trades magazine.
The cost to t~e firm was minimal, just a few hundred ~ounds.
Considering all these changes t~:e program was rerun. The
results were mainly a repetition of the ~reviou5 results, but
this time seme experimentsYiere done with sU~l-ressine either or
both of'Preston or Sheffield. The results were quite interesting
and SLowed that most of"Sheff·ie1d's trade could be serviced direct
and via other local merchants at very little extra ·cost. Also
that Preston's business could also be shnre~ be~ween other merchants
.;-. ;
and the Halifax depot. With DArlington now gone, the most likely
merchant to support in the area was Stockt~n-on-Tees. The
cognitive data was now as in Figures C.55 and C.56.
Using both the economic and attitudinal data the following
•
recommendations were made. ..
1) To continue pressure on gainin& direct orders in the Selnec
region, especially the South of that region.
2) To speed up the equiping of the Halifax depot and betin
servic11'lgmerchants from there 'Ss soon 8S possible.
3) To encourage the growth of strong merchant feeling in the-
Sheffield'area against Sheffield 2. Also when the time ia
considered right to·be&in to try and make users transfer their
trade in that area to other merchants'., This is likely to be a
sensitive move and it WIlS not agreed to amone the Coventry Board
.,. _-.. ~
Efforts must be made to recaptur~ some of the DarlinGton
- .some reluctance. ..
ensure that the.same
. .'
Fig.C.56. CV/CH merchants-suppliers: four'monthscV
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does not happen with Manchester4.
5) Talks must begin in the North East about wher-e a
dealership or fra.nchiRe might be Loc abed now thlJtDarlinDtc..nhad
been lost.
6) Also in the North East the ,dual variables showed that
it would be profitable to try and increase sales there if possible.
The marketing personnel were asked to investicate this.
7) The analyst recommended th~t some tests ought to be
devir;ed to test the strength of supf.ort givon to Preston by other
merchants. Some ideaB were put roward, but the Board finally
decided that the risk was too zreet. Instead, Preston wes advised
that the Halifax depot was there to serve him and other merchants and
would not be selling directly to users, other than to a few
selected major accounts.
-,,
This ended the second phase of the national study. Although
frequent minor decisions occured, it was not until about eit:hteen
months later that a whole cluster of major 'decisions arose. TheBe
will be treated as the third phase of the st'ldy•
..
C.7 'JULY 1969 : THE THIPD PHASE
!l!7.1. The Chanr;es So ftH'
In the previous eighteen months the following principal
changes had oocured throuehout the United Kingdom.
1. The whole of Beta's distribution system had been
absorbed into that of the competitor's which purchased it. A
oonsiderable amount of the business haa been lost en route as ~hovm
below in Fig. C.57.
Fig~ C .51
Initial Lost to· Lost to lost to July 1969
Beta Direct Alpha Gnmma Beta
.South
West 975 442 • 47 0 486
south 1".. I,.
East 1880 240 'lOS' . 461 971
Midlands 2470 218 330 132 1790
North 1120 115 '82 212 •• 711
Scotland 375 25 88 15 247
- ~otals 6820 1040 755 790 4205. (£1000'8)• inoluding sales through Swindon
•• 1nQluding sales through Halifax
It was further estimated that between £100,000 and
£400,000 : .... '".,of the trade :oemaining to Beta could be stUl
',. ".. .
-,
secured on grounds o~ technological incompatibility.
2. Gamma had been purchased and integrated into the
I firms distribution system. This inoluded the followln~.
"...a) .~isClissal of several exces3 employees in the London
...'distribution depot, espeoially am~ng the clerical
staff.
b) .Rationalisation or sales staff, including reallocation
of salesmen and sales clerks to customers end demand
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c) Inclusion of G~mma employees on the firms payroll
computer pro~rams.
d). R~tionalisation of lorry routes and centralisation of
lorry maintenance facilities. Sales ~f two excess
vans.
e) Integration of the Gamma administrative system to match
the firms standardised procedures.
f) 0 & M study of Gamma's office procedures, followed by
considerable office re9~gnisetion.
g) Consolidation of stock, scrapping of obsolete lines.
Integration of Ga~s stockholding with the fir~'s
computer,controlled system. Datel 600, d~t~ trensmission
line installed.
h) Reorgimisption of aanagemerrt structure at Gamma to
';.
.; ,
.. r , ~ ;fit.::thefirms management profile •
A programme of consolidation of customer accounts
embarked upon andpartlally completed.
3. The Ralifax depot h~s been operating for over a year,
an operation,that had included, amongst others, the following actions.
. .
a) Hil'e'and training of personnel. Purchase of suitable
lorries and equi~ment.
b) Installation of administrative procedul'6s for customer
servioing and ~tockholdini, both 1ntegratedvia a
Datel terminal to the firm's' system.
c) The reallocation of salesmen -and sales clerks within
the region'.'
'-d) ,The consolidation of customer's eccounts in the retion.
4)" The sien:iticantly enlargud }'farketingand Distribution
functions within th~ fiI'lll.Iladeit ne,oessary to reorganiMd tha
organisation of the firm.
I
. .
~e~iously Distribution had bee~ controlled by the Produotion
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Manager, who also controlled the stocks of finished goods and raw
materials. Now an enlarged Marketing function was esta.blished
responsible for:
l).Salesmen and Sales clerks nationally
2) Overseas Marketing Operations
3) The Covent~ Sales Office and Publicity departments.
4) Coventry's Finished Goods and Raw Materials stocks.
5) ltaihtenane& of the lorry fleets.
6) Halifax depot. •
\
7) London depot (from Gamma)
8) Birmingham depot (from Gamma)
9) Swindon Limson and stockholding
10) .Merchant and distributor liaison.
With this considerably expanded function~. the marketing
director increased his influence on the Board.
5) Several merchants had been purchased by competitors
including in particular both Kineston and Sheffield 2. Pre~ton
had to some extent learnt to live with the Ealifax depot. Gloucester
had been purchased in the South West, Bath had diversified into an
alternate prodpct market and Reigate seemed to be doing the same.
6) In Scotland the key merchant ha.d been purchased and
a collateral ~ereeinent between the firm and Alpha had been made about
s~aring warehouse and office facilities.
7) Alpha had been suffering a business crisis, from the
economic recession affecting ~-product5 and the parent was considering
some form of reorganisation.
8) Due to the economic recession the firm had been forced
to cut indirect workers by 120 and direct workers by 80.
9) Not countine the capital expenditure of about £0.5
onthe)urchase of Gamma, the firm had made a modest Los a
• _. ',' -', ".; ,-c:" ',.:' . : .-" ", ~:
last·financia.l year, compared with a substantial loss in
years.
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10) All the reoree.nisntions hl.'ld involved rerunning the
model At V&riOU3 times as the situ~tion.had chuneed, and also
another ir.dircct applica.tivfiof the instn:.rr:onthad been ca.rried
out over Easter 1969. During this time the analyst had been
partially involved with this work and partially involved with
solving other problems arising within the Corporation.
C.7J2 Problems Outstannin~
As it stood at that time there were several shortcomings
in the distribution system. The principal ones are detailed
below.
1) Notwithstanding the integration and rationali3ation
of Beta's captured customers with the distributive systems of
both the firm and aamma; the total duplication of a nationwide
distribution syste:nstill existed with ·l:Al)ha.
2) No satisfactory solution to-the pr:>blem in the ljorth
East had been found. No merchants having been found satisfaotory
enough to be offered a franchise agreement.
3) The shared facilities in Scotland could only be
considered temporar,y.
4) Competitors were '!lakingcon,siderable strides·in
the Selne'C region, mainly at'the expense of Alpha's Manchester
'depot. It was clear that better servioing of the area would be
needed to maintain trade there at a satisfactory level.
5) The small Gamma depot in Birmingham was proving to
bea bad~ compromise. Either a proper depot ,with adequate
, facilities was needed in the area, or the Eirmintham trade ought
to be serviced directly _from Coventry. This was particularly true- -,
.because of Beta's 8tronghold on this locsl market.
Considering all these problems .man~,eeltentrequested' that
the analysis be resumed with the object at deciding.whether:to
or bypass Alpha. Both economio and attitudinal model~
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were used in the subsequent analysis that took until November' .
1969. The principal recommendations ar'agiven below.
C.7.3 Principal Recommendations for the T~lird Ph~e~
1) That Alpha be purchased as long as the price i3
not much in excess of £900,000.
2) That the two wholely owned merchants of Alpha
are not to be included in the above p~ckage in
order not to alienate the merchant level in t~:e
particular regions where they were situated, vis.
Leeds and Manchester. These two merchants had
'most of their trade with other products produced
by the parent company cbwningAlpha.
3) That ~-products be added as a factoring service
,to the whole of the firms enlarged distribution
aystem.
4) That in the short term rationalisation will occur
between the two London depots. In the longer term more
,suitable premises may be needed. '
5) That complete consolidation occur at the premises in
,Scotland.
6) The ~!anche8ter and Newcastle depots are developed as
centres tor all the trade in their resEeotive regions •
. 7) That all the Birmin,ham regional trade be serviced
trom the Alpha depot and the small Gamma depot olosed
8) That the aales torce, stockholding functions and
,administrative procedures of the two networks be
totally integrated. This would mean that a proportion
of the Alpha workforce would have to be made
reoommendations were implemented durine the
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C.8 Au;:ust 1970 : THE FINAL PHASl'!
By this time most of the recommendations made in the third
phase had been implemented. The one major exception was the
using of the Birmingham Alpha depot. The parent company intended,
todispose of these premises completely and the part-used for warehouse
and distribution would consequently not be available. The decinion
was taken to service all the Birmineham area trade by a consolidation
of the Alph.'3.Birmingham depot'with Coventry's facilities. Thin
caused even more retlundancies than was initially envisaged. Some
public r~action t!Jthese changes are shown in the press cuttings
. .
taken from the front page of local newspapers in Fig. C.S8. All
theroutes and customer accounts were then standardised over a
period of months and the stockholding procedures centralised.
With this ~ajor new addition to the firm's Distribution system
. .. .. ':the Marketing management was again reorgariised and strengthened.
Over the previous year and currently.the firm was making
a steady profit and rapidly recovering some of its lost market
share, despite the continuing economic recession. At this point
.
the research project, which had already only been continuinG in
an advisory capacity for the previous year, was terminated.
C.9' CONCLUSION
During the two and a half years of the study the
following major changes occured either directly er as a
consequence of recommendations made usL~g the mathematical and
attitudinal models.
1) The complete physical revamping of the distributicn,
,system involvine the removal of all three diatributors and ma~
metchants .•·.~f~'.:~ts.·
, ,2j The re-establishment of the firm at least
, ,
temporarllTi;trom making a.con~iderab1e annual loss to a reasonable
int~rnal'recrganisat1on of the firm,
the increased emphasis ~n l~arketing and Distribution.
,.'
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4) A:cowplete shj£t in the attitude of me~agement
towards t~e ohjectivE'~of the firm.
On arrival at the firm in 1967, a possible ztrategic
optd.onwas to give a sole agency and withdraw from distribution ..
On leaving the firm in 1970 a sa.riously considered possibility
was to closp the manufacturing facilities and use them for
distribution of components imported from .:>thermembers of the
parent company.
-,,
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D.I INJ.'ROr;UC1'ION
An unstable Gystom i::Jhere taken to mean a syscem vlhich
it is anticipated is about to sustain a shock or change of
sufi'iciently major pr-opor-tLons to force action to be taken at
a S1ira..~egic Le veL ureently. Decision making in such systems
differs in degree to decision making in more stable systems.
These differences are prLlcipallYi
1) A change in the quantity and type of inform~tion
availa.ble.
2) A tendency of decision makers to choose between
available alternatives rather than search for new
ones.
3) 'A move towards decisions based on the individual
,decision markers power and 11nfiuence end away from
rational instruments such as the consensus.
4) The aband.on:nent·cf::lone;erterm thinking in the
pursuit of immediately objectives.
5) Finally a tendency of decision makers to beccme
too committed to entrenched positions before the
situation is really.clear.
As the case study of section C proceeded it became clear
that these differences of degree between the two types of decision
making was forcing the O.R. analyst to anapt his behaviour towards
the decision makers. This was not sur1Jrisin~because the classical
J O~R. approach to or€;anisational oesign of letting a fairly cl.Atlliled
modeller the system mperate in a rather crude model of the.. .
environment is 'one which relies heavily en the assumption of
reasonable environm:.ntal 8te.bility~ It was the intention during
the study to record the changes in behaviour forcE.c on the analyst
and to e.ttempt e.fterw~rds to draw some generalisations on this '.
3'+2
Discussions with colleagues ann other pr-aetdtLoner-s beforehand
tended to give the impression th~t the only practical help thnt
O.P. coule..giYo'ir. these situations, wc.s a'quick and dirty' study.
This presumably meant that the analyst must be prepAred to weaken his
criteria as to what constitutes valid information for inclusion
in the study and as to what conclusions can be taken as Viell-proven.
l'he resuk ts of the study tended not to SUPlJOl'tthis view,
identifying rather the principal changes in the analysts behaviour
as being concerned with the reletionship he maintains with the
client decision maker.
The next section gives the framew~rk fbr the d1scussion by
giving more detai13 about how instability changes the decision
makers behaviour.
Then section D.3 passes to a general discussion before
focusing on three areas in particule.r in sect16ns D.z....to;P.6 .
inclusively.
The statements made throughout this section are to be
considered re,ther differently from those in' the rAst of the
thesis. In section C the question under consideration was 'technological',
a problem basically of design. Sections A ~nd B were concerned with
scientific description and explanation. Here the focus is on general
'methodogical' conjectures, or guides to furtherlesearch. r:o claims
are made, at this level of generalisation, other than our results
provide supporting evidence for the conjectures.
I ,
D.2 CONST-~0U1~!CEOF IFS'l'ABIJ,ITY
i'oThere ~ a wealtll of possible consequences of
instability but we shall concentra.te on those that arose
most frequently durin~ the empirical study.
1) Environmental instability.
T~is involves instability in what is recognised to be
the environrcent, and in the shifting nature of the key variables
defining it, making it necessary for model testing to be carried
out in a wide range of possible environmental futures. Especially
important are 'structural' changes, where the formation or
dispersion of other formal organisations either of a oompetitive
or co-operative kind become increasingly major components in
decision making. A convenient description of this is a
'turbulent field',Terreberry (68) and conc~~n L22 processes in
the note.tionof Emery and Trist (65). Terrebcrr,y reports that
both DrucAer and Gardner;
"assert that the kind and extent of present day change
precludes prediction of the future. Increasingly the rational
strategi~s of planned innovation and lone range planning are
being Undermined by ynpredictable ohanges"
In this context we remember the dour prophesy of
Cyert e,ni !larch (6lb).
"As lon~ as the environmnet of the firm is unstable -
the heart of the theory (of the firm) must be the precess of
short run'adaptive reaotions".
In our study it was not found tc be suffioient to deal
"
with organisations ~ithin the environmnet as formally defined or
to treat them as statio phenomena. It was found necessary to
consider relationships between organisations, and to treat the
formation, weakening, strengthening or destruotion of these
as critical factors in prediotion.
•
The organisation behind 'merchant soliaarity', however leose or
~nformal, Vias nonetheless t~ekey variable in determining actions
and re~ctions within the distributive system. This same loosenes::.
and informality can result in the complete texture of the
distributive environment changing without the firm's management
·being properly aware of it.
2) Instability of the actors perceptions and attitudes.
In a ra.pidly changing situation each actor's perception
of his goals and the alternative options open to him are liable
to frequent changes •. Without a suitable period of time the actors
fail to interact and influence each other,· to gain an insight j.nto
each others' percept.ions, to isolate conflicting goals and there
is &enerally no time for a consensus to emerge. As information
is often scarce, the importance of what Is available is often
"•• p I
exaggerated. Biazarre interpretations are often given to quite'
harmless information or actions, and as possible conflict is seen
to approaoh polarisation occurs and the selective weighting of
evidence begins.
In distribution, as change appears likely, business
confidence and tr~st disapfears, attitudes are realigned, and every
action or piece of information becomes a source of sp~culation
and debate usually aimed at reinforcing their new attitudes •
. ,
As circumstances chang~ opportunities for personal goals
change, and theBe ~an affect the actors preferenoe for and
perception of organisational objectives. But it is doubtful whether
I .
I
this is any stronger here than in any situation of organisational
change. •
~) Uncertainty concerninG th~ availability artdtaooessiDility
of infoniiation.
When considering unstable systems the following become.
of ~oncern.
a) The actual time available for information eathering
is unusually limited.
b) Infcrma.tion concerning when the decision is to be
made be'come s particularly important.
c) Many sources of Lnr ormat ion ere too slow to respond
to change s,
d) External sources of information cease to be co-
operative and many situations are so sens i.t Ive th9,t
merely the act of requesting information could severely
change the position. InternallY, sectional interests,
fear, often justified, and claims of territoriality
or 'empire building' causes information to be with-
held or f'alsified deliberately. Thus when estimating
the re~inbility of a source, we are forced to begin~
to consider the motives .for:dis'torting, the evidence)
of that source.
e) Much information can no longer be obtained by direot
measurement elther because it is inaocessible or ,
beoause its only manifestation is as actor's jUdgements.
Here indirect methods of information gathering is
necessar,y with all its attendant epist~ologioal prmblems.
f') In the early stages of'most O.R. studies it is quite
common to be ignorant of'what it is that informatiol'l
1s needed about.' But in'unstable situations this . ,
seems ~o permeate the ~hole course of'the work. This
problem diagnosis aspect', of' determining whether one
phenomenum is a core problem or merely a symptom
of a problem, is particularly diff'icult to make
presoriptive comments about; being,~s it is,so tied up
with abilities and experience of'the particular analYfrt.
models for strategiodecision-making
.'~ .
rm~ve from strate-gio plans in general to tactical actions in
particuler. The assumption of a certa.in stability implies
that tnctical deviations caused by unexpected onviro~onLal
influences can be a.ccomodated within existing strategic plans. A
stream of such deviations would feed back to a realignment of
the strateeic position over a period of time. Being in an unstable
,situation seems to force a different pattern of bemaviour though.
It is typical that a series of tactical changes are the first
significant warning that the organisation received concer~in,
theapproach of a sudden change. Organisations will yy.pically
ignore the need for a strategic overhaul and entrench their
position with a series of piecemeal provisions. Thus a
situation can occur where a decision is needed which is not
catered for within existing strategic plan3 but there is no time
to restructure these plans. In such a caSe i'ticannot be assumed
that the sensitivity of future strategic· positions to this decision
•
is low. This one tactical decision can determine to a considerable
.. extent what strategic options remain open. In section C, a
competitor made a ~id for one of the firm's distribution outlets.
The immediate response to the decision, although by itself sca~cely
a strategic decision, significantly affected which ~ong term options
remain open. The result'of that decision was a m4jor factor in
whether or not it successfully moved into the distribution business
or concentrate on remaining primarily a manufacturing concern.
Thus a summary of.this point would le; that the relEl.tionship
'between strategic and tactical decisions becomes more complex in
unstable situations and the direction of cause and effect influence less,
10_& predominately one way affair.
This conoludes the list, but t'/Opoints must be borne in
mind when' considering it. Firstly it is not meant tobs exhaustive. ,
but rather'refleots the factors tha.t arose most frequently in .
practice. Secondly, none are uniqu_, to decision makine in unstable
, ,., ..
environments, theY,just appear more urgent and important then.
D.3 A G~n:i<.f\L DISCUSSION
A client decision maker ma:l request help from an C.R.
analyst for many reasons, but two in particula.r are usually
prssent. The first is his skills and experience, and the second
is that he is anticipa~ed to make a scientific attack on tho.
problem. It is the second. that we shall concentrate on hera. The
request for scientific procedures is really a request for more
conf"idence in the criteria used in decision making, for "hat is to
be accepted as valid infonmation or deductions concerning the
situation.
The Oore problem here ie what, if anything, h~ppcns to
the use of concepts such as information, verification, hypothesis,
production, proof, facts and judgement, all of which are accer)ted ... ._. ;
terminmlo~y when discussion decision making; when the time in which
the decision is to be made becomes a dominant facto.r. There would
be no point in discussing this m~tter unless we suspect, as we do,
that pitfalls of reasoning await the deoision maker. Pitfalls that
is. where potential danger would have baen lessened had there been
·time to reflect on the implications involved.
D.3.l :Facts
On entering a'situation an analyst is confronted with
several actors intent on tellinc him -tha 'facts', usually different
..versions, and he is then expected in return to 'tet at the real
facts'. Thus the analysts takk is seen' as attemptine to approach
J
what is 'l'l!l:!llythere already' althougbws are not quite sure yet
what it is. This causes no troubler when calibrating some existinb
model. It is not ~ntE!nded to underestimete the statistical problems
involv.ed ~ere but the point is that there are few sources of'
t,· • ~
the problems are. If time pressure forces a
taken,then problems do arise with statistical
iestim.ation And inference, but they ere of a type which a statistician
would be used to handling.
Qu:.te a.different situa.tion is met with in the Lhc ory of
distr5,bution channe Ls when we talk of tne rcharrt power. This
attribute is seen in the minds 'of'actors to transcend the limits
of an indiv::tfua.lmerchantor retailer and is a property of the
collectivity of merchants. Before it makes sense to desicn an•.t
instrument to calibrate this power some thoueht must be given to
its exi5tenc~. It might well be a shared delusion on the
actors part which has developed as a defence me eharrlsm to lrotect Jlihem-
selves against attacks on their own lack of retailing competence.
It is maintained either consciously or unconsciously by a fear
of retalitpry:' action in the market place if they 'step out
of line'. Retalitor,y action which is pushed forward on a wave of
t;, .;
'merchant power' in itself merely a mental construct of their own.
Theanalyst can refuse to share the delusi~n and find it impossible
to follow the rationality of their future actions. Or he can
remember that a certain troup rr people among the' actors ~ut'fer
from this,delusion, if that is w?at it is. By moving firmly into
retailing and finding no reaction from merohants comparable to
what would be expected from merchant power, he might attempt to
explode the myth. But the actor's conviotion is likely to have
"been rather weak in order to agree to such a move. Thus a ca~e could
be me-de that the very act of beifl! alloy,ed to test the myth went a.
lo~ w~y,tow~rds destroyine it. Thus a 'fAct' becomes an opinion
'that we feel no need at present'to'question.
The point here is th8t it is difficult, or maybe impossible,
to give a reference to the term fact which will be independent of
the languaee used to think, speak or write about facts. The serious
problem ~ith the 'merohant power' ,.concept is tbat given a,reasonable'
span of time then doubts 'would 'arise, queE::;ionsmight be asked and a
. ~~-. - .
empirical evidence of the pbenomennm , But under aeutre= time
spirit of investifation or enquiry mi-t:htgroYI in o:..·,Jerto gain
pressure actors mentally r'ecof.Le d f'rom the idea 01' questioning
a basic belief. hs the eround starts shiftine, he relies on
supports found se£e by ex[erience and about which there was a
concensus of ofinion among actors' 01' its correctness. Here we
are suggesting that not only did actors require something imm'obile
to rely on but that this psychologinal ne~d for support produced
three derivative states of mind. Firstly it provided a means of
simplifyinc the situation, en opportunity eagerly grasped.
Secondly j.t made actors develop motives for d:istortion of the
evidence that was available and potentially damaging to the belief.
Thirdly it imposed a petr:ifica.tion on critical, questioning. Probing
and searching for truth and illumination iL that area was stopped:
Rather, it did not have to be stopped because t~ere was no perception
••. i
of the need ever to have begun it. Why search for truth when truth
is obvious. This attitude spills over onto the analyst. Firstly he
is unlikely every to doubt,/ft6~iPfrmly actors believe and rememberine
his o~~ mctives for accepting simplifications to make his job
easier. '
Secondly, if he does'question he will be 8ccused~ar:wasting
time, confidence in his judgement will drop, he will be increa8in~11
isolated as a deviant who cannot see the .obvious, end his working
'rel~tionship will gradually deteriorate. Thirdly by sooring
'successes' by pointing up flews in their belier, the analyst will. ,
put actors on the defensive, will alienate·himself from the group
_itb:1Vhich actors are willing to share opinions end might well
entrench actor's potion'even further.
A tinal result of the tormation ot shered delusions, Is
their, self-t"ulfilling' tende~cy ..Spen~~r (65). .The emphasis by
actors cw1:'tliin: :the~organisation'~"of the exte~l'~.rof"'dIttlrchantpO:O'lcr,could
·~·onvince-·merohe_nts:'that:.:this.:~~ 1:nde.ecL~tha.CA$e...Jiv;'.chants.,'Wo}1Js\.:,)th3n
,"_"'c:;,· 0·," ., •
trade associations
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in order to instituU.onalise and direct app.HcatLon of this power
and hencefcnvard power ther~ wouldbe.
An exsmple where the roles of analyst and actor have been
reversed was found in the same context. The analyst quite freely
discussed the distribution channel. He had read books discussing the
distribution channel, was quite clear on what he meant by it and was
willing to share his definition and perception of it. Simply th~s
concept referred to goods passing from manufacturer E to a d~8tributor
C or a wholesaler D and then to a broker or to a retail merchant B
for sale to a user A. Any person in this chain might bypass any
other at a particular time. Thus the channel was perceived as a
chain of ev?nts, of good~ passing down end orders passing up the
chain with a transference of ownership at each link. He visualised
something like this example below:
Yet the analyst found that aotors in client organisation E
were,basically irratio~al in their discussion of possible changes to
be made to the system~ After con~iderable investigation the analyst
, .
realised that the actors perception of a distribution channel was bas~d
on which organisation they send to direotly. For example:
;
~..
!
Of course if this were merely a semantio confusion regarding
the meaning j:,~ of channel it would be a tri·,ial example. But it is
rather more •. By using a conoeptu-:.lt'l·arJIeworkwhich was not 'rich' enough
to adequately describe the system under 5,tudy,what was recorded as
, . .
.facts wero at some variancewlth what the a,nalyst recorded. Again this
8ituationresulted in a petrifioation of critioal questionine and was
meintained by the desire not to overcomplicate th~ ureent matter
in hand , This is ceI'tainly understandable, but it lead iu this
instance to ienorin~ certain changes occurring two etage s away
in the distribution channel' which was soon to remove most 01' the
choice in the so-called urgent matter. Interestingly exactly the
same example with distribution channels has been reported elsewhere \ :,
e.g. if..cVey(60).
From thE' above then we become aware that treatine the facts
as existing 'out there' already for us to tr,y our best to make
statements about, is an unacceptable position, and it would also be
wrong to suaest th!tt.a little cleare!" thinking by all those
involved would clear up the problem. The point, is that new ways or
1;- I •
talking, writing and thinking, when tested and established, initiate
.new facts. Thus what we call factual staiements are hypotheses which
we feel we have no need at the present time to question. When we
lose oonfidence in their validity we either drop them altogether,
keep them with a changed r.secantiovalue, or modify their f'om or
scope, e.g. by addin~ oonditional clauses. We must next turn to
disoussing in what way these ~~potheses can be used in research and
particularly in operational research. As the present research was
intended both as an individual piece of Operational Research and as
a foundation to begin to make gene~llisations about applying O.R. to
unstable situations,' it is necessary to consit3~r first how the
J
classical orientations of O.R. and 'soie~t1tic researoh ccnflict in ar~
individual situation,
D.3.20n~r~tion~1 PAsearch end Scientifio Research
It is meaningless to discuss what these t·..rms t really' mean
and how they differ, the important matter is for us to state our inter-
pretation of them. Aa long as these interpretations do not diverge
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too radically from accepted usage a comprehensible discussion ca.n
fSHlow.
.Both O.R. and scientific reftoarch use tho scientific
method to approach their own type of questions. A scientific
question takes the form; given a system S under study at time T
we wish to understand and describe the behaviour of the sy~tem in
order to predict what state the system will be in at line T + K and
with what probability?
Constrasted with this is a technological question; given
that we wish a system S to be in a certain state at time T + K with
a·c€rt'lin probability, what must we do to it how?
Of course involved in the technological question will be
an iteration of scientific questions concerning predictions with trial
system confirurations. But this does not detract from the view that
';' ;
the driving force berind each question is distinct. I propose
that the primary p.tirposeof scientific research is to answer scientific
....
questions and that of O.R to ~ddress itself to technoloeical questions,
that is questions of desien,several corollorys follow from this '.;':~:'
proposition. Firstly that even in this most .general formulation of a
technological question the concern with when deci5ions are made to-•.' change the system is manifest.· Secondly that it would be expected that
design questions are framed more on the perticul;tr and less on the
.general. Thirdly that the probl~m of valid~tion with the technological
question is somewhat different to the problem of validation with
the scientific question. We do not in ess.ence require tt.e..tthe whole
J
operation be repeatable with similar results by other analysts. The
~ scientific question of validity though must be continually concerned
with repeatability and with deciding which of several alternative
theories is the bast. even th01lgh each of them f~.t the, empil'ical
adequately.
Tw~ rival theories in science is a cause afconcern and
~,' •t
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a focus of research effort. Two alt-ernetive de sdgnn whd.ch fulfill
clients specificntions equally well Are a. source of indifference.
!!.:l.3 Hypothf>sis end Inter_l?J'eta.tions
Having argued for a distinctly different praematic
orientation between scientific and technological questions it is
time to redress the balance. This is especially lrtecde-dl in or~an-
isational research because eo many of thep.runomena under study have
qeen man ma1e. Co-operation between men for certF.:!lnends requirE:os
the solution of a set of problems involving co-ordination, control,
planning etc. A solution is usually what we mean by an organisation
and the study of alternative solutions and their efficiency, what
we mean by organisational scier;ce,~ one trouble is that it is
likely that existing organisations form only a small percentage of
possibly solutions to the set of orga,nisational problems. As such
. ,
l ....it seems unjustifiable to make I too. clear ~;:.disrinction between
, design and research. As an example, let us consider the term, 'die.enosis'
An outstanding diagnosis of an organisational problem could be a major
step forward in research as well as also solving a particular client's
problem. On the other hand a failuI'e to solve a particular problem
might also constitute a sign1finant .theoretical insight. The caUse
of tailure may be quite irrelevent. The relationship here is quite
complex. An analyst ~hile attempting to unravel a-clients problem
may pro:rer an interpretation of a situetion. This could serve es a
re6~arch hypothesis. that is, an explanation, or it mif,ht be an
,intervention, changing the situation under study by the client recognisine
its value as a diagnosis.
Th,:!salthough design and scienti!"ic quotations 81'e
'. 10eioal1y distinct they can often result in tbe same activity.
Nevertheless successful solutions to a design problem cannot be
taken as a criterion of the validity of organi8~tional theories. We
may well solve particular problems while adherrine to false theories
We may be right about the' cause of the,orBanisational problem 'and our
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series of recommended ections mie;ht be efficacious,
but our theory for explaining its efficiency be quite
false. We may be wrone about the problem and the
solut:i.cnbut a side affect of our intervention might
be to remove the problem. Or, finally, success might
be a chance coincidence between our presence and
the problem being solved naturally.
We can thus see that interpretations can play
one 0f these three roles
. '.~ < •,
(i) A hypothesis
(ii) A di~gnosis or identific8~ions of a
organisations problem.
(iii) An intervention which changes the
situation. The cha~e;es indllced by
interventions must not be considered
necessarily accidental.
;
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We are specifically a.rguin3 here for thp.use of hypot.heses as
(l . . •mechand sras of ch ange , sta.tements made by the analyst, of tel'lknowang
them to be false, in order to chance e situaticn or to obsarve the
client's response. An important special case of this type of
hypothesis would be speculation, par·ticular~y,me.kil}Gstatements as
a l(),;risk 'testing of reality.
~.3.4Practical Problems
Tims, in summary, we have argued that a mode of behaviour
is possible which allows Operational Research to contribute to
the solution of problem~ arising in unstablo situations and
concurrently to draw generalised conclusions about decision making
in tt~se situations. This behaviour is similar to the type now
known as 'uhange agent research' and relies on the use of
interpretations and statements as mechanisms of change rather
than as .iust diagnoses. This \ehaviou~.:. change e'the relationship
between the analyst and the client, making the analyst an
indispensable part of the decision 'makine process.
The adoption of this form of behaviour weakens many of
the safeguards normally attending the analyst. The more critioal ..,
among these whic~ are weakened are the analyst's objectivity and tho
actor's ability to 'ohat over' his side of an argument with the
analyst in an open manner. 1/hen the lOBstor these 'safeguards' ",ere
corupounded with ma.ny new'"errors arisintS as a result of haviDG to lr.ake
decisions under acute time pressure, the p05sibility of an error of
judgement became serious.
Belowiwe have attempted to look in more detail at three
areas which were continuous sources of concern d1Jr1n~ the chance period
in order to isolate' the major hazards. The first concerns errors of
reas~nins caused by ha~ty deoisions. The second a review or other
peopl~'s experience in change agent research. Thirdly the chances
found Lecesssry in the epistemological foundations of the information
used.
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D.4 Nine Possible Pi traIls of Re aeord.ng in Decision }.~e.kinf;Under
Acute time cr-e ssure
As discussed above, during the empirical work of section C
it was f'r-equerrtIy the case that errors in reasoning wer e being made
by the client decision maker and the analyst. When considered e£ter-
wards it was unually the case that these lapses could be attributed
to either 'political' sectional interest or to inndequa~y or the
available information. When th~ could not be 80 explained the
cause was usually thought to be because of the lack of normal
safeguards of having to rethink, 'chew over points', or 'let ideas
;shake down': The errors in this cate50ry tended to fall under
several natural headings and are considered hero so that by beginning to
recognise these pitfalls, we might defend ourselves against their
worst implicntions.
When organising the material unde~"the~e headings frequent
.,I
recourse Vias mate to those developed by SeabcrnJ'ones (68) in another
context.
D.4.l Rationalisation
'Tbe invention of specious reasons to explain irrational
behaviour, or t~e ir.vention of acceptable reasons to conceal
unacceptable ones' S.J. p.214. For example two actors might be
involved in a bargaining relationship and one has received what' was
taken as an insult from the other. He cannot say to himself that
here·is a sufficient reason to break the bargaining.relationshipi
"atter all, .r.e mi8ht say '1 ought not to let my personal feelings
iDrluence my ,business jdugement in that way'. However, he is now
ever watchful of the, others' busine ss behav3.cur and should the other
cause some provocation, he will raise the stondard of behaviour
normally required in order, to' justify to himself that there is '
sufficient reason to discontinue the relationship, purely on the
grounds of the star-derds of· business behaviour.
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~J).;.•. :.4..:...~2 0_v_e_T'_e~y.t.endinf,A~
The sales management; of the fin~ had a quite legitimate
argument for not challenr:ine the merchp..nts sta.tus quo in cflrtai~
areas of the countrJ because o~ their belief in the merchants
ability to retaliate severely. But becaus~ of the difficulty
enoountered with provinE this to t~eir Gclleae.ues on the Firm's
Bo~rd, they we!€ forced i~to a defensive position end began
extending their argument as a dogma to COV&.c the base of a..."ly
change proposed at the merchant level. 'Overextension is the use
of a single principle or theory to explain a range of phenomena too wida
to be· adquately explained, without distortion, by that principle alone'
S.J. p.208.
The method used in section C to overcome this overextension,
attacked the problem in two ways. Firstly it developed a sharper meens
of analysis to ~hat overextension was not necessary. Secondly by
stu~ing the problem of how to measure 'merchant power' the sales
management felt enough support to be able to move away from the
defensive position and begin to' investigate where their arguments
fell down.
D.4.3 All-or~lothin~ Answers
Here a single answer is required to a question which correctly
involves several related questions or an unqualified answer involves
maki."1gan implicit ar.sumption. An example, tha.t frequently occured wi.~n
the analyst was givin~ his opinion on a matter to the Board, was the
question 'Do you or do you now think X?' ,·,where X could be interpreted
.in, several situations ~ This technique: is extremely dang:rQu~ ,when it
i.sused to make some decision about an urgent matter. It was frequently
used by actors for whom the early polarisation of views was advantageous
. '
An answer beginnine 'well, if we consid~r X just in tre context •••• ·,
would meet e response of, 'don't 4tt~rt' ir'a and but ..,
Ii> give a straieht
answer to a straieht question.'.
Psuedo";Scientific
The use of scientific jargon and terminology to cloud the
tentativE. na tur-e ef x·esults. A atat.emerrtin the study was :}'oken
by a senior exectuive to the analyst, 'the corporate chief is
visiting next week will you develop some mathematics to show our
decision about the •••••••••• was correct'.
~D~.~4~.~5 ~~~~o~v~enbleCriterion of Acceptnnce
This is 'the technique of rai3ine the standard of evidence,
confirmation or ppoof required before acceptine or acting upon an
unwelcome decision'. S.J. p.201.
This is fa convenient technique and one which is used univer'sally,
it is difficult to detect and even more difficult to confute, beceuso
standards or evidence ere seldom explicitly formulated' S.J. p.201
Model building in unstable systems req~ires so many wide
•_- i
and ~eneralised assumptions, that an actor intent on wei1dinc this \
technique of varj~ng the criteria of accept~nce can easily ~~ing the
whole process to a stop. Two methods of overcoming this were tried
and to some extent suoeeded. The first was to present as a topio
for general discussion amonest decision makers the havoc that this
behaviour can cause. The second was to persona1ibe the problem by
either the analyst himself, or him encouraging enother actor to
question, during a meetin~, a particular decision maker about why
he feels it necessary to use this technique. It is quite likely
that he was unaware of his own continual use of the technique and
care must be exeroised in case this attack ccused resentment or over
;
·reaotion.
It is well to note at this point· that the recognised use of
this technique can often be an extremely valuable key to all othelwisa
intractable proble, and is pctentially a very :ld.n'hsource of infotrllation.
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An example concerned 11 clecision to try and bypas s a Lur'ge me rche nt
i.n·Preston)seT"!~_nguse rs instead from the depot in Helifnx. '1'1-.e
local salesman produced one by one a stream of rether spurious
reasons why this should not be done, such as his t.rade is predcmimmtly
in 'c!:'.ll-off'accounts makd.ng bJpas~in5 aLmo s'timpossible. These
reasons had all to be checked and found not really to be case.
Aftp.r some time it became evident the.t his continued pr-otect f.on er
the merchant was eoinc beyond t~e bounds ef normal business caution.
After som~ background investi~~tion, the an~lyst disoovered thnt
the salesman and the merchant had been close friends for ye~rs and
on being cmllenged the salesman agreed that this was the case. With
this new information, new options were generated. The trust that
-, existed in the reletionship between the salesman and the merchant
made it possible to negotiate on open terms about w~t to do about
the conflict between tr~ roles of Halifax and Preston. Such
negotiations had been quite impossible before because of the merchant's
defensive attitude.
Seleotive ~vidence
Here inst~ad of attacking a theory,directly, a particular
aspect of a theory is attacked and shown to be unten~ble. This is
taken as refuting the whole theory without making it clear that only
a part is being criticised. ],'orexample in·this study when computer
inv~ntory control for a regional warehouse was mooted, this was
'decisively proved untenable', bya detailed cost analysis of the
number of stock transactions dealt with per week. The frequent
method in inventory control of only controlling the fast-sellinz and/or
hieh-value 1te~3. autom~tically was conveniently not considered, although
it had been. sug~ested by the analyst earlier.
D.4.7 The Vechanistio Pitfall
This is to assume that the springs of e person's action can
always· be traced to external stimuli received py him, rather than by
his interpretation of those stimuli. Attitudes can often
apparently run count.er' or quite independent of these stimuli,
as is vividly shown through the a.nalysis of 'merchant power'
in section A.4
D.4.8 Overenthu.siestic F.ntrenchment
Wh~n pressure was on the decision makers, it was
common for individuals to rush into forming a definite opinion
before all the evidence was really available. Pressure was put on
people, who felt that they had not goy as semb.Ied enough information
to 'come down off the fence'. ~eople who admitted to 'not reallybeing
sure' were made to look -'weakminded' t and weFe not considered
'men of action'. Those that had committed themselves to certain
positions often found!;to,ttheir acute embarassment that, when
new information was brought to light j they:werei defending an untenable
position or perhaps one which they would now not normally
have chosen. This rather ridiculous position was only aggravated
by the charges of 'traitor' or 'fickleness' levied on those who
h&d then attempted to ohange their position.
D .4.9 ' Closure
This is the technique of concentrating only on the options
perceived available and of 'closing the doors' to any new
considerations. This is a difficult error to guard against.
There must alway~ come a time for choosing among alternatives rather
than searchine for new. 'In this work though, it was found that when
decision makers were ~nder actte time pressure the activity that
, ~
su:f'feredfirst was the searching. Frequently seve'rel days would
be spent choosing between the options that were immediately obvious.
It would have be~n conside~ed a shger waste of time to sp~nd the
first day searching for new options, even though when this was done
'it often made ,the choosine; muoh easier subsequently.
Bound up with thilj technique of closure is the phy schc.LogdcaL
need for simplific8tion which is felt by both decision Ulaker and ana.lyst
alike.
Conclusion of Discussion of Pi tf?.lls
Risking the accusation of repeating ourselves we will
stress agaL~ that all the above pitfalls are preoent in some form
in any thinking process, certainly any concerned with the solution
of organisational pDoblems. The point is that there has been no
necessity to train analysts to recognise and hence dilute the
effects of these pitfalls because the normal process of intcllieent
inquiry carried out with a degree of intellectual honesty will do
this naturally. But, when dealin~ with decisions taken under acute
time pressure these normal safeguards cannot be assumed to be
thoroughly active. A summary of.our position would be the following.
,11
In rapidly changing decision situations, analysts need to
be specifically trained to recognise and deal with the pitfalls or
reasoning occuring in groups, as time does not allow the natural
control of i)~ormed soeptisism, reflection and discussion to develop
to a sufficient degree. In these situations ~nalvsts will tend t~..
use hypotheses as much for diagnosis purposes as for explRnation
or prediction.
J
362
D.5 CH1J;G~ N~ENT T:ESRARCH-
Undertaking either e:npirical r-eaearch into strateeic decision
making ·in unstable situations or more simply apflying Operational
Research to a particular example of this activity, both involve the
problem of access to the real decision making process. ChAracteristic
of this type of decision making is it's informality, without"the
CIlsual reliance on working documents and mj,nut~s found with more
formal lone ran~e planning
One solution to the problem of access and hence a way to
undertake either of the above activities is to ensure that the
analyst is an indispensable part of the decision makin, process.
Several practical problems, though follow in the wake of this solution.
Common to both is the availability of such an opportunity.
Mainly of concern to the research side is the problem of divided
.";. • i
loyalties, of whether not not to pursue topics not central to the
clients interest, and there is also the problem of objectivity and of
disturbing the situation in the very act of measuring or observing
it. Principally of concern to the Operational Research prooect is
the changed rate it forces on the analyst, weakening the distinc'tion
between staff and line ro~ and putting him into the position of havine
to defend certain proposals rather than being an unbiased evaluator.
Section D.3 argued that this chaneed role was primarily manifest in making
the ~nalyst use hypotheses for diagnostic Furposes as much a3 for
explanation or prediction. ' Also iintcraction with clients tended to .
become more speculative and interpretative rather than just informative.
Rp.lationships with clients beccme more of a dialogue or
combined effort of formulation or clarification, rather than a
technical service. . ,
Similar problems and the same sort of approach to solutions
has been made independently by other 'l'esea;chers and'it is necessary
.
here .to briefly review their work. Their areas of research are quite
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broad and do not have much in common with that undertaken in this
thesds, but the pr ob'Ie.as they have identified in client r-eLat.Lonc are
very 5imile.r.
This review is intended to be brief end is not comprehensive,
the aim is to gain advice en how we might have tackled the problems
of the analyst-client relationship more satisfactorily. Change
agent research is the generic. title given to research in which the
researcher plays an active role in the decision making process.
Sofer' 5 Therepeutic and Research Work
Sofer (61) indicates that his work had two Coci. 'One was
the provision of help to the organisation - the therapeutic component;
the other was the scientific use of the material to which access was
gained - the research component'. The work was aimed at the analysis
of problems wi thin organisations and to provi~.ing.assistance in
making the necessa~ changes. Concerning the therapeutic component
he makes many comments relevent here. Conce~ning the eternal
problem o~ data collections he says, 'The importance of fact-finding in
this work can, however, be overstated. For one thing the facts I
collected were often new only to me ~ the organisation knew about
them already.' He then makes the point that the mt::l'ecolle ction of
fects may give little help and mentions experiments whereby decision
making about complex iss~ea) may even b~ impaired by providing a
mass of data. The relevance 1 of tl:is latter point is doubtful
because of the uncertainty concerning data, its aggregation and
contextual development into usable information. He continueB;
'Cft~n it was tho process of analysis, the redefinition of the
probiem, the, character of the material mustered, the weights
which different items were given~ which provided 'the most help fol'
adrninis1;rat~rai••••••(these contributed) to th~ olal~if'ication and
explication of the logical basis for conclusions already suspected.
He found himself 'accepting feelings and attitudes as
in any overall a~preciation'.
, .~
Concerning his }.larticipation he notes that it 'helped the r;roups
to·be more objective' and "t c see themselves e.sI saw them'.
When discussing the research component he considered
advanta.ges and difficulties. One advant~ge concerned the
granting of access. 'T~ understand the behaviour of cr{;e.niaetions
it is usually helpful and sometimes essential to undertake field
studies, i.e. the firsthand observation of social events in the
milieu and at the times when these ~~t\.l~.llyoccur. This necessity
derives from the complaxity of organda ational behav Lour (and)
from the limitations of uninformed reflE:ction', (my emphasis) ~
Havine indicated the necessity he describes some reasons why industrial
firms in particu19r seldom grant access to this form of
observation; these include co~~identiality, observ~rs 'eettine
in the way', 'observation implies the possibil~ ty of compa.risons.;. }
that can challenge the rightn~ss end inevitability of existing
practices' and discomfort caused by the actors 'personal conflicts,
setb9cks and defeats' being public ally witnessed. Discussin,
possible strategies for the investigator he notee a limitation on
the mode of approach whereby the investigator is a passive observer,
having been granted access.
,•••••• the observer tends to be exluded from the inner
councila of the leaders of the orcanisation beoause they see little
overlap between his.interests and objectives and their own, and do
not expect a return from him. He must ~onr1ne most of his
;observations to matters of more peripheral concern to them.' This
is a lim~tion that cuts rieht at the heart of the methodolo~ical
difficulties in our own subject field. T.hile listing some of the
diffioulties he says tln.wQ~k of this type the investigator
f.ind! it d1.t'ficult to study any problem except the one pre-
. .~ . . .otloUPyin:e:his respondents. His choice of problem is restricted,·
and this makes it difficult for him ••••••• to execute· a sustained
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prograrr.rneof re seA.l'chon one topic or to pursue 0. re search Lntere st
t.hrough to f:, logical conclusion.' And later, 'Once the "..ork is
in motiCm he for~goes much of his freedom,: of cho Lce in ree:srd
to the order, the timing and the condition::;under which his dAta
will appear'. 'It is moreover, "ea"syfor him to be diverted even
from those research interests with which he started by the urgencies
of problems within the ol·~anisation'. He concludes by adding
an extra warn5_ng tha.t a '••••loss of' objectivity occurs through ••••
Co high det;ree of emotional ~dentification Vlith the (clients),' and
in summe.ry says he doubts if this type of research will ma.ka much
contribution to our theoretical understanding of orgnnisationG unless
, a separate exercise is underte.ken with each major field study in
order to relate it as specifically as possible to a formal body
of knowled~o·.
.: ;
~ennis' ~pproach to Planned Orc~nisa.tional Char~e
W.G. Bennis' Tery important contrib'ltion to this area has
been worked out and developed ,over many years, ~nd disseminated
through many publications. We can Bive nothing except a cursory
inspection of his work, selecting only those parts essential for
our immediate purposes. The major sources will be Bennis (63,
"66a, 66b). l~ost important for us to discuss whAt he sees as
""possible programmes forimplementin~ planned oreanisational change.
He focuses on the three broad types most frequently used.
i) Training
Here he includes laborfltory training end T-group training
as developed for example by Argyris (62) and Blake· and Mouton (64).
The emph~sis of this work is on management to experience through
. "
sroup leborator,y work the process of problem formulation and solution.
In this '8~e' environm~ntparticipants can observe group processes
in action and can evaluate the effect of, for example, leadership,
"distortion, the roles and maturations of ot~.er participants and , in short
'to analyse and beco:ue more sensitive to the processes of hwuan
:~_nteractionand acquire concepts to order and control the ao
phenomena.'. Obse rvat.Lon of these groups provides researchers
with valuable insights into the processes of decision makine;.
But the work is focused on helping the individual decision maker
to perform better over a series of trqin~e sessions. Little
relevo;nt l'es~arch information concerning decision making in
rapidly changing environments could be p'ained in our opinion from
such observations and neithen is the technology of this type of
plsrmed change really suitable to our needs.
ii) C6nsu1tilllO:'
He bases this type mainly on Sofer" s above, and we will
bot repeat ourselves. One point is worth making, referring to
Argyris (62), he describes the way clients conttuually expect
';. i
'answers' or 'solutions' from consultants, somethin8 he is
usually not in a position to give, and ere often disappointed or
resentf'..llwhen none are forthcoming. In our own work we found
this abdication of decision making frequently. An analyst will
sift out unlikely courses of action, generate a few more perhaps
and compare and evaluate these • It' the analyst be&ins to say
"'this is what you must do' the deoision m~ker ceases to make
decision and the point of the analyst~ role is lost.
iii} Applied research
Here research results ere used as an intervention in
'"the system, and beoause of this intervention 'involvement and,
partioipation,in the planning, collectio~, analysis and
interpretation of mere dtta is activated.'
Applied resarch, as defined by Bennis, seems to us such
definition as to ap,1Jlyto almost any type of analytic work
It oerta~ly ,applies to our own work, but
,
gain no benefit from knowing this •
. '-.'
does,stress that these types
on the contrary, most cases involve change acents using ell three.
He .dce s point out that I some change a~:ents repor-t , however, tbat
they work in collaboration vlith others and the.t they divide tbeir
functions'. We must return to this point later.
As criticism of the above he particularly cites that
(i) 'e,llthe approa.ches••• tend to emphasise interpersonal
and group factoI's as casual variables in blocking
prvblem solving a.ctivities, and tend to de-emphasise the
cognitive processes of problem~8olvinc'.
(ii) change agents typically lack explicitness conce mdng
what criteria of oreanisational effectiveness they are
trying to optimize.
(iii) tr.e lack of any real 'theory Gf change' having been
distilled from the existing work is disappointing.,.;.
This criticism does not really apply thouCh to Blake (64).
A final comment from Bennis is, 'Too ~ften, rational elements
are denied or rendered impote~t because they conflict with a
strongly inBrained belief, consciously or unconsciously held'.
Jones' Study
Jones (68) undertook a content analysis of 190 published
accounts of organi8!tional change. His taxonomio scheme for the
study inoluded the type of rd1e:adopted by the ohange agent,
environmental olassifioation, classification of the client 8ystem,
a delineation of the client/agent relationship and some measure of •
the suoess of the ohange. We will review briefly his work only in
I
as far as it,~pinges on our own work. He peroieves two change
agents role distinct from our usage so far, these are the pacema~er.
'His usefulness to an organisat'ional system is his capacity'
to energise or cerry out a,vita10r6anisational function with an
exteI'nal supply of p'ower'•
and the change,'catalyst, which is,
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'Elnegent that causes or speeds up or slow down chance
(catalysis) in an organisational system' 'a small input
of'catalytic influence has significant and widespread affect
in an organisational system' (p.16)
His conclusion concerning change A,gents was that the
most successful were internal to the client system and indigenous
to the clier.t systems socio-cultural envd.r-onmerrt, It 'lould also
function as ari 'economic organisational system', that is have
distinct organisational and fiscal responsibilities.
CODoerning client/agent relationships he concluded •
. 'The most critical dimension 1.'"1 change is the l'eceptivity
of the client system to change. If the r'3ceptivity is high,. then
successful change usually results', and vice versa (p.109). He
also found that 'the greater the magnitude ot:th~ change altera t.ion
, . .
resulted in an even greater Lncree.se in the overall organisational
effectiveness. A majorchan~c alteration should not be a serious
deterring factor •••••••• ,.(p.lQ9) And again, 'mutually set goals
usually resulted in successful change, whe~as the opposite was the
situation where either party dominated the change relationship'. (p.109)
Summarisinc'·what~·tlegained from Jones' study for our own work,
remembering that it was published while this project was in progress:
a) A thoroush discussion of the change agent rate b) the
broad strategic variables ~ely to assist sucoess. But we still felt
we lacked a discussion of the role of the change agent qu~reseerche~.
w~ felt that the strategic variables of II study were still m~re a .
matter of opportunity rather tha~ choice, especially in our own research
-' .,",
area. \'lealso felt that more tactical or operational beh!t"licural\
characteristics of the agent/client relationship would be valuable.
e.g. we felt 'client receptivitY'to be difficult to define or assess
'ina~ particular situation. We .ere elso'sceptical about Jones'
the criticism in Cl k" F . ( )or -;.-'ol'd 70 )elt~ough we
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o.clmowlcdr:es his sienificE..nt reseerch contr-iu'.ltiull in an otherwise
uncharted ocean.
In Cooper (64) and March (64), Leavitt mak~s a couple of
points especially worth recording here. Firstly, noting the
·'r1Inumerablecases where oparat Icne research techniques have fallen
short because they ignored the human side of the enterFrise, he
continues;
'Operations research people can be incredibly naive in their
insensitivity to hurnan feelings. But in another, more gracious
senese, one can say that the technoloe;ical apj.r-oache s have simply
taken a more macroscopd.c , longer view of the world than the people'
(meaning T-group trainine etc.) 'approaches. Better solutions do
getaccepted in the long run, because deeper forces in the economy. .
l·.. ':press them upon the individual organisstion.:.competitive forces,
mainly'. Cooper (64) p.62.
Of course, here, I,eavitt in his turn':..is being 'inoredibly
naive' about 'deeper' and 'competitive forces' finding 'better
solutions' and the quotation reads more like a creed than a work
of scholarship, but he makes his point well ~~ou(h for our prese~t
purposes.
Secondly, when discussing decision-making he sees senstivity
~raining as aiming at 'achieving committed agreement'. On the
other hand he describes structural organisational.theorists as
'locatini precise decision points and assir,ning decision making
responsibility always to individua1s~ Cooper (.64) page.69. . .,.
The research implications of this dichotomy are profound, but
also severely practical. Should the researc~er with
record individuals' aotion or group's
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This is work that bas Lof late come to my at.tention, after
the research project was over sornomonths. I base this brief
review on 3tymne (70a, 70b).
He defines 'client-orientated' or" clinical" Ort;anisati6nal'
Research' as referring,
'to projects where a researcher ••• works in an orsonisa.tion
with the intention of contributing to the solution or some of
the organise,tion' s problems. In addition, durine tr.e course of
the project, the researchers should observe the course of
events, especially with respect to their cwn measures and the
effects of these measures. They should try to link their
'analysis to existing theories and aim towarq.s making their
results puhLi,c in written reports. (70b, p.4)
He gives two main arguments ~or this type of research.
Firstly the access problem.
'Sometimes there is ••• apprehension that the results
(of the project) will dir~ctly dnmage the interests of the
prevailing power group. As a result, researchers are bar'red
from studying the most important problem areas end from access
to the most sens1tive type of data. In a client-orientated project,
the researchers and client try to work out a joint t'oI'Dlulation
of the problan, •• the researcher will gain acoess to detathat
are overwise concealed. lIe might even have an opportunity to
/
,.
observe the decision maiine; of the top rroup in the or~Anisationt
'{my emphasis) (70b, p.s)
Seoondly the dynqmio affect;
,•• •-i.-projectsprovide an' opportuni~y to follow the
organisation for along period 'of time. The researc~ers can test
the validity of their explanations by proposing chaIl{:es.... The
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;,schenr.ttisc..tion::;used by the researcher (or someone lese) are ir..ft.c:t
o~e pr th~ means of bringing about organisational cl:anCIj'(70b, p5)
Ni;) erguI::tent~Fagainstthis type of research he mentions firstly that
'researchers can be l.,bouCht'and counters this vlith tlle ability to
maintain the integrity of research ••••
The second argument
'has to do with the difficult in establishing pxperimental
control and the difficulty in making ecneralisatior.s.'
.He counters this by two proposals one of which we consider to
be somewhat spurious. His first is that 'the control as}Ject is
irrelevant to some extent because organisations Are unique'.
Of' course organisations are unique J and we must use care in
comparative studies, but this merely encouraees us to search for
generalisations and to employ experimental leontrol •. If oreanj.s!'.tior,s
could be identical, the experimental control proble!IIlIould be triyil\l.
He continues, 'Another reason is that the result or a particular chanze
is not determined by a number of experimental situation variables but
by peoples' ways of thinking and reasonina at a certain time'(70b,p6).
He closes with: 'The ability to make generalisations can seldom be of
the. type 'of A and B, then C!. Instead they have to be expressed in an
increasingly developed and coherent language in order to talk about how
organisations with different combinations of properties funotions'(70b,p.6)
We are not entirely olear about the point b~ing m~de here, but we. ,
consider he is confusing the difficulty of castine zeneralisations about·
complex phenomena into the 'modus ponens' form, with the possibility
of doing so.
There are much less Grandiose reasons for suppor t.Ing this
type of rese8r'ch, and these have b":!endiscussed above. Our mC!3t
com""'ol1411P'reason r>.t the t~me "/8S the Lack of a Vl.° ab Le• ,i.J¥ .L V ~ .L' "'-
alternative research method. Vlhich would. yield l'IS much, in as
short a time.
The last pcint that we wish to ~iscucs from his work is a
practical one. IIis rese~rch was conclud.ed in p~irs, one acting
in the advisor role the other as observer. The advnntages,
of r~:sources all0\7 it, are obvious but it is interesting to note
some of the difficultien experienced:-
1) 'The client feels unce::-tainwhen is is treated
differently by representatives of the research Broup'
2) 'The members of the research group run into different
types of problems and therefor5 find it difficult to
understand one another'.
and 3) the moral dilemmi.
'Is it in fact rieht for me to collect data that I know
are not the most urgent when it comes to 301vine the client~
problems' (70b p.9)
We have quoted at some lencth from his work firstly
because of the closesness to our mcthodoloeical conclusiond....
and seoondly as (7~b) is not published at the'time of writing.
,r'
;
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Clark And Fora
Another recent paper in this area is 'byClark and F'ord (70)
again br?ueht to my attention some months after the completion of
the project. Firstly they competently survey the field usinG
as a framework, for considering existing accounts of planned
organisational research, a typolor~ distin~lishing the source
as self-reH)rtin~;; or external reseorch and timing as concurrent
or past facto. The present research is thus self-~eporting and
concurrent. They consider the major methodological difficulties
concerning planned organisational change at th~ present are:
1) the antecedents to planned organisational chanee.
Very little is.re~orted concerning organisational or
technological antecedents prior to entr,y by the
'"t ';researcher 'Thus we can say very little with certainty
'lS to how antecedent condit:1.onshave influenced particuler
examples ••••• ' (p.40)
2) 'Tae handling of conflict'
'Jones is very typical of researchers in.this area who start
by stating that the change agents' service tlu! or.;anisational neE-ds'
end blandly dismiss anY conflict as 'resistance' (to change') (P.41)
3) 'The analytical frameVTorks which consultants use to examine
particular situations; though we do learn about the
frameworks they present to th~ir clients and to the gen~ral
publio' (p.41)
I They then present an alternative approach~ utili sins two research
strategies. Firstly researchers are attached to existing consultancies •
.This is termed a tandem relationship, and may involve one member takinl 0,1
a ~ Tole of researcher and consultant. Secondly proj?ct de8criptiG~s
are juxtaposed to existing published reports and this has led to 'the
. .. .
01 a limited number of hypotheses and is being used to
develop a more flC'.rmtJ.isedr-esee.rch desie;n' (p.45). They repcr t
thet thi s 'tandem rele.tionshil'~,81though thwart with initial
difficulties, which have noy; lareely been solved by two years
experience, is pr ovdng a suitable vehicle to solve the joint
problems of access and concurrent analysis.
Conclusions
The reasons why we adopted the re~earch method under
discussion have already been outlined. Our conclusion can now be
compared alongside other accounts. We found we experienced the
same problems by and large and although the methods and hints
recorded.as solutions have been varied, we believe one major factor
stands out above all the rest. This is, that if it is required
.to study strategic deo~.sion making in rapidly changing situat!ons
empirically in the field then the problem of,;.acc1sscan be solved
satisfactorily by the change agent or the d.ual consultant/researcher
.method. We do not say, can only be solved because we do not believe
this and welcome alternative. suesestions.
Two further points need to be made finally. The first is
the present clRrity on the research problem and the attendant
attempts to surmount them is very much a P03t facto reoognition and
,
interpretation of the thinking pursued in tha heotio days et the
Events were beginning to occur and we had to
decide not only what to do b:,tt how and what to record. The second
is the impossibility of separating our insights from those
Perhaps ~his is alweys the case with
research but we note with interest thet th9 accounts by Stymne,
Clark and Ford and Jones were all published tow~rds the end or tho
project end Sofer was not brought to cur attention until le.te also.. .
.are optimist1c ~then; thC\.t'El· convei-ge~~e or ideas is oc·currinc·and
the development of a sounder and more bro ust methodolo~y
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D.6 }. J)Isr.nS~~I01: ()~: Tl-H: f,CnFr.~m m' P;PCr:~.!:,TIClT-
D\lrin~ the study of section C, when decision~ha.d to be
made urGcvtly i~;Vle.S er..ticipated that we vtould have to we"kp.n our
cri t.er-La of' V1h~t was accept.ab'Le0?te. end ev Ldence , It VlllS Rl ~,o
nnticipatecl that this Vic-uldmost fr~quently occur in tho form of
t.!!l:ir.Z :.;r.~(;.llersa:q;les. Al tihougl; th::'sVIas tI1.1i,it wa s only Fsrt
of thetruth. }.:"r9often i'j:was found necessvry to change the
very source from which .information VIas obtained. This VIas tho case
fo:, several reasons which shall be described by exacp'Les , Firstly
if knowledge of'. the total market t'or a product in a certain area was
required and time and resources me.tlea thorcugh study impossible we
might ask a group of informed people for their estimates. Such
.
people would include salesmen,salesclerks, sales manAcement or
friendly merchants •. Vie could have taken a very small research
sample of the market, but frequently it was f'oundipreferable to
shift our source to thi3 act6r~ estimates.
Secondly, when est~mating the streneth of me~ch~nt cohesion
it would have been impossible to apply the direct measurement
instrument that had been developed, while a change period was
actually in proeress. The ver,y act of applying the instrument could
"have seriously affected the level of mGrchant cohesion. There was
no question here of being forced to take smaller samples, the source
of the information itself had to chan,e.
Thirdly when estimAtine the merchants stockholding matrix,
considerable data would have been necessar,y to obtain a confident
estimate. It w~s found in practice that quite reasonable estimates of
. .
the matrix could be ~iven by salesmen and others who dealt with that
merchant. These results could then be checked for consistency arterwnrds
by predicted reorder distributions with thoso' actuall!p received •
.
Fourthly, a rather different case ~ ';lehave areued elsewhere
....
in unstable systems actors tend to behave in accordance with
situation, which is o,ften considerably volati le,
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rather than as a direct result of economic variables. To
understand such behaviour these perceptlon~ or attitudes must
be measured, and this implies that these sources of info:rm£;tion
are likely to be more relevent bere than in more stable situations.
On the other hand there ware many instances where the time
preS5u:re di.dnothing except force a smaller sample to be taken.
An example is the crude grid search on depot throughput. Only a few
points were estimated and we assumed the curve was reascnably well
behaved between these points.
Having established via examples the way that cur study was
forced to change its sources of information, the question arises Il~
to how to assess the reliability of the information. In most of the
cases this weant in ~rRctice, asking questions about the reliability
of the source. If a salesman has accurately e3timatea markets in thG
past we would be prepared to accept his judee~ent,in this case.
But supposir.g he has never been asked to estimate before, but he
bas been successful on the football pools, what are Yle to think?
What is needed is a 5erie~ of criteria for deciding on the
acceptability of a source. But what form are these criteria going
to take, and presumably these criteria m~ change depending on the
type of information required, the use eor which it is intended and aleo
with the source in question. There arerio:~--llriori·trciunds.ror
assuming these criteria will be consist!nt across all these.
categories of requirements. For eX8.¥ljlle~ifwe wished to know where,
the major competitive activity in the component field will be in 1990
fle/will ask a different person from whom we required to know how many
sold in 1959.
,Because we wer~ intending to rely on informqtion from diverse
it wes important to develop some practical way of assessing
Turnin, to the published literatare we discovered little to
The writers in the field of scoinl research such as
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contributed careful thought and anaJ.ysis to the problem. But they
l~ft us in practice with not much more than a feoling that we must;
1. Try and consider any possible motives for
distortion that the source may have
2. Try and cross-check information when received,
checking particularly for consistency.
3. Prepare the instruments, e.g. interviews or
~uestionaires, very carefully beforehand.
4.' ~aintain research integrity at all times.
Althoueh this is very sound advice it could s~8rce1y be
'termed a significant insight. Another possible attack on the
-
problem was vie. the research done on the 'delphi' m~thod of
8ssessing roliability. The writings of Hel~er and Reacher (59),
Brown and Helmer ( ) and Dalkey ( ) although each Et most
sensible piece of writing in their own field.,.leaye a feeling of
profundity in intent and trivia in actual content. Any version or
the ~dalphi' approach we found quite impossible to use in this context.
~hU5, as far as we are concerned, the question of how to '
8ssess sources remains very much an open one';'requiring considerably
more research effort. Our only conclusion would be alone the followinc
-,
We 'Would expect to find it necessa.rJ to he-ve frequent recourse to
alternative sources of data, especially where that means obtaininc
judgemE;!ntsfrom actors involved. This makes us more concerned about tho
Criteria to judge this ~re not consistent'
and need to be varied with the source, and type of information and ter the; ,
required.
D.7 G}"J":SRAL cm:CLUSIONS
~he gf.meral conclusions cons'i.ated of the followine five
con,j<;)ctures.
1) In ra.pidly changing decision situations, analysts need
to be specifica.lly treinedtto recognise and d.cnl with
the pitfalls of reasonine occurine in groul's, as time
does not allow the natural contr"l of informed
sceptisism reflection and discussion to develop to a
sufficient de~ree.
2) The problem of 8ccess in these situations can be
solved satisfactorily bytthe cbr.nge agent or thel'dual
cc.nsuItant/researcher method.
3) The situation forced the analyst to use hypotheses
for diae;nostic purposes and interpretations AS
mechanisms of change, 95 much for exp~anation and
predlcti~n. Interaction with clients tended to
become more speoulative rat~er than just informative.
Relationships with clients beoame mora or' a dialoeue
or combined effort at fOl"mulaticn or clarification rather
than a technical servioe.
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4) It becomes necessary to have mere frequent
recourse to alternative sources of data, especially
wr.el'ethat means obtaining personal jUdgements of
the situations from ·actors involved. This tends to
shift the concern to the reliability of the source
•
rather than the data itself. Criteria to judge
tbis reliability are not consistent and need to be
varied with the source and type of the information,
and with the purposes for which it is required.
5) The telationship between strate~ic end tactical
decisions becomes more complex in:tuns'table situations,
with the direction of cause and effect influence less
a predominately one way affair. ,
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APPENDICES
Annendix ].
. Extensions to Deal With 'l'he Option to Lst(ib lish :::>cpots
Initially vh en this option. looked a s thou61 it miGht be rof.ovcnt
,SOIre theo!"'.!was developed based on toutendi.jh.' 5 (60) method of
feasible di rections, On actually 9'sl.ng the model it VIas fourn
tha t only once VIasit necessary to consider as many as three depots
ani even in this case it was soon apparent that no more than t ....110
mu]d 00 needed, Most of the time the only concern 'Ims the one
depot case. The theory was then somewhat redundant, as a crude
grid search on the channel floVl th rough that depot was cpite
adequate, Nevertheless thetneoIY will be descrd.bed hare because
of an interesting simplification that wa3 found to be possible.
Representing the cost for depot j as ij. (S.1) where Sj if ttc
flow throUt1l that depot, and letting t (St, ••Sm) to be the optimal
value or the transportation procedure gi~'en that the depot flows
are restricted to be exactly St, ••Sm'
Then the 2-stage/single geoeraphical region problem
M
Min G~) = :Min t tj (S.1) + t (Si' ••S )
.1=1 m. .
such that t S.1' T arx1. Sj ~ 0 Yjj
is;
where T is the total market.
This case can be extemed to the 3-stage, multi-mnrket· case
straigltforwardly, Thus the t8.8lc is to choose a ..vector.§. to satisfy
this lllinimisation. The feasible region has a particulnrly simple
structure" The l'j co.sts are charaoteristically aesoc intaCt.'IIi til
economics of scale and we can expect the familiar local-e,lobal
I prublans of non-convex p:oogramming.
For 11=2the search sur-f'ace is;
'0 ...
,\'le can always rim. an Llitial feasible point thus:-
S. = 0 V. that is all goods go direct or throudt mercha.nts.
J J
Let a feasible point be Sa then too direction of steepest descEnt ,is
-VG ~) I§. = §.o •
. I.OQ,
There are two cases eitheri~ can move.in this direction or we
cannot, let us call the se cases 1md ?.
Case 1
Weare free to movein too downwardgradient 100 thad. to._. ,
one of "Jlrel) things can happen;
a) The one dimensional optimumis reached while still
feasible •
b) ,Sore variable s beoom negative •
. c) The diagonal constraint is brocken ,
For b),
Weonly appr?,ach axis Sj = 0 if'
\
aGeS) > 0 ,.
as j
i.e. M:j(Sj)+ "'.1 - cl> > 0 which ~8 reached atterJwhere .Vj is the
. 8Sj
I '
shadowprice on the flow ~hroutjl 'the j-th de!X)t)a distance sj It;(S)
, Thus case b)' occurs after travelling a distance j
, 0'
fJ = l1!n l' :.,_
J '.!9;(§') ,',ss overall .1 ,.hero
, g j
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'<'le c an only approach the diaGOnal constraint if the neGative
gradient I!IDk8 S an am te ang'Ie with the nannnl to tho constro.i.nt, \'hich
is (1, 1, 1)
Thus (1, 1, •• 1) • qG~) < 0
. rr\ of . (S.) + Z3~ ~ Li "-
i.e. ,> 8s~ J j 't'
.L..J' J
j
The distance to the 00113 traint 13 T-~S~and. thus it is met ·a.:rtcr
j
a distaroe.
oe- = T-ES.
j J
{ M~ -EV.- E atj(.s.) 1
j J j as Jj .
WeCM simplify this a little, for we know that
cl> I- 0 only wren T-tS~ = 0
j
Thus we have:
,.
.:
choosing the least of' these A: min «(.8) we are then interested
whetha- C./S)achieves a minimumon the closed interval [8 ,S - AVG(S ))
\!! -0 -0 -0
To determine this any of' the simple one dimensional eearch rothcds
. 1s appropriate.
Case 2
If we cannot move in the direotion -VG(.§)then we are lyine o·n
. / ore or seve!rel constraint 5, eni the negative e;ra.aient veotor is
.crossing it into the infeasible region. l£t us denote the aoti vo
variables by A •. Then ir we let £ be a veotor in whose direction we
can move we knovl thnt ri> 0 for all i/A.
393
al.so if the dweonal constraint Le ncll ve then (u1Y paint in ttl;! !
clircction nust ru. 80 eo.tisty it thus ,
(1,1,•• 1) (S~ + A£ ) = tsj + AIr. 'T
j 0 j J
thus l:r. ~ 0
j J
';le also need to nonnalise £ thus 1: r~= 1 an1 also to minimise
j
the al13le between r and the domwnrd pointinc e;rndiont vector, or
4 .' .. ; • ~
equivalently to maximise the cosine of the anGlo between thell; thus
we must find minVG(S) • .!
~'lritine V,G<!)= .!! the problem is min ,!.£ such that I: rJ ,0 it
j
dbe;onal constraint active
ani ri ~0 for, all 1 I A
and also I: r~ = 1
j
There are three cases to consider;
Case A) only axes A active, diaconru. not 8.ctb-e see diAgrrun be1o.'q
~'l
Here, A • {21. In this case "0 must alwt\ys Mve r
1
• 0 V 1 lA
and such that 8.i ~ O~ Our problem thus bocOInOa
2
min 1: airi such that tri • 1
1~" 1~.
I
r1'~ 0 5,C.
where B • A \J { 1/1/A. am A1.( 0 J.A\JC
These equation" hAve the aolution
r1o• aa!. i,B
• 0 1/B
mere cCis a normaliacrct, - l/('Ca2{\
lenl
Case u) wher-e only the diagonal constraint is active a s j.n the
o 75'
As the downward.gr,:uiient points into the infeasible reGion,
Z a. < 0, and that a feasible direction r must satisfy ~ri = 0 ,
i J.. - i
\"'21 ~. \'~ r.= an~ mJ.n ~ a.ri•• J. .• ~
J. J.
This has the solution ri = a (ai - a:) Vi
Case C) This was whenwe lie in a corner, as below;
S~
(i) This we treat as case B and moveup the diagonal.
(ii) Here we are at a local optimum
(iii) This we treat as case A and movelOIlBtl"e axis •
•..~
Thus in sumrnar,r,it is seen that the principle difficulty in
the use of ZoutendijA~s method, that of hB:vingto solve the quadratic
programmingproblem in order ix> find feasible directions in case (2)
has been overcome. In this case the equations have been suff1c 1ently
simple to permit r.n analytic solution. In adaition to this the function
evaluation at each staee gives the eradient direction and gives all
tll3 information necessary to calculate the feasible directions.
I
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APPENDIX T~'JO
APPENDIX2
DOCUMENT 1-
COMPROMISE PROCEDURES USED IN THE &\RGAINING
RElATIONSHIP.
General Instructions.
1. The researcher is advised to try and keep to the
topics of conversation as listed here. If the client
is getting impatient and has other appointments it may
be ne~essary to jump some of the early topics but topic
4 must be included, otherwise' t~~ results are useless.. . . ~.'I.
The researcher should then try and fill in from context
wha t he can of the others. Sil4lilarremarks apply if the
client is becoming bored or losing interest to a degree
that might cause the interview to terminate prematurely.
But in this case an attempt should first be made to regain
the clients interest by int~oducing other neutral topics.
Suggestions are ~in~ S.E.T., against decimalising,
neutral on metrification unttl~. the client states his
position, sadness about: the economic recession" be 1D!orn'ed
about the growth or decline of local industries, the'raising
of the price of the Road Fund Licience is I1diculous, and
"the new laws for lorry drive~ls hours are going to 'put a
lot of small men out of business'.
If the client wishes to 'BO off on a tangent' in the
discussion, then follow him some of the way but beware of
~O'7
/ ./1
those who do this intentionally rather than answer your
·questions. A firm, 'now 1 shall have to get on with my
questions, otherwise 1 shall.be wasting too much of your
time', has been found useful in the past. Make sure you
return to the correct place.
2. Personalise this document as much as is necessary.
If the client is clearly interested and thinks the questions
are sensible, make it appear that you were really the key
figure in d~veloping it. If the questions are falling
rather flat,or are inappropriate, or just sOlmd rather
silly, be the first to mention this. If necessary disscciate
yourself from the document, but make sure you stay with ~. ....
client. Good comments are, 'this is just th~ sort of thing
those backroom boys are always dreaming up', 'goodness
knows who could have thought this question up' or '1. think
that the person who wrote this was trying to get at ••••••,•
•
A good technique is to try and create an anticlimax.
Thus on one question s.ay, '1 bet you won't be able to keep
a straight face when you answer this da~t question'. If
you do manage to generate soma laughter, at an appropriate
time go to the next point with 'now to some more serious
questions'. :
If you do per~onalise or depersonalise the document
record this un,der tother notes', for future applications.
3. Try to estimate ·the time the client has available
before starting, and plan the interview to fit this.
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4. Know the document thoroughly beforehand. It should
be totally unnecessary for you to refer to the document
other than to read results. DONIT SHUFFLE PAPERS OR.....----- --
CONTINUALLY SCRIBBLE RESULTS DURING THE CONTO\CT PERIOD.- ---- -- __._...,___.
This has been found to be most important, to maintain a
working relationship.
5. DO NOT FORGET TO RECORD THE DATE.
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TOPIC 2.-- IDENTIFICATION OF REV\TIONSHIP.------ ___.-------
Name of
contact
Channel
direction
- .,---Level of
contact
Freq. of -,contact
-
'. _ ..-- .., ..
Name of.. . , •.'contact It i
Channel
direction
Level of
contact ...~
Freq. of
contact
Notes :--
Name sufficient to identify
,(towards market = T
(
(away from market = A
Channel direction
Level of contact (salesmen = SM, salesclerk = se
(
~supervisOry = sv, manageral = M
(other please epecify.
A couple of times
Estimate per year =
!~01
TOPIC 3.
This must be led into carefully, most clients not
being prepared to admit beforehand that most of their
day is spent in reaching agreements on individual orders.
Firstly for each group of contacts what; factors are
of principal interest.
Prime = 3, average = 2, little = 1, not relevant = O.
Group
Quantity
.,
Discount
-
Credit
Price .-'.
G.M.
Delivery
Quality
Availability .
. _.
Min.Order Size
"
.. -
'I·O?
IOPIC l~
RE.t\CHING A N AGREEMENT.
If at all possible this topic should move from the
particular to the g£~.rleral.Suggestions are to encourage
him to take recent examples of orders, perhaps the day
before's, and discuss each one in particular to them to
try aod lead into the general framework. If this isn't
possible he may be able to recall recent orders from
memory and disc\.\ssingthese might gi\1e a lead-in. If
neither of these are possible it will be necessary to
prompt him on the particular. Start by getting some
estimate of the three categories be:low~;
% Freq.
No disagreement
Compromise found
No order placed because agreement impossible
This is likely to be very crude in practice, i.e. 50%, 25%,
or 33~% for eachjbut it is most important in be6inning to
get an idea of 'scale of seriousness' in the clients mind.
Having established this, it is possible to begin to subdivide
each of these categories. If the client wishes to extend the
I
list to more categories do, not discourage this but invent
whatever notes are required to record this. If the client
wishes to 'bracket together' some categories attempt to
persuade him against this. Eave ready sensible e~amples to
4-03
show how different the categories can be. Do not push this
persu~ding as far as to reduce general co-operation. .It is
more important to get some results, however-crude rather than
risk antagonism and get nothing. At all times use the typical
comments listed below. Do not use the 'type' name, unless the
client becomes particularly interested in it, and only then
mention it in passing.
1. No disagreement.
2. Splitting the difference; both sides are prepared
to give a little; meet each other half-way; this is
reaching an agreement on one factor.
example: One proposes a price of £2 each, the other £1.5
'..
and they agree on £1.S'. No other product
characteristics. entering the bargain •.
3. Straight compromise; this is trading-off one product
characteristic against another.
examples: 1 will let you have that discount for double
the quantity.
1 can't meet those terms unless 'you can reduce
your credit balance.
I can let you have half that quantity now and
the rest later.
4. Parallel trade off; thic ~.~trading-off one order
against another; sometimes on the same invoice.
examples: If you are prepared to wait for your other
order we will be able to get this one for you.
As 1 am buying all these things from you
1 would like a discount, otherwise certain
items 1 would prefer to purchase elsewhere.
We can do that if you are prepared to wait
until we can deliver both orde~at once.
5. Sequential trade-off; this is trading-off over a
period of time.
examples: If you place a regular order for these, we
can give you an extra 2~%.
1will give a bit on this order as a favour,
but 1111 ask you to remember that for next
time.
Unless you can begin to reduce your credit
balance, we will have to reduce your discount.
We can meet those terms if you are prepared
to contact a call-off agreement.
6. Stonewalling; one side refusing to give way. other
than a very minor amount. Otherside finally to give in.
7. Repeating; cannot reach agreement, let us both think
it over for a while before talking again.
8. Mediator; a.mediator is sought in order that agreement
might be reached. Often this means each,client passing
·the didagreement to his immediate senior •
..
9, Failure to agree on this order. ·The account is
pre&umedto be still secured.
10. Failure to agree on the order with the customer
discontinuing his account. Breakdown of the bargaining
relationship.
When estimating the frequency of each type it is
best to try and make tho client give a number for each, .
converting this to frequencies afterwards. It will usually
be necessary to go down the list several times comparing one
with another. Thus you would ask, for two types which have
both beon allocated the same number, 'so these happen about
equatlyoften?'. When it is possible to do this estLmation
using invoices from several days or weeks orders the whole
problem is much simplified.
1. No disagreement. .---
2. S~lit the difference.
3. Straight compromise.
i4. Parallel trade-off. I--r-- -·-1s. Sequential trade-off.
6. Stonewalling.
7. Repeating.
8. Mediator. I
9. Failure. .
10. Breakdown.
-Contact.
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TOPIC 5
Record any other comment3 or gossip that you think
may be relevant. Also include any advice for future
visits, e.g. enquire about his family, or his health.
End of document.
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DOCUM8NT 2
M&.s\SUREMENT OF THE HERCHANTS COGNIT!VJ!',.
POSITION.
General Instruction~.
Tr4ediscussion can be fairly unstructured. There is
no need to follow the topics in the correct sequence if it
seems easier to do otherwise. Giv~:an{overall view of the
sort of cognitive positions possible. Illustrations are
often best done initially by using extremes to make the
point. Try and hav,eprepared examples of merchants whose
position is well known and who is likely to be known to the
client. Many clients find it necessary to adjust their
answers after comparison with other's estimates.
J~OB
tOPIC 1
Thorough description of client.
Name of researcher.
Date of contact.
IQPIC 2
+2
+1
;
I~09
VERTICAL TO\'l~RDS USERS.
I don't identify at all with the user. The
user's problems are his own, I have no interest in
them. User~ can co~e fro~ where they like, I have
no particular segment of the market or industry
that 1 specialise in. If the user doesn't like
my terms he can go eLsewhere, In my dealings ,,~ith
the user 1 act as the manufacturers selling agent.
I still consider myself primarily the manu-
!acturer's agent, but I try and fit in with some
". 'of the users requirements, for example, I persuad~d
the manufacturer to keep a certain item in the
standard produc~ list for a certain big user.
o It's my job to try and balance out the needs of
the user and the supplier. Neither gets priority
treatment from me, I try and stay fair to both. I
represent the needs and problems of each side to
the other.
-1 I find myself frequently representing the users
'a~ainst the manufacturer. I know more about the
users problem and know them better personally than
I do the supplier. The user trades with me so that
I can protect his supplies and do any chasing or
progressing necessary.
-2
L~10
I fu'n effectively tho user's a3cnt. I protect
his supplies and prices. I stay in business by
making the users needs and vt.ews, my own needs and
views. 1 have frequent contact with the user and
we have made many contractual agreements on supply,
including several made informally. He helps me out
where he can with lorry maintenance and in return
1 look after his interests.
!QPIC 3
-2
-1
ll'11
HORIZONTAL Tm-1~RDS OTHER MERCR~NTS.
The other merchants are my worst enemies.
Competition is cut-throat between us. You have
to be continually on your toes to stop them
grabbing business.
1 have some interests in co~~on with other
merchants. We get together to talk over general
business problems such as the trades description
aet , or lorry drivers hours. '{ehave made a joint
contract to have all our addini mIc's changed over
for decimalisation. But underneath this we realise
that we each grow at the others expense, we are
competitors and often bitter ones.
o We know each other socially and met at various
trade association meetings. We help each other out
in times of emergency. Often 1 will drop off the
odd parcel for another merchant if 1 have a van going
that way.· If 1 don't have a part in stock, I might
,ask anothe~ merchant to loan me one temporarily •
.Persistent and del~berate poaching will cause
sev~re retaliation, but general competition is
considered fair game. .\
· +1
L~12
We know each other's specialities aridtry to
keep to them. We co-operate quite extensively,
helpin3 each other out where possible. Poachiug is
not looked upon kindly and severe pressure could be
applied if indulged in persistently. New entrants
tc the field ~re not encouraged. We all have our
own accounts and tend to stick to them. New users
are fair game to anyone; but the wcrd usually goes
round beforehand not to touch anything above a
certain %. If free competit~on was allowed, we
would all go out ,of busine~s, and the cost to the
customer would rise in the long ter.m•
.;.
+2 We act as one voice. Ue carve-up the custom,
agree on servicing and discounts. We act together
against new entrants and deviants.
Note: It'is important to remember on this topic
........
that we need to measure w~at people !~l
the situation is, not necessarily what "it
actually is. These comments must be used
as cues or levers to focus the comments of
the client.
}-\,1;;
VERTICAL Tm-1~\RDS SUPPLIERS.
+2 +1 o -1 -2
Each ara to be interpreted in the same way as
in Topic 2, but the role of the users and suppliers
must ba revarsed. It will be common for aberrant
results to occur, and this should not worry you.
Many clients will claim to be +2 or. both, or -2 or
both. To isolate this it is bette'r to separate the
application of Topic 2 and 4 which have 'been purposely
separated by the discursive Topic 3.
•
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TOPIC 5
Record any other comments or observations that
you consider relevant. Also recording hints or
advice for future visits to this merchant.
1~15
I.Q.PIG 6
Try to arrange a visit to the storeroom and make
a crude estimate of the 3tockholding in the following
manner :-
1) Are shelves 3, 4 or 5 high.
2) Walk at a steady pace.
3) Recoz-d paces for each colour code for our goods.
4) Try and make estimates for other goods •
.5) Count nuu~er of stoc~~en.
6) Count number of salesclerks •
• : i
7) Remember and record any stockhandling equipment.
8) Ask or estimate type and number of vans.
Before or after the visit try to arrange to observe
the merchant's premises for a period. Notice and record
the registration number of any customers or suppliers
vehicle. Also record any firm's vans with identification
names.
, End of
